The Press MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1942. The Final Break In India

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23712, 10 August 1942, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1942. The Final Break In India

On Saturday the All-India Congress Committee adopted by 200 votes to 13 the Congress Working Committee's resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of British rule and delegated to Mr Gandhi the task of organising a campaign of non-violent resistance to enforce compliance with the demand. Immediately after the meeting Mr Gandhi called on Indian newspapers to cease publication and on teachers and students to hold themselves rc dy to go on strike. It seems, however, that he did not intend this step to end finally the possibility of a compromise settlement; for, ignoring his previous statement that the “quit India” resolution meant “ open rebellion ” and that “ the time “ for negotiations is past,” he announced that he hoped to meet the Viceroy in conference. The obvious inference is that he wanted to leave the way open for a retreat if the public response to his first non-violent measures should be unsatisfactory. The Government of India has, however, decided that the time for discussion is past and has arrested Mr Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Dr. Azad and many of the provincial leaders of Congress. At the same time it has renewed in the plainest language the pledge of self-government to India after the war, proclaimed its determination to do everything necessary to maintain order rnd essential public services, and promised that its measures will as far as possible be preventive rather than punitiv£. The next phase must be a trial of strength between Congress and the Government of India. There are grim possibilities in the. situation. The consensus of opinion is that Congress has enough popular support to make non-violent resistance a serious threat to essential services, that the movement will inevitably lead to violence, and that conflicts will break out between Hindus and Moslems. The hopeful factors in the situation are that Congress has never been less united on the eve of a campaign of nonviolent resistance, that the acute rice shortage caused by the loss of Burma will lessen the willingness of Indians to disrupt public services, and that at least a part of the Indian labour movement is opposed to Congress’s policy. This Tast factor is particularly important, because a general strike, which Mr Gandhi has threatened to call, is by far the most dangerous weapon could be used against the Government. The core of the Government’s difficulty is that, although opposition to Congress is widespread, there is as yet no person or programme which can unite antirCongress elements for constructive action. The leaders of the Moslem League, much as they detest Mr Gandhi, are on thoroughly bad terms with the Government; and by their, flat Refusal to modify the vicious “ pakistan ” scheme they are making any possibility of a Hindu-Moslem settlement indefinitely remote. The failure of Mr Rajagopalachariar’s efforts to promote a settlement of outstanding differences between Congress and the Moslem League is a sad commentary on the extent to which Indian nationalism is losing its coherence. By some Indians the Government of India’s swift and resolute action against the Congress leaders will no doubt be denounced as precipitate because Mr Gandhi was still willing to negotiate and because the Congress leaders had, two days before the Bombay meeting, pledged themselves to align an independent India with the United Nations. The truth is, however, that Mr Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee have spoken with so many voices in the last few months that it is possible to judge them only by their actions. And their actions threaten chaos for India and disaster for the United Nations in China and the Middle East.