The press WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1942. The Attack on The Solomons

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23714, 12 August 1942, Page 2

The press WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1942. The Attack on The Solomons

Five days after the commencement of the Allied operations in the Solomon Islands the first informative statement has been issued from the Navy authorities in Washington. Admiral King, the Commander-In-Chief of the United States Navy, has told a press conference that the purpose of the operations is “ the occu- “ pation of the Tulagi area and the “ south-east Solomon Islands.” The operations are under the immediate command of Vice-Admiral Ghormley, who is in charge of the south Pacific area, and “ special forces “ under General Mac Arthur are co- “ operating.” Losses to date have been one United States cruiser sunk and two cruisers, two destroyers, and one transport damaged. Though these are heavy losses, they will not surprise anyone who has watcher] the course of naval warfare in the Pacific since the fall of Java. Japanese naval forces were heavily defeated in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island because they ventured beyond the area in which they were supported by their own shore based aircraft and into areas in which Allied shore based aircraft could operate. This time the conditions have been reversed. The Allied forces attacking the Solomons will have tr get their air support mainly, and perhaps entirely, from aircraft carriers, whereas the enemy has aerodromes scattered throughout the Solomons. The reason for the operations, according to Admiral King, is that “the Japan- “ ese have been consolidating their “ position on the islands in order “ to use them as a base for offensive “ operations against the Allied “ positions, which cover the lines of “ communication to Australia and “ New Zealand.” The move is thus primarily defensive, intended to disrupt Japanese preparations for an attack on New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, or Fiji. But if the purpose is clear, the tactical objective is not. Clearly the operations are something more ambitious than the combined naval and air bombardments of Japanese installations n the Marshall Islands and at Wake Island earlier in the year, since landings are mentioned in the official statement. The question is whether permanent occupation is intended or whether the land forces will be withdrawn after effecting demolitions. There are certain diffi culties in the way of accepting the .view that permanent occupation is intended. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an Allied force in the southernmost islands of the Solomon group and leave the enemy in possession of the northern Solomons; and it would be equally difficult to occupy the whole of the Solomon group without taking steps to neutralise the powerful Japanese naval and air forces at Rabaul. It would seem, therefore, that the attack is either a raid for the purposes of destruction or the beginning of an offensive the ultimate objective of which is Rabaul, the key Japanese position in the area north-east of Australia. And unless the United States has managed to concentrate in the western Pacific much larger naval, land, and air forces than is commonly supposed, it is difficult to believe that an offensive on any large scale is yet possible..