POSSIBILITY OF STALEMATE

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23748, 21 September 1942, Page 5

POSSIBILITY OF STALEMATE

EFFECT OF FALL OP STALINGRAD BURDEN MOVING TO U.S. AND BRITAIN NEW YORK. Sept. 18. “An American must step into the place of every fallen Russian. Russia will not make a separate peace and the United States will not listen to any overtures that Hitler may make from conquered Stalingrad, but a German victory at Stalingrad means a stalemate in the East, which means that the bulk of the German Army is free for adventures elsewhere,” says the Washington correspondent of the "Wall Street Journal.” "The great burden which the British and American Allies would not, or could not lift off Russia, will now fall upon them. The next great climax will be the success or failure of either an Allied landing in Europe or an Axis drive in, the Middle East. “One of the war’s great climaxes draws to a close at Stalingrad. The consensus of opinion here is that the city will fall and that the Russians, at least, will retire behind the Volga. The fall of Stalingrad will be as important and as dismal a milestone as the fall of France and Allied fortunes of war will have reached their lowest point since the day Marshal retain asked for peace. "The military situation facing the United States will be much grimmer than any official has yet admitted publicly. Responsible men call it desperate. This realisation will gradually seep through Washington to the nation. Just as the fall of France changed the magnitudes of the war so they will change again. Preparations which once were thought adequate will become inadequate. These signs already appear with the talk of an army of 13,000,000.” ' Talks on Second Front Saying that London dispatches leave no doubt that the Russian Government is in disagreement with the British and United States Governments as to the opening of a second front in Europe, the "New York Times,” in a leading article, states: “There cannot be disagreement concerning the desirability of a second front, but only

doubt as to whether it is immediately P °"lt b cannot be decided by M. Stalin who, like any hard-pressed commander, is only too well aware of ms need of reinforcements, but by Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt, acting on the advice of men they trust and over whom they have authority. “We do not believe there is any element in a Churchill-Roosevelt decision except the calculating of the available strength. It is as much to our advantage as to Russia’s to give Russia all the possible help that has a chance of success, but it must be a fair chance. It cannot be a reckless Sa The o “New York Times” adds: “We must face the fact that the old distrust between Russia and the democracies has not vanished." It refers to its correspondent’s assertion that Mr Churchill found the Russians less confiding than M. Molotov found the British regarding their potentialities and reserves,” and adds; “The blame is partly attributable to the British appeasement and American isolationism policies, which are as dead as Napoleon’s continental system; but of this M. Stalin may still have to be convinced. .. ~ ' "M. Stalin should believe that the splendour of Russia's battle for freedom has ended for ever any wish or possibilities for her interests to be sacrificed during this war or afterwards. “There will be a second front in Europe whenever the strength of Britain and America justifies it. M. Stalin cannot speed it because he cannot control the conditions making it possible.”

Japanese Naval Envoys Reach Turkey.—The German radio says a Japanese naval delegation, headed by Admiral Nomura, has arrived at Istanbul. —London. September 18.