CRIPPS’S MISSION TO INDIA

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23625, 30 April 1942, Page 5

CRIPPS’S MISSION TO INDIA

STATEMENT MADE TO COMMONS

“IMPOSSIBLE TO GO FURTHER ”

(N.Z.P.A.) LONDON, April 28. A full statement on his mission to India was made in the House of Commons to-day by Sir Stafford Cripps, who reminded the House that in sending him to with the Indian leaders the British Government had hoped that the mission would be successful in determining two main issues —the future of India and India’s defence now.

“Unfortunately events brought a disappointment,” said Sir Stafford, “but no one in Britain need feel regretful that the Government’s proposals were put forward or need blame the Government or the British for the failure to reach an agreement. “The moment was a difficult one. Many things that might usefully be discussed and negotiated in more peaceful times could not be dealt with because there was the overriding need to do everything in our power to carry out our duty to defend India against a foreign invader. Owing to events in the Far Eastern theatre of war, accompanied by highly skilled though grossly misleading propaganda from Axis sources, an atmosphere of anti-British sentiment showed itself in certain sections of Indian opinion. “With the approach of self-govern-ment or Dominion status as a reality, communal differences of view as to the form of government suitable for the future of India tended to become more definitely crystallised. It was the need for clarification of the situation and for consultation with Indian opinion that impelled Britain to decide that some positive step must be taken quickly. Britain’s objective and hope was that she might use these very difficulties to bring together all the main leaders in Indian opinion for the double purpose of solving India’s future and reinforcing her defence against the invader. “The future is inevitably linked with the present, and I am confident that no mere temporary arrangement could have been reached without some exposition of our future intentions. Had we attempted to deal only with the present we should immediately have been met with a demand for clariflca-. tion of the future. I was most anxious that there should be no suspicion that the Government hand-picked those whom I saw, and consequently I asked the main organisations themselves to appoint those they wished to meet me. I believe that on the fundamental vital points of self-government and selfdetermination there was not a single case of disagreement. Responsibility Taken

“I alone was responsible for what was put forward to the Indian leaders in the amplification of the details in the draft declaration,” said Sir Stafford. Referring to his talks with Colonel Louis Johnson. Mr Roosevelt’s representative, Sir Stafford Cripps said that there was no question of any American intervention, but only personal help from a very able American citizen.

"I do not believe that it would be possible to find, in the existing circumstances, a fairer solution of the problem than the Government’s declaration,” he continued. "There was a distinct division of opinion among Indians on the question of defence, but practically unanimity that the mechanical conduct of the war in India and the control of the fighting forces must remain under the British Commander-in-Chief.

“Differences of opinion came when the responsibilities of the Government of India, apart from those of the British Government, were considered. “It was impossible for the Government to go further with safety, and no risks could be taken at such a moment as the present on so vital and immediate a matter as the defence of India.”

Discussing difficulties in the way of apceptance of the draft declaration, Sir Stafford Cripps said that although he thought the Congress Party leaders themselves appreciated that no restriction would be imposed on the power of the Indian Union in its future relationships with other States of the British Commonwealth, they were afraid that their followers would attach undue importance to the apparent limitations included in the definition of “dominion.” The words had been accepted as making it perfectly clear that India could in fact leave the British Commonwealth of Nations should the Indian Government, under the new constitution, so decide.

Referring to the problem of defence, Sir Stafford Cripps said that he took the view, in which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief agreed, that it would be difficult for representative Indians of the Viceroy’s Executive to rouse the peoples of India to their defence unless they could say with justice that at least some part of that defence was the responsibility of representative Indians and so of the Indian people. Various suggestions w6re made and several formulae tried until eventually that one was worked out which became the final suggestion. Its object was quite simple—to allocate to the Commander-in-Chief as war member of the Viceroy’s Executive, all those administrative functions in the Government of India vital to the efficient carrying on of the war, while at the same time leaving to representative Indians the other functions of the defence member, together with several other important functions. He felt sure that had the Congress Party leaders accepted the final draft declaration they would have been able to rally their followers behind them. Demand By Congress It was not on this that the final break came. The possession of complete power asked for by the Congress Party, and not demanded by any other section in India, would have left them in an impossible situation. He was confident that none of the minorities would have accepted such a position, least of all the Moslems. It was on that issue that the final break came, followed by the rejection, as he had expected, by the Moslem League, for reasons which were the precise opposite of those stated by the Congress Party, but all were concerned with the future rather than the present. Sir Stafford Cripps said that there was much to be placed on the credit side. Advantage had come from the evidence that Britain desired to give India self-government at the earliest practicable moment, and wished her to determine the form it could take. The whole discussion had also served to bring to the front the determination of the Indian people to defend their own country. Many Indian leaders would do their best to arouse the Indian peoples in their own, defence, and he hoped that by co-operation in defence they would be a step nearer to a solution of their problems. In the debate that followed, members said that the negotiations had laid the foundation for an Indian Constitution. One member described Sir Stafford Cripps’s task as “one of the greatest missions in history,”

“IDEAL OF UNITED INDIA”

STATEMENT BY MINISTER (B 0.W.) RUGBY, April 28. The Secretary of State for India (Mr L. S, Amery) said in the House of Commons that the Cripps mission to India and the unanimous policy for which Sir Stafford Cripps had endeavoured to secure acceptance, were not sudden improvisations to meet a critical external situation—a death-bed repentance of imperialism in the face of the Japanese menace. They were the natural and inevitable culmination of a steady development during the last few years of thought and feelings about Indian aspirations. The British ideal remained, of a united India, sufficiently united at least

to present a common front to the outside world: but Britain would sooner see India divided and free than keep the various elements for ever chafing against Britain and against each other under a sense of impotent frustration. Mr Amery said that within the limits of the ultimate responsibility of the Viceroy and Parliament of India; Sir Stafford Cripps had been given wide latitude, and had gone to the utmost length to meet the wishes of Congress; but the Indian leaders had made no attempt to reach agreement among themselves. In spite of this, the mission had been far from a failure. It was the epilogue to an old chapter, in which the contending elements strove to attain their ends by belabouring the Government, and the prologue to a new chapter in which Indians were beginning to realise that the key to India’s problems was in their own hands. Britain had certainly not withdrawn what was her main object and purpose, namely, that India should as soon as possible attain full freedom under constitutional arrangements of her own devising, and suited to her peculiar conditions.