The British Crisis and the Dominions

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22339, 1 March 1938, Page 8

The British Crisis and the Dominions

The departure of Mr Eden from the Foreign Office may well unravel another strand in the already frayed bond of Imperial diplomatic unity. If the ascendancy of Mr Chamberlain does indeed mean a retreat from Geneva and a return to the system of bargaining in the open market, the solidarity of the British Commonwealth as a unit in international politics must be weakened. In its early days, When optimism ran high, the League was regarded as the “ deus “ ex machina ” of the British Commonwealth, as the heaven-sent means of allowing six different foreign policies to be reconciled. These hopes have been largely disappointed, but it would be foolish to underestimate the cementing effect of membership of the League. The Covenant, however imperfectly, has laid before the British nations a tangible ideaj and defined, within its limits, the means of realising it. Like the Scriptures, the Covenant has been interpreted variously, but. as the Abyssinian affair showed, it has not been altogether useless as a means of harmonising the Imperial chorus. Further, the League has enabled a small “Imperial Confer- “ enca ” to meet every September at Geneva during the session of the Assembly, and it has done another service to the unity of the Commonwealth by drawing Canadian interests across the Atlantic and preventing Canada from revolving as a satellite in the orbit of her powerful neighbour. But even with a League functioning efficiently there would be ample room for differences of foreign policy. Most obviously, the dealings of the United Kingdom and the Dominions with several important nonLeague States cannot be regulated on Genevan principles. A divergence is possible in the attitude taken up towards regional agreements within the framework of the League, and there are numerous questions which must be settled by the individual governments as they arise—such matters as commercial and industrial disputes and the recognition of new governments. Yet, wide as these loopholes are, no serious breach has occurred on any major article of foreign policy. For example, but for the

anomaly threatened by Mr de Valera’s approach to Italy for an exchange of diplomatic representatives, refusal to recognise the Italian conquest of Abyssinia has been unanimous. It is precisely this nice political understanding—based ultimately on the belief that the League as an institution embodied ideals similar to those of the Commonwealth and that the United Kingdom was wholeheartedly intent on making it effective—that is endangered by Mr Eden’s resignation. Though it can be taken for certain that a Four Power Pact, such as Mr Chamberlain is said to be contemplating, would not bind the Dominions, the legal aspect is of secondary importance. Twelve or 13 years ago the limited liability of the Dominions was officially recognised in the Locarno Pact, under which Britain’s obligations are entirely her own. If this was, as General Smuts gloomily said, “ cut- “ ting the heart out of the Empire,” a Four Power Pact could hardly do worse. While Mr Eden was in office, the Dominions which expressed devotion to the League, as most did, could be reasonably certain that their policies were marching in the same general direction as that of Britain. Now many thinkers in the Dominions may not be so certain; the resolution of the Dominion Council of the New Zealand League-of Nations Union, asking the Government to reaffirm its adherence to the principles of collective security as the only way to peace, is a straw in the wind. A possible conflict between loyalty to London and loyalty to Geneva was foreshadowed, it seems, at the Imperial Conference. In the words of the conference statement on foreign affairs, “ The representatives of the govern- “ ments concerned found themselves in close “agreement upon a number of general propositions which they thought it desirable to set “ out in the present statement.”. But to this was added, probably at the instance of Mr Savage, a saving footnote declaring that nothing in the statement should be held to diminish the right of each of the governments “to advocate and “ support their statements of policy as submitted “ to the Assembly of the League of Nations in “ September, 1936.” As one commentator remarked, “ Here, as in many a scholarly work, “ the sting of controversy is in the footnote.” The conference further gave a reserved welcome to regional agreements, provided they did not conflict with the Covenant and “ in so far “ as they can be made to contribute to the cause “of peace.” How far a Four Power Pact will fulfil these conditions is a question to be pondered. But there is much to support the contention that if Mr Chamberlain’s faith in the League becomes openly faint and perfunctory, the Monroeism of Canada will receive an impetus and the internationalism of the New Zealand and South African Governments will be at odds with. British policy. Yesterday Geneva was in a sense the diplomatic capital of the Commonwealth; to-morrow there may be no such capital at all.