The Press THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1943. Arakan Front

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23946, 13 May 1943, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1943. Arakan Front

Since the end of March and particularly during the last three weeks, the news from the Arakan front in Burma has indicated that the light forces which struck in late last year have been obliged to extricate themselves from increasing difficulties. Their early successes were surprisingly easy and rapid: so much so, it may be surmised, as to encourage an advance further east than had been intended, to the Kaladan. Trouble first began here, when the Japanese began to reinforce from the Chindwin area as well as up-river from Akyab; and simultaneous reinforcement of the Japanese on the Mayu peninsula, which had never been cleared, added trouble to trouble. It is plain that the Japanese have continued to press their advantage against forces which were never strong, have been Mainly scattered, and are maintained by exceedingly difficult supply lines. The advantage has been pressed far. Euthidaung was lost when the Japanese, west of it, cut the Buthi-daung-Maungdaw road. Attempts to clear the road, some days ago, were useless. Two questions have yet to be answered: whether the Euthidaung defenders were withdrawn in time or have fought their way out, and whether Maungdaw can be held against attacks which may develop in rear as well as south and west. The operations of five months have swung back to the area where they began, and nobody suggests that this has happened according to plan or without sharp setbacks and severe losses. But Rome radio, which must look far for comfort, has found it in the renewal of the “ threat to “ India’s east door.” This comfort will soon cool, There is no reason to believe that the Japanese reinforcement approaches the assembly of an invading army, nor that the Japanese plan now an enterprise which they did not attempt in much more favourable circumstances. On the contrary, they are heavily occupied in two other theatres and they are well aware that India has been greatly strengthened and can now be strengthened much more rapidly; and it seems safe to assume that their object is, first, while the task is relatively easy, to increase the difficulties in the way of any major offensive against Burma and, second, to confirm their hold on Akyab, particu’arly. Referring to Akyab, the Calcutta correspondent of the “ Daily Express ” suggests that the penetration has ended in failure because no sea-borne atta’ck on this base was made. It could have been made, “ if the available “shipping had not been needed for “the African campaign”; and if it had been made, and succeeded, “ the “Japanese could not have counter- " attacked strongly enough to push “us back.”'These are not useful ifs. The thrust was planned in known conditions, precluding a sea-borne attack on Akyab, and in accordance with them; The cause of its failure —and failure is perhaps*too big a word—should therefore be looked for inside them and not beyond. Nor is the correspondent much more helpful when he does confine himself to them and suggests that the troops used were too few and insufficiently trained. One of the declared objects of the expedition was lo give troops the practical training of experience in river, mountain, and jungle warfare. Other correspondents have testified to their aptitude. As for numerical strength, that was determined by the limited extent of the objectives and by the appalling difficulty of reinforcing and supplying. The early success and development of the thrust are fair presumptive ground for the theory that this initial calculation was well made. It may. however, have been thrown out if the advance was carried, as has been conjectured, too far beyond the limits originally set. There is, in fact, some reason to suspect this apart from the course of events on the Kaladan. “The Times” correspondent on the Arakan front, at the end of February, reported that unexpectedly hard fighting had been necessary to recover tactical features at Rathedaung and Donbaik, because they had been “left unconsolidated,” on the supposition that the Japanese had “ run away.” This premature supposition, in one form and one sector or another, is enough to account for the reverse, in its origin and culmination, and perhaps does largely account for it. School Leaving Age Some weeks ago the Minister of Education stated that, if the country had to wait for teachers and buildings enough before raising the school leaving age, as it has waited for 20 years, it would have to wait too long. He had, therefore, instructed his officers to pursue certain possibilities of acting at once, even if in stages. He was able to announce in Christchurch, on Tuesday, with the Prime Minister’s cordial assent, that there will be action at once, and proposals to advance the leaving age to 15 will be put before Parliament when it meets. This decision is welcome, not less so because it is made at a time when difficulties may be greater than they would have been earlier. The Minister must know very well that the building programme has been so cut down and delayed that accommodation, next year, will be far from adequate for an increased roil number, and that the problems of reorganisation will have to be tackled while hundreds of teachers are on war service, many of the ablest and most experienced among them. Nevertheless, his boldness is thoroughly justified. If this reform is not undertaken now, it will be undertaken too late to be as useful as it ought to be in certain respects. .The tendencies which are carrying

children prematurely into employment, and often into unsuitable employment, are very strong. They cannot be effectively controlled unless the school leaving age is raised. Beyond that, it will sooner or later be necessary to ease and speed the process of rehabilitation by. checking the competition of juvenile labour; and, more important still, it, will be increasingly important to build up the country’s resources of skilled labour, and the best foundation is adequate schooling. The fundamental reasons for the reform have existed 'and been urged for many years. It ought not to be introduced, and it is not being introduced, because new or different reasons appear in an emergency, but because these emphasise and reinforce the primary ones, as they do. The difficulties will not be small; they can be overcome by the spirit which accepts them as the conditions of an opportunity much greater.