The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1940. Finland and Russia

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23002, 23 April 1940, Page 8

The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1940. Finland and Russia

A detailed indictment of the conduct of the Soviet in its negotiations with Finland in October and November is contained in an official report, “ The Development of Finnish-Soviet “ Relations,” which has been published by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report, which consists for the most part of official documents, makes no resort to polemics in telling of the dispute and its consequences. It sets out simply and directly the territorial guarantees given by Russia at the Tartu Peace Conference in October, 1920, when the chairman of the Soviet delegation declared that his Government recognised the right of selfdetermination of nations as a principle of its international policy. In the treaty negotiations, however, the Soviet went further, and acknowledged the territorial limits of Finland as they existed when Finland was a Grand Duchy of the Tsarist Empire. Even at that time the security of Leningrad was, according to the report under review, very fully and exhaustively discussed and the Finnish Government agreed to make concessions limiting its defences on the Karelian isthmus to those of a nonaggressive character, abstaining altogether from fortifying a number of strategic islands in the Gulf of Finland. The report then advances the very sound argument that for the succeeding 19 years relations were so amicable between the two countries that no cause for dispute was found until July, 1939, when negotiations were in progress 'by Britain, France, and the- Soviet for a three-Power pact. At that time Finland was given a foretaste of present-day Russian diplomacy when the Soviet desired her to accept a form of guarantee which she immediately construed as endangering her neutrality and independence. Finland refused the offer on grounds which were reasonably stated, and for various reasons the plan was abandoned, but it cast a portentous shadow over the future. On the outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, Finland’s declaration of neutrality was prompt and clear, and it was communicated in an exchange of Notes with the Soviet- Finland watched with some alarm the diplomatic pressure exerted by the Soviet on the three Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which resulted in the grant of defence concessions to the Soviet- When the Finnish representative in Moscow received a request from the Soviet Government on October 5, 1939, that Finland should send a delegate to Moscow ior the purpose of negotiations, the Finnish Government had good reason to expect that proposals similar to those made to the Baltic States would be made to Finland. The history of those negotiations, at least in the broad lines of their development, is fairly generally known. It is told, with the inclusion of much important detail, in the official language of the report. If there was ever any doubt about the peaceful nature of the relations between Finland and the Soviet, it is dispelled by the tenor of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the two countries concluded in 1932, and extended in 1934 on Russia's initiative to December 31. 1945- On October 5, the Finnish Minister in Moscow was summoned to the Kremlin and informed that the Soviet desired “ an exchange. of views with the Finnish Gov- “ eminent in regard to certain concrete ques- “ tions of a political character.” Three days later the Soviet Minister in Helsinki called on the Finnish Foreign Minister (M. Erkko) and an an interview wliidi carefully noted complained of the appointment of M. Paasikivi as Finnish delegate, and demanded that M. Erkko himself shoidd go to Moscow. This attempt at brow-beating was firmly but politely resisted by M. Erkko, who said that M. Paasikivi as a former Prime Minister, was fully competent to represent Finland, and that in any case any decisions must be made by the Finnish Parliament, It is interesting to observe from the report that the Soviet Minister informed M. Erkko that the negotiations would be of a grave character, but there is no bint in the recorded conversation of what the nature of the negotiations would be. Perhaps the most interesting item in the report is the publication of the original instructions issued to Mi Paasikivi on October 9 for his visit to Moscow. These set forth with the greatest possible clarity the interpretation which M. Paasikivi was to place on his mission. They Instruct him that Finland’s independence and neutrality are not to be made the subject of any bargaining- But it is equally clear that Finland had reason to expect that demands would be made of her, similar to those which had been made of the three Baltic States, Even here Finland’s readiness to go to the farthest possible limit of concession is shown in the particular instructions to M. Paasikivi. Soviet interference with the A aland islands is ruled out, but M. Paasikivi is told that Russian demands for consideration of the security of Leningrad can be discussed, and he is further given a line of instruction on the conditions suggested for the cession of Finnish territory in the Gulf of Finland. The subsequent negotiations and exchange of Notes show clearly that Finland was prepared to enlarge her concessions, the main exception being her refusal to sell or lease the port of ' Hanko to Russia for use as a naval base. The reasons for such refusal were and are obvious. Even when the negotiations had broken down on Russia’s insistence on the cession of Hanko. , the Finnish delegates left Moscow only after _ clearly expressing their willingness to enter s later on further negotiations. The indictment : of Russia’s deliberate aggression concludes with , the message addressed to M. Molotov by the j Finnish Foreign Minister on December 14 in which, at a time when the Finnish army had shown every sign of putting up a long and bitter resistance, the Government made an oiler to reopen negotiations to settle the disputed questions without resort to bloodshed. The absence of any reply to this message speaks for Itself.