The War in the East

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23413, 21 August 1941, Page 4

The War in the East

It is not necessary to go further than the Russian communiques for evidence that at the northern and southern extremes of the eastern front the German armies have made gains which threaten the defenders with their first serious defeats. In the'north, the German capture of Kingisepp, 70 miles west of Leningrad on the Leningrad-Tallinn railway, means that substantial Russian forces have been isolated in the north-western corner of Estonia, that the Russian Baltic fleet’s bases in the Gulf of Ifin*land are iiv danger of being isolated, and that to the west the' Germans are in contact with Leningrad’s outer defences. At the same time, the drive on.Leningrad from the south of Lake Peipus and the drive in the Kholm area designed to cut the Leningrad-Moscow railway have both dangerous, Only in the Karelian isthmus and in country between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega 'do the invaders seem to have been halted. The defences of . Leningrad are so strong that the cutting of the Len-ingrad-Moscow railway is likely to be the next main German objective in this sector. But it is iin the Ukrainian sector that the German gains appear most impressive. In the 10 days which have elapsed since they captured Uman, the German forces have reached the Black Sea at Nikolaev, thereby' capturing an important naval 1 base ahd isolating Odessa, and have reached the Dnieper after overrunning the industrial area centring on- the mining town of Krivoi Rog. The German rate of progress in these operations seem to have averaged about 15 miles a day—a spectacular answer to those commentators ,who were proclaiming a week ago that Russian tactics had “taken the blitz “out of blitzkrieg.” The speed of the Russian retreat may not, however, be a bad sign. After the German penetration at Uman Marshal Budenny had a choice between lodging counterattacks to break the 1 German pincer movements and withdrawing as large a part of his forces as possible to. the Dnieper. The second and prudent course involved sacrificing Odessa and J'Tikolaev and the industrial areas in the bend of the Dnieper in order to concentrate on the defence of the vital industries of the Donetz basim , There will be general relief that, in spite of 1 his predilection for taking chance's, Marshal Budenny has chosen to withdraw. By doing so, he brings to his assistance the armies of the Kharkov region and the Crimea, two of the strongest military districts in Russia. By not doing so, he would have placed the whole of the Ukraine in jeopardy. The important question is at what cost the, withdrawal has been effected. Although the German claim of a few days ago to have caught the main body of Marshal Budenny’s forces in a pocket is by implication abandoned in the latest German communiques, the general assumption seems to be that Russian losses are not less than 150,000. And sinde some 200,000 Russians are still fighting west of the Dnieper, the total is'certain to be greatly increased. The deficiencies of the Russian transport system in the Ukraine are . heavily against the, type of operation which Marshal Budenny has been attempting in the last week or so. The next phase of the campaign will be awaited with, anxiety. It is now clear that there is a possibility of Russia suffering reverses which will cripple her military power . before the onset pf winter stabilises the front. Germany’s next and fourth offensive in the east must decisively Affect the whole'course of the war.