The Press MONDAY, APRIL 5, 1943. Eden and Hull

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23914, 5 April 1943, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, APRIL 5, 1943. Eden and Hull

The close of Mr Anthony Eden’s conversations in Washington, not with Mr Hull and Mr Roosevelt only but with Mr Litvinov and Mr Soong, has come without any very significant disclosure of their course and result. The British Official Wireless, which observed enigmatically that no difficulties that “could be foreseen were “evaded” in Mr Eden’s conversations, suggested that they advanced “towards the preparation of firm “ground for wider exchanges”; :t said more positively that they were “intended to lead to a four-Power " agreement which would be a solid “ basis of the general system of “security and co-operatioh”; and it said that Mr Eden had “presum“ably” invited Mr Hull to consider the Anglo-Russian treaty as “the “ necessary precursor of a wider “ agreement.” These well tamed phrases do not say much; but they imply, it is clear, that agreement among the United Nations is too loose to be safely called agreement. The implication makes a depressing background for Mr Eden’s farewell announcement that he and Mr Hull “ thought alike ” on problems facing Britain and the United States and that he departed with “ new under- “ standing ” of American policies and ideas, and for Mr Hull’s praise of Mr Eden’s “ real contribution ” to their common cause. The praise may be just. The conversations that were “ only tentative ” may have passed that stage, the preparations may have been solid, the advances sure, the prospects encouraging. They need to be. What the British Official Wireless message implied has been written large during the days of the Washington talks. Mr Eden himself, in his speech at Annapolis, considered it expedient to appeal to China not to “mis- “ doubt ” her allies. This appeal was prompted, no doubt, by Madam Chiang Kai-shek’s comment on Mr Churchill’s recent statement, which raised the possibility that, after the defeat of Germany, Britain may be able to demobilise partly while throwing into the Pacific theatre all the weight necessary to crush Japan. American press reactions to this part of Mr Churchill’s speech have been disturbing, not because they are critical reactions but because the line of criticism is one that endangers public support for unified strategy; and the danger Was not lessened by Mr Hull’s answer to a press conference question, whether Mr Churchill’s reference to partial demobilisation coincided with American views. “ America,” he said, “ stands for the “ defeat of both ends of the Axis — “ Europe and the Orient. I do not “ care to go into details.” Mr Curtin has just said that, whether Australia “ likes it or not,” the holding strategy in the Pacific must be pursued. Dr. Evatt, however, has turned his Leader’s acceptance of it into a warning grave enough to sound contradictory. He spoke of the risk of invasion to Australia or New Zealand as one involving “ an “ unspeakable disgrace ” to all the United Nations, after the Dominions’ service. “ The United “ Nations have duties to Australia “ and New Zealand,” he said, “ as “we have to them.” If this was not intended as a charge of neglect, it should not have been said. If it was intended as a charge of neglect, it would have been better left unsaid. Again, while the Chicago “ Tribune ” continued its policy of antagonising Americans to their allies, the British Dominions- and Russia, Mr Maisky, in London, repeated, in effect, Stalin’s recent charge against Britain and the United States. When the German counter-offensive began, Stalin told the Russian armies that they were fighting “alone”; Mr Maisky declared that Russia was still “wait- “ ing ” for aid. These are all indications of an anxious want of full accord, among the United Nations, on the conduct of the war, or even of the assent which, after different views have been discussed, should be wholeheartedly given to the one that prevails. Accord or assent, it is wanting because the machinery of consultation and planning on the highest levels still remains imperfect; and while it is, German arms and German propaganda both fight an easier war and a more hopeful