Air Production Race

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23248, 7 February 1941, Page 8

Air Production Race

To reach a definite conclusion upon the relative strength of the German and the British air force and upon the rate at which British production is gaining is for obvious reasons impossible. The most obvious of all is that Germany’s original strength was only approximately known and' that her building rate since is still more uncertain, while the British fighting-line strength and construction figures are carefully cloaked. Neither generalised nor specific estimates agree very well. The cables a day or two ago reported an American estimate that Germany now has 70,000 military aeroplanes;-the “Sunday Times” air expert reduced this to a maximum of 40,000, of which only 9000 could be thrown into combat at any given moment. Again, on August 20, in a review of, the progress of the war, Mr Churchill declared that the British air strength was growing “ at a greater rate ” than the German, and that “the longer the “ struggle went on the more quickly would “Britain approach parity with the enemy and “ then gain superiority.” It may be noted that Mr Churchill’s phrase claimed only a greater acceleration of output, not the achievement of a greater output. Expert opinion in England, however, w-as prepared to accept the larger claim, which Mr Churchill was generally supposed to'have intended. The acceleration has no doubt continued; but the United States Secretary for the Navy, Colonel Knox, giving evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, a few days ago, quoted what he called “ reliable information ” to the effect that “recent British production, coupled with “that of the United States, actually exceeded “ Germany’s.” With that is to be read Colonel Knox’s further statement, derived from the same source, that this joint superiority had been reached during a lull in German production, due to a desperate attempt to develop “ a new and more effective aerial “weapon.” If his information really was reliable, it meant, of course, that while German figures were temporarily down,-they were still ahead of the British figures by a margin not far short of American production, which reached 900 aeroplanes a month in August and has now perhaps risen to the schedule level of 1500. But of the 900 American machines produced in August only 236 went to Britain. To trust the information that Colonel Knox trusts, therefore, is to infer that Mr Churchill was, in fact, speaking of an advantage reached in acceleration rates and not in net production rates, and that the numerical superiority of the Germans was not yet being reduced.

Though this is a disappointing inference, other considerations weigh agaijnst it. First, still faster building is carrying (Great Britain towards the effective superiority \promised by Mr Churchill. The much heavier '.loss-rate of the Germans works to the same effect. Second, the net production | advantage Germany has held over ■ combined British and American production may not, even briefly, be regained. Third, Although American deliveries have been only te small fraction of total production and havgl lagged far behind the British Purchasing Commission's orders, there is good reason to hop,e for

• .. . i \ an early and large increase in deliveries ifrora present (and past) production as well as fhom the greatly increased production of the future. Of the 11,000 aeroplanes ordered by July last, only 2800 had been delivered. When the British Purchasing Commission asked for 3000 u month by January, the National Advisory De-| fence Commission promised 1300 or 1400 a, month by the end of 1941. But the situation has vastly changed, since, not merely because American production plans have been speeded but because the President’s Aid for Britain Bill promises to clear the way for the transfer of huge deliveries of aeroplanes from the American army and navy to the Royal Air Force. There is good reason to believe that the output of military machines will be largely diverted to Britain, while the United States retains the training types. What is immediately and ultimately to be expected of American production is again not wholly clear. The production (not delivery) figure of 1500 machines a month by January of this year, rising from then on, was given four or five months ago by Mr W. S. Knudsen, production member of the National Defence Advisory Commission. Mr Knudsen’s evidence is the more acceptable because he has never shown the easy optimism of other American authorities. For example, about the middle of last year, when the British Purchasing Commission was pressing for an early delivery programme of 3000 machines a month, the secretary to the United States Treasury, MrMorgenthau, was confident that this could be managed, without hindrance to the American defence programme of 50,000 machines. Mr Knudsen said that 38 new factories would be required to meet such a demand by the middle of 1942. His estimate, then, of production figures rising from 1500 aeroplanes a month through 1941 is probably a safe one. It is sufficiently well checked by that of Colonel Jouett, president of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, who recently forecast an annual production rate of 24,000 by the end of this year and of 30,000 by the middle of next. If these estimates are fulfilled, the power to swing overwhelming strength across the Atlantic into British hands will be in the President’s.