The Press THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1938. Mr Chamberlain’s Speech

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22519, 29 September 1938, Page 10

The Press THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1938. Mr Chamberlain’s Speech

Mr Chamberlain’s wireless address is first and foremost the profoundly moving story of a man who risked humiliating himself and his country to avert war, who had success within his grasp only to see it snatched away by the hands of madmen, and who now stands appalled at the blind onrush of events towards chaos. It is the greatest tragedy of the present situation that his words, which might at this time have a greater power for peace than the desperate makeshifts of diplomacy, can be heard only by those who need no persuading. In Germany, more than 70,000,000 people are being thrown into war without knowing the real issues involved and without knowing that there is no real obstacle to their peaceful settlement. They do not know that they are being asked to die for the liberation of those who are already liberated. The effort now being made by the British and French broadcasting authorities to filter some of the truth through the German censorship is a forlorn one; the effects of months of careful propaganda cannot be counteracted in a few hours.

Mr Chamberlain’s speech is not, however, an appeal or an exhortation; and in so far as it has emotional qualities, they are unstudied and proceed naturally from the subject and the occasion. Primarily, the speech is an account of his part in the events of the last few days and a guarded indication of the attitude of his Government. As such, it deserves minute examination, since it is clear that each word has been weighed. From his narrative emerge two facts in particular which are of first importance in any assessment of the German Government’s responsibility for a situation which makes it difficult to envisage any peaceful solution of. the dispute. One is that the German Government’s demand that specified areas of Czechoslovakia should be occupied immediately by German troops took Mr Chamberlain “completely by surprise.” At Godesberg, that is, Herr Hitler introduced into the discussion demands of which no hint had been given at Berchtesgaden. In the circumstances, it is impossible not to suspect that the memorandum was a deliberate attempt to deadlock the negotiations and make it impossible for Mr Chamberlain to intercede between Herr Hitler and the Czech Government, In short, it was necessary for Herr Hitler to appear to win the Sudeten German areas by a direct threap of force and not through the good offices of Mr Chamberlain. The second ‘ point is that Mr Chamberlain, on the charitable assumption that the hitch was due to a sincere mistrust of the Czech Government’s intentions, offered on behalf of the British Government to guarantee the execution of the undertakings entered into. By so • doing he removed the last reasonable excuse for resort to force or the threat of force. When he came to deal with the immediate intentions of the British Government, Mr Chamberlain was cautious to the point of being enigmatic. Since March of this year, when the absorption of Austria by Germany# forced the Czech problem into the foreground of European politics, Mr Chamberlain has refused to assume further specific military commitments in Europe. The wisdom or otherwise of that policy is now an academic question; having gone so far in the role of unfettered mediator, Mr Chamberlain cannot now do otherwise than keep his hands free until the last possible minute. Those who want to know exactly what the British Government will do if Czechoslovakia is attacked are therefore left guessing. One sentence more than any other will be the subject of their guessing. It reads:-

However much we may sympathise with a small pation confronted by a big, powerful neighbour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account.

Various meanings can be fitted into this curious pronouncement. It might mean that Mr Chamberlain contemplates limited assistance for Czechoslovakia in terms of the covenant of the League of Nations; it might mean that Great Britain will not intervene with her full armed strength until France is endangered; and again it might mean that the situation is still developing and that therefore it is too early for any final pronouncement. The. third of these interpretations is the most probable, for it is hopeful that the search for a formula which will give Herr Hitler what he wants and leave the Czechs relatively secure and independent has not yet been abandoned by the British and French Governments. It remains to be said with thankfulness that, under the heaviest responsibility any man could be asked to bear, Mr Chamberlain has shown a rare combination of greatness and humility, of sound Judgment and imaginative daring. Whatever happens in the next few days, Englishmen will have the consolation of knowing that the nan who spoke and acted for them in the crisis was equal to his task. If he has failed—and it is still too early to say that he has failed—it is because no man could have succeeded.