The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1938. The Impasse in Spain

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22308, 24 January 1938, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1938. The Impasse in Spain

A month has now elapsed since General Franco launched his much-publicised general offensive on the Toledo, Brunete, and Teruel fronts. The attacks from Toledo and Brunete were directed against Madrid and have had no greater success than previous attacks; indeed, it seems generally agreed that their main purpose was to immobilise a large section of the Loyalist army and that the idea of ending the war by capturing the capital has now been abandoned by the rebels. The main drive had been planned for the Teruel front, the object being to reach the coast and cut off Catalonia from the rest of the Government's territory. The Government's capture of Teruel, its first successful offensive since the early months of the war, upset this plan. In the improbable event of the present rebel counter-offensive succeeding, General Franco may still be able to fulfil his promise of a final victory in the spring; but the opinion is growing that the prospects of a final victory in the field for either side ar- remote. General Franco's superiority in the air and in mechanical equipment is offset by the poor quality of his infantry, both local and imported. On the other hand, although much has been heard of the Government's new army, it has never shown much capacity for largescale offensive operations. Even the capture of Teruel is not an exception to this rule, since the possession of Teruel by the rebels left them dangerously well-placed for an advance which would have isolated the Madrid area. For the moment, therefore, Spain is in effect divided into two belligerent States, each with an organised government and some international status, and neither in sight of victory. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that talk of mediation and a compromise settlement has been revived. Spain, it is suggested, mighthave two governments, just as Ireland has; and Spaniards would be free to choose one or the other. That the British and French Governments would approve some such arrangement is fairly certain; but the attitude of Italy and Germany is difficult to predict. It has been pointed out that the clause in the Anglo-Italian " gentlemen's agreement " relating to the " ter- " ritorial integrity " of Spain can be interpreted as a declaration by Italy that she will not agree to any partition scheme. But since the impending attempt by the British Government to seek a reconciliation with the Rome-Berlin axis is likely to hinge on the Spanish question, and since the burden of intervention is becoming increasingly severe for Italy, the possibility of compromise cannot be ruled out. It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that, even if a partition scheme were accepted by the two parties in Spain, the Spanish question would be at an end. Partition means only the continuation of the war by other means—and those means may be as much a threat to the peace of Europe as what is happening in Spain now. ____^__