The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1940. The American Presidency

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23131, 21 September 1940, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1940. The American Presidency

The cabled report that the “New York Times,” though traditionally Democratic, has announced its support of the Republican candidate for the presidency, Mr Wendell Willkie, will disturb everyone who believes that Mr Roosevelt’s reelection affords the best hope of a swift, strenuous, and generous American effort to organise the maximum material aid for Great Britain. Nor can anxiety be allayed by reference to the reason stated by the “New York Times”: that it believes Mr Willkie “more able to carry out “ the defence programme and stimulate eco- “ nomic and industrial activity.” Although it adds that both Mr Willkie and Mr Roosevelt are aware of the danger to the United States and both “ desire to help Britain,” it is difficult to interpret this preference otherwise than as a reaction towards a narrower international policy and a narrower conception of ‘American security than Mr Roosevelt’s; and it is also, of course, a reaction against the methods and measures, characteristic of the President throughout his two terms of office, which could alone be expected to swing the American energies and resources into the rhythm of a tremendously expanded war production. Mr Willkie is cautious and clever. He did not oppose the sale of the American ships of war: he merely advocated a different process of authorising the transfer—which must have delayed and might have defeated it. The incident is suggestive. Mr Roosevelt is not reckless; but he has never been afraid to use his powers as boldly and resolutely as his sense of situation and his sense of right and wrong directed him. He has, however, frightened the isolationists, he has frightened (and wounded) vested interests, and he has frightened political traditionalists, who see in him (or pretend to see) a dictator disguised as a democrat. “A third term for “Sir Roosevelt would’ mean shattering the “ democratic tradition,” says the “ New York “Times”; and it is a whether the word was spelled “ democratic ” or “ Demov cratic.”

The defection of this powerful newspaper from Mr Roosevelt’s support may or may not be symptomatic of a great popular drift away from him., It was lately reported that in the Maine elections, for all the key offices, the Republicans outvoted the Democrats by two to one. But the significance of such an elec* toral turn-over, even if repeated in other states, may easily be exaggerated. In 1936 there were many indications of a similar sort that the President would be defeated; and one of the most elaborately conducted straw-votes promised a land-slide against him. In the first place much may happen in the course of a few weeks to strengthen Mr Roosevelt’s hand and weaken Mr Willkie’s. The difference between the two men is one that is more likely to turn events dramatically to the President’s advantage than to his opponent’s. Second, the United States electorate may very well be quietly shaping its mood for one of those surprising but'characteristic contradictions, to which the system of government gives free play. It may be preparing to throw out the Democrats but at the same .time to retain Mr Roosevelt. It would be absurd at this stage to predict that this will (happen; but it is necessary to remember that it may happen and not at all difficult to understand why. When every handicap under which the President seeks a third term is estimated, it remains obvious that he still holds an excellent chance in his personal ascendancy and aptitude for leadership, and particularly in his aptitude for leadership bn a plane of realistic idealism. Mr Willkie has disclosed no equivalent power. But in a critical national hour the tendency to turn to one or hold to one who obviously possesses it has an instinctive force which can cut through a mesh of contrary reasons,' Mr Roosevelt probably owed his first election to this’ force, which has more than once been fortunately exerted in the history of the • American presidency. But if it may be thought likely to exert itself again, it is much less likely to save the Democratic Party. OA the contrary, the curious, unconscious principle of compensation which appears in American politics may well harden the electorate against the party whose nominee it places in White House. It may fulfil one large and clear impulse by electing Mr Roosevelt; it may respond to others, more negative, more partisan, more t truly but more narrowly political, by dismissing the Democrats, and feel,' obscurely, that it is licensed to make the first bold decision by its prudence in making the second. Less obscurely, it may feel, as it has felt before, that it has put the necessary check upon the President if it sends the Republicans to take charge in Congress., It need hardly be said that this situation, if it does arise, will be a lamentable one. Under the United States Constitution, the President has large, executive authority, independent of Congress; but it can worry, impede, and block him interminably, and it is one of the most depressing habits of Congress to relish this game of obstruction, and play it out recklessly. If Mr Roosevelt is re-elected, his greatest need will be the support or at least the watchful tolerance of a well-informed, unprejudiced Congress. His executive he can make and remake to suit his plans. But Congress can undo, or disastrously hold up, a programme in which, from Great Britain’s 1 point of view, two things are essential, the courage to think across the Americap frontiers and the determination to work fast within them. ,