PACIFIC COMMAND: WHY IT FAILED

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23588, 16 March 1942, Page 4

PACIFIC COMMAND: WHY IT FAILED

ALLIED STRATEGY

(By the Military Correspondent The transfer of Sir, Archibald Wavell from the Allied command in the southwest Pacific to his former post of Commander-in-Chief in India is primarilv a recognition of changed realities brought about by the rapid southern advance of the Japanese armies. The Downing Street announcement was careful to emphasise that the change involves no weakening of the general co-ordination of strategic policy in the war against Japan. The approach to grand strategy m the Pacific remains the same; the present rearrangement is due to the greatly altered military facts m the last two months, since the Supreme Command was instituted. , The truth is that it " is doubtful whether General Wavell’s Supreme Command ever functioned in any real sense of the term. He was assiduous in visiting many of the battletronts within his vast territory, and he was doubtless.preparing to implement the essentially long-term strategical scheme which underlay his appointment. But events moved far too fast for him. The Pacific war became a series of practically isolated campaigns which were perforce directed by the local regional commanders. There was a cahipaign in the Philippines, another in. the outlying islands of the Netherlands East Indies, another in Malaya and Singapore, and still another in Burma; the very speed of the enemy advance preventing the development of nny homogeneity in strategy. In the end, the concerted ABDA front resolved itself into MacArthur’s stand on Luzon, the Dutch fight for Java, and the British defensive action west ot the Sittang river in Burma. Just as the vague Supreme Command had not decisively affected the campaigns in any of these regions so too its abolition has not materially changed the situation. In short, the pressure of changing facts prevented the Supreme Command developing from shadow into reality, though the experience of the last three months might justify doubts as --to whether the theoretically sound policy embodied in General Wavell’s appointment was really practical. Presumably a Supreme Commander has two functions He must exercise some kind of technical oversight over the various arrhies in his control: and he must decide the flow of reserves, reinforcements, and supplies to the several fronts. But, in reality, the former functions are impossible to discharge in any detail when such vast distanbes are involved: while, as for the latter, it is doubtful whether they can be delegated to any field commander under conditions operating in the Pacific where so many other factors than the purely military com? into consideration. Politics, and Strategy High strategy to-day is determined by Governments and by their various chiefs-of-staff: and the local commanders implement decisions arrived at in Washington or London or wherever else the politicians and their technical advisers meet. This being so, it is difficult to see what effective role is left to a' so-called Supreme Commander, especially when he is dealing with every arm of the services and with a number of independent national forces. Under such' conditions, the essential need is to simplify the machinery of consultation as it affects the various Governments and to allow decisions to be made and executed promptly. With a kaleidoscopic war situation changing almost daily, something more is needed than the necessarily limited powers that can be vouchsafed to any supreme commander. As events have turned out, the problem seems to have solved itself in the south-west Pacific. General Wavell now reverts to his former position of

it of the "Sydney Morning Herald.’’) Commander-in-Chief in India, and his 1 task is well defined in view of the transfer of Burma to the Indian sphere of action. Under present condition* there are two main fronts in the Paci fic. India. Burma, and China constk tute a single land front, although it must not be forgotten that sq, much even here depends upon the supply lines across the Indian Ocean. Second the Anzac zone includes Australia* New Zealand, and the Pacific islands?' The Anzac Zone It is in connexion with this second region that further definition is needed.The Anzac zone must become a mam' base for future action against JadT Moreover, since supplies must in-hflU , measure come from America, the P tic sea routes are, the all-important fafl. tor in the situation, and the problem l of the Anzac base, cannot be dissociated from the far-flung supply lines across the Pacific Ocean. For this reason, some expansion of the Anzac zone seems in- I evitable. Here, again, it is not a ques. tion of what is theoretically desirable, but merely a recognition of inescapable facts. Paramount needs of the moment are to make the Anzac Command a wider entity and to improve the existing arrangements for arriving at decisions on high policy. The Chief-of-Staft Committees functioning in Washington and London and the Pacific War Conncil are doubtless doing good work, but the process involved in their operations is too lengthy and complicated to admit of swift decisions, without which a defensive psychology, is bound to persist. Nothing is more important than to capture the spirit of attack. Consecutive withdrawals and attrition^, defence offer nothing to the solution of the Pacific challenge. In essence, the defence of Java represented the same interpretation of grand strategy that typified the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, and that, if unchecked, may well see Australia and Hawaii added to its victims. The Dutch had the right idea but not the resources, when they advocated a policy of “offensive defence”; but now the inexorable lessons of the last three months can no longer be overlooked or postponed. As General Marshall said a few days ago, “the timi has come to carry the war to the enemy”; and all questions of command or organisation or consultation must be judged and answered in accordance with whether or, not this oftensive spirit is being served. The Alternatives There are only two alternatives. The Allies may seek seclusion in “an ivory tower” of unreality and base a future on the long-range factors of America’s still largely unrealised potentialities or Japan’s ultimate weaknesses in vital materials; but, if they do this, the Japanese short-term advantages may prevent the wider factors from ever coming into play. If Japan moves over. Australia and India piecemeal, she Will have one of the most self-sufficient empires in history and will have deprived the Allies of all bases from which the counter-attack is possible. The second alternative is not to wait and watch this consecutive conquest occur, but to employ the methods which have produced such rich military and economic dividends for the enemy Under Pacific conditions especially, the attacker has the advantage; and it must not be forgotten that, at the present inchoate juncture, the Japanese are no less vulnerable to aggressive measures than the Allies have proved themselves to be in the last three months. Aggressiveness mb work both ways; and it is fprvjjje • United Nations to take their turnjpS it in the Pacific.