Egypt to Greece

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23295, 3 April 1941, Page 6

Egypt to Greece

Hitherto,, accounts of the naval engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of last week have left unanswered an interesting and important question.: SinCe Italy entered the war, her navy has consistently and as a matter of policy avoided engaging the enemy in fleet actions:; Why, then, were 1 three battleships (possibly all that Italy now has in service). 14 cruisers, and the destroyers needed to screen so large a force moved 600 , miles east of the .nearest Italian bases in Sicily and perilously close to British air bases in Crete and to the main British flee,t in Alexandria? An official tu)d[ detailed account of, the engagement printed >ik the , ckble news this moyning gives part of the answer. When Sir Andrew Cunningham was told on March 27 that enemy cruisers were ; |»t jea!Wthe southeast of Sicily he, “ concluded their , .intentions were to; attack '■'"dth'’;:convoys between Egypt and Greece.”, he ordered ’a light force of -'proceed- south’;*# * Crete, In which position it would be strongly ii'ltercept any-epemy forcesattejnpt•*ing\to interfere with pur'traffic, with Greece/’ "wa# So? that

disrupt it. Not, surely, ordinary convoys of munitions for the Greek armies and food for the Greek people; to use a battle fleet against traffic of this sort would be to use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut. But if Mussolini had reason to suppose that armies, as well as munitions and' food, were crossing from Egypt to Greece, the risk might seem worth while—at any rate to a man very near the end of his tether. The explanation of recent events in the Balkans grows a little clearer.