Military Aid for France

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22661, 16 March 1939, Page 10

Military Aid for France

Mr Hore-Belisha’s statement on the Army estimates, now being discussed by the House of Commons, marks the most important and controversial change in British military policy since the Great War. It is generally agreed by military experts that the net result of the mechanisation of armies and the development of automatic weapons has been to make the defensive power even more superior to the offensive than it was in 1914. The verdict of the British official history of the Great War is that “ in a conflict between foes of the same stand- “ ard of skill, determination, and valour, num- “ bers approaching three to one are required "to turn the scale effectively”; and it can be assumed that at present a substantially greater superiority would be required. For this reason popular and expert opinion in Great Britain has for several years been against the participation of a British land force in a European war. By the time a British expeditionary force could be transported to France, it is argued, the French arid German armies would be deadlocked; nor could a large enough force be sent to create a superiority sufficient for a successful offensive. Moreover, it has to be remembered that the development of the air arm since 1914 and the more recent increase in Germany’s submarine strength have immeasurably increased the transport difficulty. Hecent Army exercises suggest that the War Office and the Admiralty have already abandoned the idea of using Channel ports for the dispatch of troops in war time; and the use of ports further west means considerable loss of time. Finally, it is obvious that, in another war, the defence of the Empire will impose a much greater relative strain on Great Britain’s military resources than it did in 19141918. Mr Hore-Belisha, seemed to admit as much when he emphasised the need for maintaining the strength of overseas garrisons and announced that his Government no longer intended to rely on a single strategic reserve situated at the centre of the Empire. “The “more one takes the measure of the Army’s “responsibilities for the defence of the Em- “ pire,” writes Captain Liddell Hart, “ the more “essential it seems to avoid assuming such a “ Continental commitment as that into which “we were drawn, by degrees, in 1914-18.” A policy based on this assumption does not, however, involve leaving France to fend for herself in the event of an attack by Germany. German intervention in Spain, which has probably been more effective than Italian, shows how much can be done to strengthen an ally by sending, not a complete land force, but technical equipment and specialist personnel. France’s trained reserves are so enormous that this type of assistance would probably be more effective than whole divisions. What makes the change in British policy more difficult to understand is the changed European situation since Munich. In the period between 1918 and

the Munich settlement, when the French system of alliances dominated Europe, a British expeditionary force might have operated with decisive effect in a European war. That system of alliances is now shattered beyond repair. Xt seems a curious policy to prepare for intervention only after surrendering the strategic advantages which would have made effective intervention possible.