The Press “THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1943. Preparations In Bulgaria

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23917, 8 April 1943, Page 4

The Press “THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1943. Preparations In Bulgaria

The recent meetings between King Boris of Bulgaria and Hitler reported by correspondents of “The “Times” and the “Daily Express,” with the suggestion that Bulgaria is tp be used by the Germans as a defensive bage, again indicate the importance of Bulgaria in Hitler’s strategic position. Originally, Bulgaria’s military contribution as an Axis satellite was confined to the occupation of parts of Greece and Jugoslavia and the guarding of the Turkish frontier. The strength of Slav sympathy among the Bulgarians was one reason why they were spared the tasks to which the Rumanians and Hungarians were sent in Russia. But towards the end of last year, addressing the Sobranje, King Boris said, vaguely enough, that the army was becoming “ more efficient,” and was “ready to fulfil its duty”; and the hint was developed in January by the President of the Sobranje, Kalfov, who warned his countrymen to prepare to sacrifice their lives. At the same time German officials in Sofia began to speak of a “ special “ task devolving on Bulgaria." Axis pressure, in other words, was being hardened; and the sequel may appear in yesterday’s report of recent riots, in protest against the dispatch of Bulgarian troops to the Russian front. The roots of anti-Axis feeling and demonstrations, however,' lie deeper than that. The Bulgarian people has no liking for the course on which it has been led and no enthusiasm for the territorial rewards which were its empty promise. The peasant movement, though leaderless and voiceless now, is a genuinely popular movement; and the peasants, who at first found Axis domination tolerable, because it gave some stability to their economic life, have found it increasingly intolerable, as the Germans have exacted more and paid less. Finally, the belief is probably spreading in Bulgaria, as fast as in any other Axis-controlled country, or faster, that the Axis faces defeat. The mood of Bulgaria, however, may be revolutionary without generating the will or the means to obstruct Hitler’s plans and Bulgarian co-operation in them. This dates back to the period immediately after the conquest of the Balkans, when Bulgaria’s part m the Nazi consolidation was the internal one of improving the country’s military communications system, chiefly towards the Aegean. While Hitler was convinced that victory over Russia was only a matter of months, and that no threat existed to German control in southeastern Europe, the Bulgarians were left to carry on this work in their own way. Whep he saw that Russia was not to be defeated before the end of 1942 and when the tide of ,W3r .definitely turned against him, he set about transforming Bulgaria into a defensive bastion from which, if necessary, an offensive could be launched against the southern shores of the Black Sea. German engineers took over the supervision of road construction. The programme, now urgently pressed forward, extended to Thrace and Macedonia, threatening Turkey. The total design was to stretch German strategy, from Berlin, through the Balkans, to the Middle East, through one complete road and rail system, with the river highway of the Danube as an important auxiliary. In this scheme, Bulgaria would of course be a vast servicing station and supply base. New urgency has been given to it in recent months; and in its latest phase, in which its defensive use against possible Allied attack is projected, Bulgaria’s military aid and the control of the civil population are directly involved. Hitler’s meeting with King Boris was no doubt arranged on that account.