The Press MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1940. Spain Nearer to War

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23132, 23 September 1940, Page 6

The Press MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1940. Spain Nearer to War

Of the many suggested explanations of Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome the most convincing seems to be that it is in some way connected with the

visit, a few days previously, of Ramon Serrano Suncr to Berlin and that it therefore implies the possibility of some further change in the attitude of Spain to the war in Europe and Africa. So far, the development of this attitude has been ominously reminiscent of the stages by which Italy entered the war. During the civil

conflict in Spain, Mr Chamberlain and Sir Samuel Hoare openly justified the non-inter-

vention policy by the argument that whichever side won would inevitably require British finan-

cial assistance in the task of national economic

reconstruction. Sir Samuel Hoare's appointment as British Ambassador to Madrid showed

that in spite of the change of government in

Great Britain, the attempt to wean Spain away

from the Axis by economic appeasement was to be continued. But with Spain as with Italy it

was soon found that economic concessions

seriously weakened the efficiency of the blockade of Germany. Spain’s imports of certain essential war commodities became disproportionate to her needs; and it was soon necessary to tighten the controls. This, and the collapse of France, brought a sudden change in the Spanish attitude. In July, Spain’s status in relation to the war was officially defined as nonbelligerency, and General Franco formally laid claim to Gibraltar. A few weeks later the newspaper “Arriba,” organ of the Falange Espanol, of which Serrano Suncr is the leader, declared that Spain had become a “moral belligerent.” “ No one can fail to regard England as the most “ direct violator of our destiny,” the newspaper continued. “ Spain was first a neutral, then “ non-belligerent, and now is physically on the “ verge of battle.” About this time the Spanish Government scored a notable diplomatic victory by persuading Portugal, Great Britain’s oldest ally, to enter into a treaty of nonaggression, which provides also for consultation in the event of any threat or incipient threat to the security of either country. The treaty is generally taken to mean that sooner or later Portugal, whose army, navy, and air force are insignificant by modern standards, will be incorporated into an Iberian federation dominated by Spain, feecent events in the western hemisphere have also had their effect on Spanish policy. The imperialism of the new Spain extends not merely to northern Africa but to the Americas, and branches of the Falange Espanol in the Latin American Republics are proclaiming that a revival of Spain’s American empire is the alternative to domination of Latin America by the United States. That is why the agreement between Great Britain and the United States over naval and air bases in the Atlantic has nowhere been more angrily denounced than in Spain, For the moment, however, it may be suspected that Spanish policy is pivoting on the problem of northern Africa. When Germany and Italy signed their armistice agreements with France, they were contertt to leave the future of France’s colonies in abeyance. But in the last few weeks popular feeling in these colonies has turned decisively against the Vichy Government. All the French island possessions in the Pacific and the greater part of French' Equatorial Africa have declared for General de Gaulle; and now French Morocco appears to be slipping out of hand, Germany and Italy may therefore have reached the conclusion that the Vichy Government can ho longer be trusted to handle the situation and that the future of France’s north African colonies had better be settled now. If that is the case, Spain has arrived at the cross roads. Unless her claims to additional territory in north Africa are favourably considered, her career as an imperialist Power has ended before it has begun. What the Axis will demand in return for admitting Spain to a share of France’s African empire is obvious enough: ah immediate assault on Gibraltar, Italy’s campaign against Egypt seems doomed to failure by her inability to shake British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Gibraltar is one of the foundation stones on Much that supremacy rests. Economically, Spain is less ready for war than Italy was. She is short of every essential'raw material; food rationing is more severe than in any of the belligerent countries; little progress has been made with the task of repairing the damage, done by the civil war; and there are still at least 500,00,0 political prisoners in her gaols. Unfortunately the very reasons which make it desirable that Spain should have are the reasons which may drive a morally bankrupt government into war.