THE LANSING NOTE

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22804, 1 September 1939, Page 10

THE LANSING NOTE

In October, 1918, when it became apparent that the final collapse of the German armies in the west had be«*un. the United States Government took the initiative in proposing to the Allies on one hand and to .Germany on the other that a peace should be negotiated on the basis of the proposals put before the American Congress by President Wilson on January 8 (the famous “fourteen points”). In the middle of October the Supreme War Council, with the addition of Colonel House, representing President Wilson, had discussed the fourteen points with a view to removing certain obscurities. This task having been completed, Mr Robert Lansing, the American Secretary for State, communicated to the German Government, through the Swiss Government, a note which declared the willingness of the Allied Pov s “to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms laid down in the President’s address to Congress in January, 1918. and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent The German Government accepted" these terms and the armistice was declared. It is on the basis of this note that the German press is now claiming a territorial revision between Germany and Poland. President Wilson and Poland In order to understand the bearing of .the Lansing Note on the Polish question, it, is necessaiy to recall that 'President Wilson’s thirteenth point was as follows: — An independent Polish State should be, created which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. and whose political and economic integrity should be guaranteed by . international cove-, nant. ! German propagandists lay all the emphasis on the phrase “which should include the territories inhabited by in-’ disputably Polish populations.” Their argument is that the Polisli settlement imposed upon Germany at the Peace Conference was .a. clear violation of "President Wilson’s thirteenth point and therefore a violation of the terms on which the German Government of 1918 had agreed to negotiate for peace. No Precise Meaning An impartial student of this phase of the Polish question would perhaps content himself with the conclusion that the thirteenth point is so loosely worded that it cannot be given a precise meaning. On a legalistic interpretation, the phrase which German propagandists regard as sc important does not mean that the new Poland should consist exclusively of territories ' “jn-habited-by i indisputably Polish populations.” There is nothing in the-word-ing which is inebnsistent with the inclusion of territory which, though not properly Polish by ethnogranhic standards, is. necessary to give Poland “a free and secure access to the sea.” Most of the evidence goes to .show ihat up to the .time the Peace Conference met there was no precise and generally accepted interpretation of the thirteenth point. The meeting of the Supreme War Council already referred to was presented by Colonel House with an official American commentary on the President’s peace programme. The comment on the Thirteenth poifit was as follows: — The main problem is whether Poland is to obtain territory west of the Vistula separating the Germans in East Prussia from the Reich,, or whether Danzig can bemade into a free port and the Vistula internationalised. ■ t . This shows clearly enough that when the Peace Conference met the Polish question was, in its most Important aspect, an open question. The actual text of the Lansing Note and the documents immediately relevant to it afford, therefore, no secure basis for Germany’s claim that her present boundaries with Poland were imposed fipon her in contravention of the terms on which she had agreed to negotiate. German’ propaganda is on much surer ground when it draws attention to Mr Lloyd George’s vigorous and fit times impassioned opposition to the Polish boundaries finally estab-, lished and to the uneasiness of many English and American authorities on European affairs over the Corridor. ’ Peace Conference’s Task The Peace Conference had to choose one of the three ways of giving Poland access to the sea through Danzig.

Basis of German Claims VERSAILLES AND THE POLISH PROBLEM '• '■}> ■ (SPBCXALLI -WRITTEN TOR THE PRESS.) [By L.C.W.] During the last few days the German press has been citing the Lansing Note, of November, 1918, in support of its claim to a revision of the Polish-German frontier. The following article shows the relation of the Lansing Note to the Polish question.

The first was the inclusion of the pro. vince of Pomorze in Poland; the sec* ond was by union between Poland and 1 Lithuania; and the third was by aa international agreement guaranteeing Poland certain transit rights over German territory, including free zones in the ports of Stettin, Danzig, and Koenigsberg, and by the internationahsa*. tion of the Vistula. The second solution was ruled out on the ground that it violated the principle of national' self-determination. The third solution, • which was put forward-by Germany, was rejected because it would have left Poland too much at Germany’s mercy. Accordingly, the .first solution was adqpted. The crucial debate on this question at the Peace Conference took, place in March, 1919., when the report'of' the Polish Commission was presented to the "Council of Ten.” Mr Lloyd George immediately protested againrt a settlement which would assign mere ■ than 2,000,000 Germans to Poland and - which would divide Prussia. Prophetically, he argued that the enlargement of Poland beyond its ethnic boundaries would be a source of weakness rather than of strength and appealed to y President Wilson, to oppose the commission’s report because it violated the principle of national self-deter-munition, of which he was the cham-.'V pion. The President, however, said that" it was a matter of balancing ethnic, economic,- and strategic fac- -■ tors, and that In his opinion Poland could not have secure access to the sea without the‘Corridor. .Moreover, ho pointed out- that the greater part of ~ the German : minority m Poland was . the result of the deliberate policy of - colonisation -pursued- for more than,a • century by the German Government. Mr Lloyd George also protested against -.j ithe matter being decided “on ex parte evidence alone,” and suggested that a German opinion should be sought. M. Camboh answered frigidly that “it • ‘ was quite true that the commission had only heard the Poles, but he was not aware of any intention on the psrt of the conference to listen to the Germans.” ' . In his final attempt to persuade the Polish representatives to be more / modest jin /heir .demands, Mr Lloyd George spbfee -witfi iankness which. drew upon him a storm of abuse from, the Northcliffe preps, which was then recklessly encouraging Polish chauvinism. Speaking of the small nations which the' conference was seeking to. - liberate, he said: “They are more im- ; perialist, believe me, than either Engr land or Fiance.' It fills me with despair - as a man who has fought all his lif? ... for little nations.” • I' Poland’s Claim to Pomorze ’■ J ■;;! Although, the subject of ethnic boundaries in eastern Europe can be der : bated endlessly, there can be no doubt that the- Poland created by the Peace /> Conference was vastly larger than the y Poland Which the conference would/ _ have created had it sought tp" apply as - , closely: as possible the principle of- . national self-determination. But it/, must further be noted that, according,/; to an overwhelming majority of impartial experts Pomorze (the Corridor.-:,/ province) is historically and ethnically/ '■ Polish. • Whether, in spite of this, it / . was wise to destroy the territorial - unity of the most important of the German states is another question.- ' , Actually, in so far as the Poland of V-to-day violates the principle of national self-determination the country rriost in- /; jured is Russia. It is not' easy to jus- y 'tify the inclusion of 4,000,000 Ukrainians / in Poland, and still less easy to justify / Polish treatment of them. Whether the / delimitation of the Polish-Gentian, /j frontier was wise is a matter of ;/ opinion. Critics of the Peace ence will point to the present situation as. justifying the prophecies made at yi the time, that the Polish Corridor''/ would be Jhe cause of the next Euro-/;) pean war. On the other hand, it is impossible l to conceive of any other ar- -JA rangement which would have given Poland access to the sea. There might /« be no trouble between Poland and Ger- / many to-day if the Corridor had not £ -been created; there might also be no /. Poland. Moreover, economically the /- arrangement has been an excellent one. v Danzig has been more prosperous as a _ free city and as part of the Polish Customs Union than she ever was as part y. of Germany; and although it may injure the national pride of East Prus- : sians to cross alien territory every . time they visit Berlin, they must at least admit that the Corridor has never caused them serious inconvenience. /