The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1938. British Foreign Policy

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22591, 22 December 1938, Page 8

The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1938. British Foreign Policy

The House of Commons debate upon Dr. Hugh Dalton's motion of no-confidence in the Government's foreign policy demonstrates the strength of Mr Chamberlain's position and exposes the weaknesses inherent in it: In certain respects, the Prime Minister's argument was unanswerable; but it was not a complete argument, and the nature of his policy denies it completeness. He declared again his belief in the necessity of winning Germany over into " partnership "with others to improve the general lot," if there were to be peace and progress in Europe; and this aim of policy is of course clearly right. As clearly, Mr Chamberlain's steps have all been taken as advances in that direction. Question arises, not over the general object or over the motives of the Government's decisions and actions, but over their validity and sufficiency and effect. Again, Mr Chamberlain reaffirmed the necessity for continued effort in rearmament. Agreement in such form and to such purpose as would remove the necessity had not been reached: Great Britain was " still wait- " ing for a sign from those who speak for the " German people that they . . . are prepared "to make their contribution to peace." This answers the reproach of " going on with re- " armament after Munich," certainly; but Mr Chamberlain appears to simplify the criticism in order to simplify the reply. The Government's critics do not suggest that rearmament should now cease; they suggest that the obvious necessity of going on with it shows how little was achieved at Munich. And this suggestion Mr Chamberlain does not dispose of. On the contrary, his own words strengthen it. He and Lord Halifax are " still waiting." The German leaders have not yet signified—that is, in practical terms—their readiness to " contribute to " peace." It is not yet two months since Mr Chamberlain said that the Anglo-German declaration, with the ink of the signatures barely dry, appeared to have " dropped out of sight "lately"; that he himself, when he signed it, had "meant what was in it"; and that he was " convinced that Herr Hitler meant it, too, when "he signed it." The placing of the last clause gives it a strange undertone of meaning. Mr Chamberlain knows as well as any of his critics, or better, that what was done at Munich averted a disaster, introduced a hope, and afforded time, though perhaps not much time, to begin the solid reconstruction of world peace. This was a valuable achievement; it was also a conditional one. But Mr Chamberlain does not admit that in the heaviness and the nature of the sacrifice made at Munich und in the precariousness of the situation that still exists there appear reasons to fear a policy of " appease- " ment" by concession and surrender and to search, urgently, for the limits and principles and proposals to it may be bound fast. Mr Chamberlain comes no nearer to an explication of these than before. He and Lord Halifax are going to Rome, he said, " not . . . " with any fixed agenda, or with expectations "of bringing away any new specific agree"ment"; they are merely to "exchange views " with Italy upon all or any matters of com- " mon interest," with "a general desire to im- " prove relations by a better understanding of " one another's point of view and, through per- " sonal contact, to strengthen the confidence be"tween us." If these were not the well-worn words of convention, rearranged upon a dozen occasions while Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia have registered the ambition and proved the methods of Germany and Italy, they would pass unchallenged. As it is, Mr Chamberlain is constrained while he uses them to admit and extenuate fresh evidence of Italy's high-handed way with agreements; and though he intelligibly resents or regrets any suggestion that he may " betray any of the causes, or aban- " don any of the vital principles, or sacrifice any " of the important interests either of this coun- " try or any of our friends," the causes, principles, and interests remain vaguely defined, and the Government's policy, accordingly, remains uncertain and therefore disturbing. That Czechoslovakia represented the extreme of the Government's ability to give and readiness to give way has not been declared and will not be confidently assumed. "It is our firm de- " termination that there shall be no sitting still " and waiting for peace to come," Mr Chamberlain said a few weeks ago. "We must take " active and positive steps towards that end." This is admirably said; but it leaves much unsaid and leaves unhappy possibilities open. The critical and anxious truth was well put by Sir Archibald Sinclair, when he said that the Prime Minister "failed to see that the controversy " was not between those who believed in the " inevitability of war and those who did not, " but between those who thought with Mr " Chamberlain that peace would be secured by " appeasing aggression with concessions and " those who believed that one-sided concessions " stimulated the invention of fresh grievances." If Mr Chamberlain does not believe this, and probably he does not, it is nevertheless the weakness of his policy that it permits him to be credited with the belief, abroad as well as at home.