Security and Change in the Pacific

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22419, 4 June 1938, Page 14

Security and Change in the Pacific

Before the Japanese aggression in China became open and spectacular, indications of the coming conflict were not lacking; and at the sixth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Yosemite, California, in 1936, some of the discussions, lately recorded in “Problems of the Pacific, 1936” (Oxford University Press), came to a deadlock, and failed to produce agreement on courses of action, largely through the dogged insistence of the Japanese on recognition of their “ special “ rights ” in Eastern Asia. It is clear from the tone of the discussions, which may now be followed in this fully documented book, that Japan has come to regard herself as an aggrieved Power, the victim of moral, if not material, encirclement. To the sensitive nostrils of other Powers her hands still reeked of Manchukuo; and she was suspected, moreover, of having little respect for the treaty system established at Washington. The Japanese members of the Yosemite conference could

point to the economic progress of Manchukuo and, to offset the other objection, they could call attention to the breach of the spirit of the Washington treaties by certain Pacific Powers in enacting discriminatory tariff and immigration laws. The group which discussed the changing balance of political forces and the possibilities of peaceful adjustment in the Pacific found Japanese policy a serious obstacle; but it was only one among the many obstacles that prevented the group from laying down any system to accommodate the ambitions and prejudices of the nations concerned. ' Of recent years Japan has felt herself increasingly hedged in. She suffers from a kind of national claustrophobia. Since about 1932 new factors have tended to curtail her dominance of the Western Pacific: the industrial development of the Soviet Far East and the Soviet’s growing military power, the gradual unification of the Chinese under the National Government—a process speeded up by Japanese aggression—and the intention of the Western Powers to be strong enough to guard their interests in the East, as exemplified by the naval building programme of the United States and the completion of the Singapore base by Britain. And it was poor solace to Japan to be told that she could meet her population problem only by greater industrialisation, implying an expanded export trade, when she found that her markets oversea were being closed, in a fever of economic nationalism, by tariffs and quotas. Therefore it was natural that while other nationalities represented at the conference were mainly interested in organising means of collective security in the Pacific, the Japanese laid more emphasis on the need for a system which would enable peaceful changes to be made in the status quo. Most of the members rightly considered that a system of collective security must come first, since “ peaceful change,” unless there was a defensive power able to protect the weaker nations, might become the mere legal registration of changes brought about by force. In view of Australian ambitions, there is special interest in the opinion of some members that the solution lay in a regional pact, supported by sanctions, even though events of the last few months have made such a suggestion to a large extent academic. The argument of a British member, which has been borne out by experience, was that the world is not ready for universal military sanctions and that, to be effective, collective security must be organised on regional lines. He proposed a series of regional leagues or groups, the members of which would have to apply military sanctions only against an aggressor within their own league. There can be little doubt of the truth of the belief behind this scheme, that nations will fight only where their immediate interests are involved; but its weakness, and a prohibitive weakness in present circumstances, is its dependence upon a strong central league, to which the regional leagues would be affiliated. For economic sanctions will fail unless applied by the members of a universal or nearly universal body. Further, it is desirable that an aggressor should be named by such a body, so that no action should appear to be taken in pursuance of a military ■ alliance against one Power. Other objections to a regional pact, inherent in the policies of Pacific countries, were raised. One was found in the naval preponderance of Japan in Eastern Asia and the probability that, if the struggle were military, only Japan, China, and Russia could take part. Another lay in the aloofness of the United States from' international commitments. The difficulty of concluding the pact under the auspices of the League, while Japan and the United States are not members, was clearly seen; and so was the danger to which European outposts, such as French Indo-China and Hong Kong, would be exposed, if Japan were made the victim of sanctions. There was a general feeling, too, that nations remain unwilling to submit their vital interests to the judgment of a third party, and that Japan would let no peace machinery stand in the way of her claims to national expansion. It is not surprising, then, that from the discussions there emerged a choice of two prerequisites to a regional pact for the Pacific. Either the .Western nations must accept Japan's policy of expansion in Asia, recognise Manchukuo, and wring from Japan the best guarantees possible for the preservation of their rights and interests in the Far East; or they must band together to use sanctions in forcing Japan to abandon her aggressive policy, help China, and hope that such a policy would cause the imperialistic sections to lose their grip on Japanese affairs and make way for those more liberal. But the adoption of either of these courses was thought to be most unlikely, the one involving a surrender of principle and the other the threat of serious war and the use of the very methods which other nations were denouncing, when used by the Japanese. Meanwhile the war in China may develop an unexpected solution. So long as the war party can whistle cheerfully enough to keep up the nation’s spirits, Japanese policy will not swerve from its main direction; and it is still driving ahead. Whether this leadership will survive the arduous and exhausting struggle that is predicted from many quarters, or whether less aggressive leadership will displace it, must depend largely on the fortunes of the war. But at least there is a chance that in severe tribulation Japan will find the origin of a wiser policy and a safer future.