NAZI OCCUPATION IMPERILS SUEZ

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23319, 3 May 1941, Page 8

NAZI OCCUPATION IMPERILS SUEZ

AEGEAN ISLANDS

(By the Military Correspondent SYDNEY, April 28. The German occupation of Samothrace and Lemuos, in the northern Aegean, has been followed by reports of the taking of Mitylene (Lesbos) and of plans to attack Chips, farther south, ff these repOrts are substantiated, and they come from such a variety of sources as to leave little doubt regarding their authenticity, the strategical consequences would be serious. Indeed, those consequences are so obvious and 'direct that it Is hard to understand why Mitylene, or even Lemnos, was not occupied by our forces long ago, in order to place beyond doubt our command of the Aegean. The experience of the Italian Dodecanese , shows how very difficult it is to take islands by assault if they are fortified and strongly contested; and there would have been .ample time to have placed landing forces on these Greek islands and to have erected gun emplacements. ' , ’, ' As it is, a German threat. has been allowed to develop against the Aegean islands from Euboea to Chios, from

Samothrace to the Dodecanese; and

the Allies are now confronted with the possibility of a concerted German drive in the Aegean. This development is disturbingly in accordance with the settled German policy of outflanking the prey next oh the list. Just as Czechoslovakia was outflanked by the occupation of Austria and later Jugoslavia, by the German occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria, so now Turkey is being outflanked In Thrace and the Aegean Sea. Once again, the Germans are consolidating their preparations for aggression while the Victim can do nothing about it, even u he sees bastion after bastion'of .his .defence, fallThreat to Turkey • If the Germans succeed in extending their hold over the islands, their first gain is to prevent Turkey’s use of the Straits Lemnos. would secure this, while Mitylene would make assurance doubly sure. Moreover, Mitylene, if occupied by the Germans, would put them astride the approaches, to Turkey’s rnaiil port in the Mediterranean. The isolation hf Smyrna would cut at the very heart , of any British plans to aid Turkey in time of emergency, should the Turks choose to fight. Mitylene dominates the. approaches to Smyrna by sea and air. If Smyrna cannot be used, the only remaining port which could serve Turkish br Allied military purposes is Alexandretta, another 700 miles round, at the extrefne north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean, where the Syrian and Turkish frontiers meet. Alexandretta was neglected while under the French in Syria, and has belonged .to Turkey only since the cession of the Sanjak of Hatay in 1938. Its harbour works thus <SU short of large-scale military requirements.

of the “Sydney Morning HeiJUS?||®?v| In addition to Tq£*j from her easiest access |b world, Mitylene would alstf* grave possibilities of air Anatolia. Smyrna itself is miles from. Mitylene, andport and its communications wiHv» interior are vulnerable to attack 'Am the air. In point of fact, Mltylep||Sß Thrace are admirably correlated sH for the bombing of Turkey. BohH working from those two pcints*||H| easily range over the whole df-'.ff® era Anatolia. ,\|| link with Dodecanese finally, any extensive occupation,,« the Aegean islands would give aai meaning to the Dodecanese, andttti transformation is so potentially: ®® portant that the question «riri|| whether a determined effort should d® have been made to capture the Domr anese when they were under Italia control and before , Germany complet® her southern drive through the B«| kans. When Italy alone was a pOMi in the Mediterranean, the islands w mere outliers, blockaded and deorilH of most of their innate strategicalaß portance; but, as matters have tunw out in the Balkans, they mlghi«B ceivably become the spearheadfw Germany’s aerial plans against Tu||m and the Middle East. /V'-SWI They are dangerously dde tASH and Palestine as well a# key, and they would < statute a threat to the even if Germany temporarily chajil “by-pass” Turkey. In so far K r M| naval activity is concerned, GenaMi is still too hampered by the .IkcraH vessels to challenge British seaiaHs trol of the eastern to maintain her supremacy, Brmm might have to divert part ready overburdened MediterraqM| forces to institute a permanent pgtim of the routes between the lands and Syria. The p«aitntes» Syria to the oilfields combinesTMfi the- obvious demoralisation of Frerfch . forces there to constituting! , great incitement to German The Ah’ Problem In the air, the problem even more immediate. Aifntljpjpl the island aerodromes are ' scribed, and thus the norober-apilfp planes that could bemused time is small; Never*ele«fc occupied the Dodecanese, aUlhi'llßWl East from the northcm Doraer ? aMM» to Suez would be within raniigliMWl bomb Haifa dhd Alexandria XMw|pK Dodecanese, and the bound to be more serious continuous : than that of the >; ItenlM More immediately, German Crete would make the position exiled Greek Government difficult.' All told, a position Ought. Which Britain’s strategical doOmMlI over the Aegean would be chaUMMRi by German forces which their outer bases to the eouthffhslMM of the Aegean Sea, and ithukygfflM a tongue, of -power , deep into?, jjjj Middle 'Eastern zone. To repeal a JW| mer analogy, 'the position is pwttDUM reminiscent of the stage wpOnfljja Vienna Diktat gave Germany counß of ‘a long narrow corridor 4uttu®|®H into the military heart of BMmrwKs thus threatening the entire? 'DwjgH peninsifla. In military terms.,,theJßß summation of the present ,G#lWm Aegean drive would : mean, tha£ji«H(| key stands in' the position BulfßlM then had. Syria .and pa»M| would have taken'the place GreecoaMß after the German penetration|H| Transylvania, and German strategy* a habit of monotonously but nonejM less effectively repeating itself. JM