The Press FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1938. Will France Follow?

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22336, 25 February 1938, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1938. Will France Follow?

So much space has been demanded in official statements and published reports by the immediate issue which caused the resignation of Mr Eden that there has been little room for reflection on the position of France. The attitude adopted by France, it should be obvious, powerfully affects Mr Chamberlain’s new foreign policy. Mr Chamberlain may be able to persuade the British public that a “ general European settlement ” must take precedence over the Spanish and Central European problems: but unless he can also persuade France, agreement with Italy and Germany must’ be either impossible or barren. No “general settlement” is possible while French differences with the dictator States remain unresolved. But Mr Chamberlain’s position is tremendously strong. Its strength has been tested time and again in the last two years, when France has chafed at the pretences and dishonesties of the non-intervention agreement. Last October, after piracy in the Mediterranean had strained the agreement to breaking point, France was ready and anxious to open her Spanish frontier. She was, however, unwilling to act alone; and it was Britain’s decision to give non-intervention “ another chance ” which reduced the French again to impotent waiting while Italy and Germany pushed General Franco on towards victory. Mr Chamberlain is no doubt applying the same logic to his plans for an eventual Four Power Pact of Britain, France, Italy,- and Germany. If France could not act alone four months ago, she is far less likely to be able to do so now, with Italian diplomats in London and German representatives, as it were, already booking their passages. But pacts are not made so easily. The obstacles to a Four Power Pact of the kind contemplated were admirably summarised by Mr Chamberlain himself in the House of Commons last Monday: “ Britain was a loyal mem- “ ber of the League of Nations and would de- “ sire to obtain the League’s approval for any “ agreement. If she were able to recommend “an agreement for approval, the situation in “ Spain must not have materially altered dur- “ ing the conversations—either by the sending “of fresh Italian reinforcements to General “ Franco, or by failure of the Italians to im- “ plement the arrangement contemplated in the “ British formula for withdrawal.” This brings to mind immediately the unconcealed duplicity of Italy in her “ adherence ” to the non-inter-vention agreement, the official lies, the cynical assurances, the manipulation of the non-inter-vention committee in playing for time. It cannot be considered unlikely that the new conversations with Britain will demonstrate similar methods of “dictator diplomacy”; and the French may well wonder, as it has been reported, “how far the subsequent reversal of “British foreign policy may go.” They may wonder, too, whether the proposed pact will be merely an impressive structure built on the weak foundation of such “undertakings” as the “gentlemen’s agreement,” entered into by Mussolini and at once broken. They may doubt Mr Chamberlain’s sincerity in seeking the League’s approval for a pact concluded with two declared enemies of the League and all It stands for. And if, as seems possible, the National Government’s position in the country is seriously affected by the change in policy, France may be disposed to stand out of any negotiation for a Western Pact, in the hope that Britain will not be irrevocably committed to Italy and Germany. That, however, is some way ahead. In the meantime, France shares the forebodings of a large section in England. She realises that Italy is willing neither to see General Franco defeated nor to give up her claim to recognition for Abyssinia; but that Italy has in the past found dishonest ways of seeming to yield and in fact not letting go. M. Delbos has said cautiously that “ France would “ decide her course of action in the light of “ Signor Mussolini’s undertakings,” and that “France remained hostile to recognition of the “ Italian conquest of Abyssinia without the 1 “ League’s consent.” If France can reserve freedom of action to that extent, there will be no easy path towards Mr Chamberlain’s pact. Nothing more has been heard of a suggestion that the French Government might resign because of the change in Britain. The basis of this suggestion was the view that, in following the new British policy, the French Government would be badly compromised at home. That the Government remains may indicate at least that France believes she can exert pressure on her own behalf.