The Press FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1942. Russian Offensive

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23806, 27 November 1942, Page 4

The Press FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1942. Russian Offensive

The remarkable gains north-west and south-west of Stalingrad, achieved by the Russians in the last few days, have given a new prospect not only in the fighting for Stalingrad, but in the whole Russian campaign. The Russians, at an early estimate, have killed at least 40,000 Axis troops, and captured another 51,000, together with great quantities of enemy equipment. They now threaten to isolate the large German forces massed before Stalingrad, whose main lines of supply, along the westward railway across the Don, and the south-westward railway down through Kotelnikov, are both cut, the one initially near Kalach, and the other at Abganerova. The Russian attacks appear to have developed simultaneously from Serafimovich, on the Don, in the Kletskaya area, 110 miles north-west of Stalingrad, and from near Abganerova, on the railway about 50 miles south-west of the city. The northern thrust has now penetrated about 80 miles, past Chernyshevskaya, to cut the westward railway at new points about 40 miles west of Kalach. The thrust from the south appears to have begun with the capture of Abganerova and to have swept on 50 miles to the north-west, resulting in the capture of the railway junction of Krivomusginskaya and of Kalach. Apart from these notable territorial gains, placing the Russians in favourable strategic positions for removing enemy elements within the jaws of their pincers, the most striking single feature of the Russian advances is the large number of Axis prisoners captured. These include not only Rumapians, but, according to latest reports, three complete German divisions, suggesting not only that the Germans have been taken by surprise, but that there has been a considerable breakdown of the morale of German troops. Some changq in the general situation before Stalingrad was expected when the period of heavy frosts and snow began, but certainly nothing on the scale that these Russian successes promise. Some reports suggest that when the Russian attacks began the Germans were already engaged in a withdrawal of their forces from the Stalingrad area, in preparation for the establishment of secure winter lines. Such a prepared withdrawal, in spite of the continued attacks in Stalingrad, is not improbable, for similar German winter preparations were under way before Moscow in November last year, even while at the two arms of their thrust towards Moscow German pressure seemed unabated. The maintenance of the offensive at the furthermost points of advance was necessary then partly to cover the withdrawal of the main body of men and material in the centre, and partly for •political reasons, as a show of victory at Moscow was needed to influence Japan to join in the war. Even though the Russian advance from Moscow last year was reported to have begun a week or two after the German withdrawal was well under way, the Germans probbably held on too long, as they may have done again at Stalingrad. This year the Russians have struck sooner, and if the Germans had begun any withdrawal, they were apparently caught with the operation at a particularly vulnerable stage. How the new Russian offensive will progress must depend not only pn the forces and equipment the Red Army has available, but on the nature of German reserves, the extent of disorganisation resulting from surprise, and the morale of German and other Axis troops in the area. The most immediate gain is likely to be the relief of German pressure against Stalingrad—in itself an important gain. If, however, a continuing advance over the whole area within the Don bend can be developed, with a thrust towards Rostov, then the main line of communication for the Axis forces in the Caucasus will be threatened. Already the German attacks from the Nalchik area in the direction of Ordzhonikidze have met with reverses, and little or no progress has been made round Tuapse on the Black Sea coast. Faced with new dangers on the Don, the Germans are not likely to be able to spare the forces needed to end the stalemate in the Caucasus. Last year the winter campaign improved the Russian line all the way from Leningrad down to the Sea of Azov. In the north, down past Rzhev and on to the region of Orel, the Russians still hold the territory they then gained. From Orel downwards the Germans this summer regained all they lost last winter, pushed on with the great bulge enveloping the Don elbow and out to the Volga at Stalingrad, and thrust south to occupy half the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian north of the Caucasus mountains. Now the Russians at the beginning of another winter threaten that part of the German summer gains which cost them most dearly in men and material. Even if the Russians can do no more than drive the Axis forces out of most of the territory of the great Don bend, they will probably contribute as much to the ultimate success of the United Nations’ cause as the recent British and American successes in Africa, for Russia is still the most important battlefront in the war against the Axis. [A map showing the approximate position of the fighting fronts in Russia at the end of last year, at the beginning of this year’s spring campaign, and before the present Russian offensive developed, appears on the opposite page.]