The Press FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1943. Tunisian Round-up

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23947, 14 May 1943, Page 4

The Press FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1943. Tunisian Round-up

The thunderbolt drives which car-| ried the Allies to Bizerte and Tunis j were so far from being spent in those successes that, within a very few days, enemy resistance has everywhere been crushed, notably on the Cape Bon peninsula and in the Zaghouan area. The general picture of operations is in most respects clear and complete; and, as it has been filled in, it has revealed more and more impressively the power of the Allies’ arms, the skill with which they were co-ordinated, and the strength of the plan that engaged them. It seems beyond doubt that the Germans were wholly unprepared for the speed and power with which the American success at Mateur and the Ist Army’s at Massicault were developed. Though the possibility remains that the Bizerte defences had been stripped of their fixed artillery, it is still safe to say that the Germans counted on time to draw off their main forces to this base and that the remainder, having held the left flank and covered' Tunis as long as was necessary, were to fall back on the peninsula. But any such calculation was wrecked by the speed with which the centre was smashed in and all cohesion in the Axis defence destroyed, from Bizerte to Tunis. The only way out for the forces near Tunis was east to the peninsula: and any chance of their linking up with the left flank units opposite the Bth Army was denied them by the Ist Army’s pounding on to Grombalia and Hammamet. In total result, one body of the enemy was isolated at Bizerte; another, near Tunis, with smaller groups scattered between; a third, on the peninsula; and a fourth, on the Zaghouan mountain front. The third and fourth groups resisted longest; but it is not surprising that resistance has been brief. Command and supply organisation must everywhere have been destroyed or damaged beyond recovery. Several points are worthy of remark. First, what was achieved was not merely a brilliant co-ord-ination of all arms, land, air, and sea, but what is even more difficult, the co-ordination of several different army groups—British, American, and French—and their commands. The augury for future joint operations is an encouraging one. Second, the air and n,aval arms had secured perhaps the most favourable possible conditions for the final assault and its swift and sweeping success. The bombers had hammered the Axis troops and their supply bases and supply lines; they had, it appears, made the Axis air bases in Tunisia almost unusable; and the Luftwaffe’s enterprise from remoter ones was heavily restricted. The naval arm shared the task of impeding Axis supply and is mainly responsible for the safety of the Allies’. In the development of the assault and in reducing the divided enemy to surrender, unchallenged air power clearly played a large part. Finally, whether the naval and air arms are to be credited with convincing the Axis that it was useless to plan any large-scale sea evacuation or with preventing any attempt to carry out such a plan, the credit is equally high. Attempts to escape by sea seem to have been few, on a small scale, and futile. Certainly, the land forces allowed the Axis little time to attempt more. But means and will were probably less. The Germans could not risk the Luftwaffe, the Italians would not risk their ships, to cover an evacuation; and without air and sea cover to attempt it would have been to invite catastrophe.