Air Power in North Africa

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23800, 20 November 1942, Page 4

Air Power in North Africa

Allied air superiority, used in combined land and air operations, contributed indispensably to the victory which broke the Afrika Korps and its Italian support, and continues to make the German retreat costly. While the Bth Army is in pursuit and General Anderson is thrusting into Tunisia, the Germans and Italians are endeavouring to reinforce on a scale sufficient to bring these movements to a halt and prevent the Allies from establishing themselves in full control o' the southern Mediterranean coast. But the Axis efforts by sea and auto maintain their footing there are, of course, only the frontal efforts of the total reorganisation in which Vichy France has been occupied and the Axis forces strengthened, from Sicily to the Aegean. In this transfer of strength there can be no doubt that the Luftwaffe’s resources are being, and will be, heavily drawn upon. On a short view, the Allied task is to smash Rommel’s remaining force, defeat the effort to reinforce him, and bring his bases and the whole of North Africa into secure tenure; on the longer view, the Allied task is to exploit those successes. Either way, the demand on Allied air strength will be severe. This is equally true whether its part in the offensive operations already developing is considered, or its part in such future operations as may be necessary to maintain command of the Mediterranean or to drive home attacks against the Axis southern wall, A factor which is easily overlooked or under-estimated is the Axis advantage of greater mobility in air power. Primarily it is the geographical advantage of interior lines in road, rail, and air transport; but in part it is due to the technical organisation of the Luftwaffe itself. Although Allied air bases and their equipment are pushed. forward as the front advances, and the range of air action is thus steadily extended, it remains true that the Allies are lengthening their lines of communication and supply in the air as well as on land; and as these lines lengthen, difficulty is multiplied. A fighter force cannot operate with maximum efficiency more than 80 miles from us base; and \his means, necessarily, that the real problem of advancing an air fighting front is that of establishing and supplying the forward bases. On the other hand, the Axis force are drawing in on their main bases, contracting their supply lines, and (in that respect) reducing their difficulties; and this applies in the air as well as on land. In this situation, the speed with which operating squadrons can be moved and sunplied is of vital importance. The Luftwaffe has always been organised very efficiently for this purpose, particularly in the tactical use of the Junkers Ju 52 transport machine to speed the transfer of ground staffs’ equipment, spares, and bombs from section to section of the front. British organisation in this respect remains undeveloped. The United States is better off. llouglas and Curtiss-

Wright machines are in use as transports; wood-framed air transports have been put into service, and more were said to have been ordered, two or three months ago. But unless much more has been decided and achieved than has been reported, the Allies are not likely to be much aided by air transport in the struggle to maintain and exert air supremacy over North Africa —and beyond. Yet, as the editor of the “ Aeroplane ” wrote some time ago, “To move and sup- “ ply a bomber force with ships is “ like chasing a panzer force with “ bullock carts.” Both London and Washington, it is clear, have found it necessary to check a dangerous tendency to under-rate the difficulties still to be faced and overcome by the armies converging on Rommel from east and west. Emphasis has been laid on the military factors, chiefly; but those of air power are inseparable from them and corroborate the warning against too optimistic expectations.