JAPAN’S "IMMUTABLE" POLICY

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22593, 24 December 1938, Page 18

JAPAN’S "IMMUTABLE" POLICY

Jettisoning of Nine-Power Treaty HOSTILITY TOWARDS BRITAIN FOMENTED [By H. G. V/. WOODHEAD, C.8.E., Special Correspondent of 'The Press" in China.] In this article Mr -.Woodhead discusses the Japanese viewpoint of the situation created by Japan’s invasion of China and of the events that led up to the invasion.

Intelligent criticism of a controversial issue demands a statement and appreciation of the case of the "other side." On November 3, 1938, the Japanese Government issued a statement which was declared to embody "the immutable policy and determination of Japan.” Though it does not mention the Nine-Power Treaty, it is obvious that this statement implies its repudiation. It is therefore of sufficient importance to demand textual reproduction of the official translation: “By the august virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have captured Canton and the three cities of Wu-Han, and all the vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government exists no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists in Us anti - Japanese and pro - Communist policy, our country will not lay down its arms —never until that regime is crushed. “What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will ensure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign. “This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination among Japan. Manchukuo. and China, in political, economic, cultural, and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realise a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed is the way to contribute towards the stabilisation of East Asia and the progress of the world. “What Japan desires of China is that that country wUI share in the task of bringing about this new order in East Asia. It confidently expects that the people of China will comprehend fully its true intentions, and that they will respond to the call of Japan for their co-operation. Even the participation of the Kuomintang Government would not be rejected if, repudiating the policy •which has guided it in the past, and remoulding its personnel, so as to translate its rebirth into fact, it were to come forward to join In the establishment of the new order. “Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correctly appreciate its alms and policy and will adapt their attitude to the n€w conditions prevailing in the Far East. For the cordiality hitherto manifested by the nations which are in sympathy with us. Japan wishes to express its profound gratitude. “The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in, complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded: to achieve such a task is the exalted responsibility with which ’ our present generation is entrusted. It is. therefore, imperative to carry out all necessary Internal reforms and with a full development of the aggregate national strength, material as well as moral, to fulfil at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation. “Such the Government declares to tie the Immutable policy and determination of Japan." Reasons for Change The writer has been at some pains to discover the Japanese viewpoint regarding, and justification of, a fundamental change in policy which if pursued must vitally affect the interests of all third Powers in the Far East. It is believed that an analysis thereof may be of assistance in understanding thegravity of the issue and the re*al nature of the problem that now confronts the Western Powders.

vinces, where, in fact, that party had never been popular. Chinese Feeling Hardens In the meantime, however, Chinese national feeling against further concessions to Japan was rising, and the Chinese Government was feverishly rearming, and making no secret of the fact that the potential enemy was Japan. A policy of resistance to Japan apparently united the whole country after the Sian coup, the attitude of the Nanking Government stiffened, and once again it needed but a spark to start a conflagration. It was kindled with the so-called Lukouchiao incident near Peking. The rights and wrongs of that clash are never likely to be definitely established. Japanese forces had the right, under an arrangement agreed to by the Chinese Government in 1913, to manoeuvre in the vicinity. But almost as soon as the incident occurred the situation got completely out of hand. The younger Chinese officers were rebellious, and resentful, at Japan’s demands. Incidents such as the firing upon Japanese troops wither the curtain wall of the Kuanganmen (Chang-i-mcn) at Peking, the Tungchow massacre, and the Pao An Tui’s attack on Tientsin, exacerbated feelings on both sides. The one hope of averting large-scale hostilities lay in limiting the conflict, until a localised settlement could be reached. That the Japanese were convinced that this would prove possible, and were prepared to go to extreme lengths to bring it about, and avoid incidents elsewhere, was shown by the wholesale ahd ruinous evacuation of the Japanese communities from the Yangtse ports and Tsingtao. The Chinese at first appeared disposed to localise hostilities, but Chiang Kai-shek was overpowered by the rising clamour for armed resistance, and rather than risk his armies north of the Yellow river, elected to make Shanghai the main battleground. For this decision the Japanese regard the neutral Powers as bearing a large share of the responsibility. They were not prepared for a Shanghai campaign, which cculd not, in fact, have taken place had the terras of the May, 1932, local Peace Agreement, sponsored by the American, British. French, and Italian envoys, been observed. They had vainly demanded its observance several weeks before the Lukouchiao incident, and, on August 12, a further eleventh-hour appeal for its enforcement. They claim, and claim with considerable reason, that the Shanghai hostilities would have been a physical impossibility if the demilitarised zone of the 1932 agreement had been observed.

Feeling Against Britain The result of Chinese action at Shanghai was to involve Japan in a major war, instead of a brief local campaign in North China. The scale of operations continuously extended, requiring the employment of hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops, and the fighting of big battles at Shanghai, at Hsuchow, and at various points in the Yangtse Valley. From the outset the Japanese Government repeatedly declared its intention to spare no efforts to safeguard, foreign rights and interests in China. And in the earlier phase it gave evidence of the sincerity of this intention. But as Chinese resistance continued, resulting in increasing sacrifices by the Japanese and demanding ever greater military effort, the safeguarding of foreign rights and interests became a secondary consideration, and ultimately the contention was put forward that it was a conditional pledge. It was necessary, in order to placate popular opinion, to find a scapegoat for Japan’s miscalculations, and Great Britain was singled out for this purpose. The Japanese people almost to a man (and woman) have been led to believe that the strength and duration of China’s resistance is attributable to Britain’s assistance to General Chiang Kai-shek. The facts—-which are unknown to the average Japanese—do not, of course, substantiate this view.

Japan regards herself as having been driven into isolation by the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Washington Conference in 1D22. That alliance was intended primarily to maintain the status quo in the Far East, and with its annulment—although the penetration and, indeed, the strengthening of the status quo policy was provided for under the Nine-Power Treaty—Japan' became more and more dubious of the wisdom of upholding this policy, and co-operat-ing to that end with the Western States. This static, self-renunciatory policy became more and more irksome, especially as Japan’s hereditary foe—Russia—was not bound by it, had to all intents and purposes annexed Outer Mongolia, and, in 1929, did not hesitate to invade Manchuria to uphold its rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Although during the period of its extreme xenophobia, the Sovietdirected Kuomintang carefully avoided anti-Japanese excesses, it was evident from the documents seized in the Soviet Embassy raid of April, 1927, that this was a temporary and opportunist phase, and that Moscow was directly implicated in the Kuo Sung-lin revolt, which, but for Japanese intervention, would have led to the overthrow of Chang Tso-lin. The extension of Soviet influence into China, and particularly into Mongolia and Northern Manchuria, became an obsession with the Japanese. They had no- illusions as to the consequences of an extension of Kuomintang influence into Manchuria. And when they failed to prevent the Young Marshal from pledging his allegiance to Nanking, it was inevitable that the “rights recovery” movement should spread to the three Eastern Provinces, and endanger those vested interests which Japan had established there as a consequence of a life and death struggle with Russia. Britain’s conciliatory policy in 1927, and the conciliatory attitude of Baron Shidehara, only seemed to be regarded as evidence of weakness by the Kuomintang leaders. The actual incident which produced the Manchurian invasion was unimportant. A clash had become inevitable unless Japan was to retreat in the face' of Chinese nationalistic agitation. The Status Quo Doctrine It was here that Japan first came into conflict with the status quo doctrine. Though some of her militarists may have cherished wider ambitions from the start there is every reason to believe that a localised settlement could have been reached within a few days, if it had not been for the intervention of the League and the encouragement given to China to hold out for the status quo. The invasion of Manchuria extended, while the League was futrlely beating the air at Geneva, and the gamble on non-resistance by the Soviet to the incursion of Japanese forces into the Chinese Eastern Railway zone was tried, and came off. Japan defied, and successfully defied, world opinion by severing Manchuria from China, and establishing the State of Mancbukuo under tier protection. , But her feud with the Kumintang was not ended. And her militarists were determined that when what they regarded as the “inevitable” conflict With Soviet Russia occurred, they would not be hampered by attacks from the flank or the rear of Manchukuo. Elimination of Kuomintang influence from the northern provinces WOs the next, and most necessary, step. This, in large measure, was achieved by military and political pressure, and by subterfuges such as the creation of the East Hopei Anti-Communist regime, and connivance at wnolesale smuggling. Pressure, financial and political, was thus applied to the Chinese Government to agree to the establishment of a non-Kuomintang administration in the northern pro-

The sympathies of Great Britain —official and unofficial—were overwhelmingly with China. But that was also true of America, of France, and of other democratic States, and of Soviet Russia. The proclamation of a peace blockade, unaccompanied by a formal declaration of war, however, converted Hong Kong—a British Crown Colony—into the main base of supply for China, through which poured thousands of tons of arms, munitions, and military and other supplies. As a neutral, unsympathetic to Japan’s adventure. the British Government could not possibly extend the anti-Chinese blockade to its colony, though, anomalously enough, the bulk of the war materials that passed through the colony were of German, Czechoslovakian, and Italian manufacture or origin. After its experience with sanctions against Italy, Britain was not prepared to apply them to Japan, but she saw no reason for applying them to China —which would, in effect, have been the result of closing Hong-Kong as a port of entry. China’s resistance owed much more to the German Military Mission and German supplies of war materials, and to Soviet assistance with supplies and personnel, than to Great Britain. But British assistance to China, like the Soviet menace, became a Japanese obsession, which made its influence felt on Japan’s official attitude towards Britain and her interests in China. Japanese Aims Expand

“As if increase of appetite had grown by what it fed on,” Japanese aims in China expanded, and her consideration for neutral, especially British interests, diminished. Why, the Japanese asked, after they had forced their way through the booms on the Yangtse between its mouth and, in succession, Nanking, Kiukiang. and Hankow, should British and other interests benefit therefrom? These obstructions, it was argued, had only been forced as a result of intensive military and naval operations, and to permit British and other shipping to take advantage thereof, while most Japanese tonnage was required for military use, and while anti-Japanese feeling still dominated the Chinese, would be equivalent to giving neutrals an initial and probably a permanent advantage in the resumption of trade. It was argued that the neutral Powers had done nothing—not even entered forceful protests—when the obstructions in the fairway were constructed —though on what grounds they could have raised serious objections to Chinese defensive precautions is not clear. Similarly, in various occupied areas; including Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Chefoo, as well as the Yangtse ports, Japan evinced a determination to prevent any neutral interests getting a start of, or even carrying on on equal terms with, her own. Various measures were adopted to this end, including currency restrictions, export embargoes, discrimination against neutral shipping, etc. Of the wisdom of some of these measures, especially the establishment and operations of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Japanese economists themselves appear to be doubtful, but their authorities are unwilling to ad-

Mit, or to rectify mistakes. Their enforcement has constituted an obvious violation of the principle of the Open Door and equality of opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations, and has been denounced as such in numerous protests from neutral governments. Rejection of these protests, without—from the Japanese viewpoint—any untoward consequences, has encouraged Japan to adopt a more and more intransigent attitud'e, and finally to abandon the pretence that she considers herself bound any further by the Open Door and equality of opportunity principle. She has intimated to America, and in the statement of policy of November 3, to all °i if ? eutral Powers, that recognition of their trading and industrial intercsts in China is in future to bo conditioned upon their adapting their policy to the “new situation” in Eastern Asia. In other words she no longer considers herself bound by the restrictions and renunciations of the Nine Power Treaty. Justification of Policy Various arguments have been adduced to justify this attitude. It is claimed, for one thing, that the conditions to-day differ so radically from & os ?.* n that the principles of the Washington Treaty can no longer be considered applicable. It is alleged that the treaty has been invalidated by Chinese violations of its provisions, it is argued that the treaty was only intended to apply when China was in danger of external aggression, whereas now, as a result of the tripartite relationship to be established between Japan, China, and Manchukuo, that menace will be removed. And it will doubtless be contended that there is no justification for the perpetuation of tlie Open Door and equality of opportunity in China, when these principles are violated by discriminatory or restrictive treatment of Japanese trade in other countries. The dominating motive behind Japan’s new policy, however, is the determination that other nations shall ot benefit to the same or to a greater degree than herself, from the enormous sacrifices she has made in the undeclared war upon China. And she is not satisfied to rely upon geographical propinquity and competitive prices to attain this'result. Though the Japanese Finance Minister has repeatedly warned his countrymen that the investment of foreign capital will be imperative for the task of rehabilitation and reconstruction that will follow the cessation of actual warfare, many Japanese appear to doubt this necessity, or alternatively to believe that it will be possible to secure large-scale foreign investments upon Japan’s own terms. Consequently, the possibility of requiring foreign financial co-operation has not, as yet. influenced the Government in the direction of conciliating neutral interests. The Statement of Policy of November 3 was. in effect, a challenge to the neutral Powers. And its immutability will depend upon their response to it. Futility of Protests

Mere protests against the proposed jettisoning of the Nine Power Treaty will be futile. There is no hope of Japan’s reconsidering this policy unless and until she is convinced by actual experience—which may be of indefinite duration —that it will not pay; or, alternatively, unless protests are supported by threats, or the enforcement, of effective retaliation. That is the situation at the moment; and the outlook cannot be considered very promising unless individual protests give way to joint action, on the part of the principal neutral governments. Even then it would be over-optimistic to expect the restoration of the staus quo in its entirety. The Far Eastern situation has been changed by the Japanese invasion. The practical question for the neutral Powers to consider is to what extent, and that will depend upon the degree to which they are willing and able to uphold what they consider their vital rights. A negative policy, a mere reiteration of their intention to abide by the Nine Power Treaty, will be as futile as was the non-recognition principle in the case of IVfanchukuo, and of Ethiopia. Japan’s arguments in support of her policy may not be convincing to the neutral Governments; but they are convincing to the Japanese public, and an acute internal crisis would undoubtedly ensue from any modification that could be interpreted as yielding up the fruits of her victories, merely to placate neutral interests. ,It is not going to be easy, whatever line of action be adopted, to convince the Japanese people in their present frame of mind that the real interests of the nation are incompatible with a policy of antagonising the Western. States.