SOVIET HELP NEEDED WITH PEACE PROBLEMS

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23445, 27 September 1941, Page 8

SOVIET HELP NEEDED WITH PEACE PROBLEMS

POST-WAR WORLD

BOSTON, August 8. Russia, having joined the list of antiNazi Powers, is to participate shortly in a London conference of allied governments. The significance of this announcement is not immediately clear because the whole question of Russia’s place in the community of nations is not clear. Yet, notwithstanding all doubts and uncertainties the future peace and security of the world cannot be considered apart from the role that the Muscovite Empire is to play in the new order. ■ _ In considering so large a question as a new order for the world, one cannot limit one’s horizon to the fact that in 1918 and for several years afterwards the Communists, who had seized the Government in Moscow, abandoned the concept of Russian nationalism and launched their abortive plan for world revolution. Nor can the view be restricted to the fact that during 1939 1940, and even, the beginning of 1941 the present precarious Russian dictatorship was signing a succession of accords with the Nazi chieftain. , These events, all happening within a brief couple of decades, may be merely a short episode in the long histoiy of the slow-moving Russians. The point is to find what estimate, based on a lone-ranee view of the Russian people, can be made as to the likelihood of their fitting into the type of new order that the democratic nations hope to construct. , .. New Foundations Apart from Russia’s peculiar political ideals and propensities, the for including it as a needed unit in the new order are almost overwhelming particularly at a time when most plans For the new order have been wrecked by the extensive German conquests, and the democratic nations are eagerly searching for new foundations for the W Original designs for a revised League or a world Fe&eral Union have been whittled down to something little mor than a glorified Anglo-American entente In short the planners. have reduced their design to include just those powers which can supplyabeu rock foundation for the new oroer. It is in the matter of selecting the foundation powers—these world cen2es of control-that the ques ion of Russia’s inclusion becomes vital. Nations have never yet settledthemselves automatically lnt g groups; Some powers—Rome, Persia, the Holy Roman Empire, Turkey, Bn-, tain or apother-have invariably established themselves as control centres to provide the needful cohesive ele ment for humanity generally, and to protect the weaker nations. , The moment that the American colonies sensed their nationhood, President Monroe and his advisers realised that there must be some power to act as control centre to supervise the Western Hemisphere, and in his famous doctrine of 1823. constituted America as that power. In so doing he was giving America precisely the same functions as the British, Germans, and Russians were exercising in Europe— France, occupied with domestic upheavals, had ceased to wield its former imperial influence. These three empires did not embody their supervision in a “doctrine.’ But each of the three watched its own preserve with a political, military, or naval vigilance beyond anything possible or necessary in the Americas. To-day’s- upheaval is due in large measure to the fact that in the years before 1914 the three-power control system in Europe was breaking down. Britain and Russia, in extending their empires to world-wide proportions, were raising problems for themselves, respectively, in the Far East, India, the Middle East, or in North and South Africa, and otherwise dispersing their Strength, while Germany, closely contained between the two, was conserving its forces and developing ambitious schemes for lebensraum. Hence the four-power world system that had maintained stability from Napoleon to Wilhelm II failed to function. Its collapse has made Hitlerism possible. The chaotic conditions of the last two decades have given warning that the first essential for world sta-bility-before any form of world government can be erected—is to get the foundations laid in the establishment of workable centres of control. What are these centres to be? Control Centre in America One of these control centres must be America unless the country is to forgo its place in the post-war world. The United States, changed from a debtor nation to the tune of 3.500.000. dollars around 1914 to a creditor to the extent of some 5.000. dollars in 1919, has become to-day the world’s great creditor, thereby exercising the most potent means' of influencing the rest of the nations. Moreover. America has discovered that supervision over this hemisphere alone cannot guarantee its security. Another control centre must be Britain, whose fleet still controls the seas and whose Empire has proved one of the greatest stabilising forces in history. But are these two powers sufficient control centres for the world? Mr Anthony Eden on May 29 said that “the British Empire and its Allies, with the United States and South America, would alone be in a position to carry out Europe’s rehabilitation.” Mr Eden, who spoke before Russia had come into the anti-Nazi fold, had certainly allotted to the two democracies a herculean task.

(Published by special arrangement with the -Christian Science Monitor.-) The conference referred to in the following article is that of the Allied Council which met in London this week and was attended by delegates from all the Dominions and nine Allied countries. A report of the meeting appeared in “The Press yesterday.

Consider the general make-up of Europe. It is composed, except for the non-dominant Latins, primarily of two leading races which, since the fall of Rome, have been engaged in one long endless struggle—the Teutons and the Slavs. Basis of Peace If Europe contrived to keep stable for the best part of the nineteenth century, it was because Berlin—representing the Teutons and dominating the west—and Moscow—exercising a general sponsorship over the various Slav elements from the Poles on tie Baltic to the Serbs and Bulgars in the Balkans—preserved a fairly even balance on the Continent. If one side showed signs of growing too powerful, Britain was at hand on the sidelines to throw its weight in the opposite direction. When in 1878 Russia planned, in the San Stefano Treaty, to extend its influence in the Balkans by the creation of a greater Bulgaria, Britain, using' Turkey as a sub-control centre, threw its weight to the German side and by the Treaty of Berlin blocked the plan. When Germany in the years before 1914 was pushing eastward to- ; ward the Dardanelles for its BerlinBagdad project, and also westward with its newly built , fleet, Britain brought Russia into the Triple Entente with France in 1907. To-day, therefore, the question arises whether one or other of these two ready-made control centres—Germany or Russia—must n)t be added to the Anglo-American combination to ensure proper stability among the distraught nations on the Continent of Europe. Assuming that the Germans are too aggressive and warlike for safe collaboration in a peace system at present, the conviction is growing that the other control centre—the Russian —should be brought into the system-* if therfe were a reasonable expectancy that the Russians would adequately perform the function. What qualities might be called indispensable for such a function? Russia is not a democracy to-day. It has never known a workable democratic government. It is uncertain whether it will evolve one in the near future. Americans are naturally suspicious of all attempts to collaborate with an autocracy. Still more would they dislike any dealings with a Communist Government—although the present Russian dictatorship appears to have little of the original Communist element in its make-up. Mutual Concessions For the sake of benefits arising from the stability to be gained by such an understanding, however, it is probable that the Russian people might well be willing to make such concessions as would remove some of thej main. American scruples. As for the British, it would no doubt be sufficient that Russia should be willing to co-operate fully with democratic governments. Sir Samuel Hoate, speaking as Foreign Secretary in 1935, In reference to Soviet Russia, said: “Any State sincerely desirous of maintaining the peace of Europe, whatever may be its government, will have Our collaboration in that aim.” Another stipulation would be that the power in question should not be an aggressor nation. Russia, having more territory than it can cope with already, may be considered unlikely to go to war merely to absorb more territory. Moreover, the Slavs in general - and the Russians in particular, while fine soldiers in defending their country, are poor fighters abroad—as may be seen by comparing the poor showing of the Russians at Austerlitz in 1805 with the fine defence set up at Borodino in 1812, or their failures in Finland in 1939 with the heroic defence Of Smolensk to-day. The aggressive action of Moscow against Finland and the Baltics has been proved by subsequent events merely a case of extreme strategic necessity, in an attempt to complete the defence system against German aggression. What of Stalin? How much Russia represents the communistic doctrine to-day is less easy to say. Stalin, as distinct _ from Lenin, has never interested himself • primarily in pushing world revolution ot in developing' Communism as such at home. On the contrary, he has liquidated many of the “idealists” who stood for the pure communistic policy. On the other hand, he has built up the army and air force as a great defence force for nationalistic pur-, poses and has played power politics along the same lines as his Tsarist forbears. It is in defence of Russia as a nation—not as a defence of Communism—that the Russian people are fighting so effectively to-day. Russia in many ways is more primitive than, and not fully sympathetic to, the western democracies. But the democracies may find they can afford to overlook these drawbacks if, in its,leadership of the various and often mutually hostile Slav races, it has generally shown inherent stabilising qualities. The fact that Russia will probably be. found to meet most of these requirements, and m any event will need all the help tnQ democracies can afford it to develop its own unexploited resources, would • seem to point to the Muscovite Empire as a natural and relatively sate counterweight to Europe’s wariiKa Teutons —provided that the nec ?® sa . l 2 agreements can be arrived at with iw present rulers.