The Press THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 1937. The Spanish Crisis

Press, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22109, 3 June 1937, Page 10

The Press THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 1937. The Spanish Crisis

Although it is reported from London that the situation created by the bombing of the Deutschland and the bombardment of Almeria has been eased, it is difficult to believe that much more is implied in that than the relief of discovering that Europe is not yet tumbling into war and that hope of avoiding the crash may still be. entertained. The facts are bad and menacing enough as they remain. In no way that affects the danger, whether to increase it or diminish it, does it matter whether the Deutschland was bombed without provocation or not, whether her commander had a right to anchor her at Iviza or not, whether the German reprisal w&s in any sense justified or not, or whether its severity was immoderate or not. These are serious questions and dreadful ones; but however they are answered the threat of catastrophic developments remains the same. Germany and Italy have withdrawn from the international control scheme; their fleets in Spanish waters are strengthened, it is said, but they are not to participate in the system of naval control to prevent arms-running into Spain. Italy is officially reported to have withdrawn its members from the International Non-Intervention Committee, “ until means are “ adopted to prevent new criminal attacks a declaration which neither in form nor in substance is likely to produce acceptable guarantees. Germany’s action is similar, though a British official wireless message notes “with “ satisfaction ” the declared German intention of standing to the non-intervention policy. But the semi-official message which reports the agreement of Hitler and Mussolini to act jointly against the Spanish Government, if provoked, and “to stand firm in Spain until the end of “ the war,” cannot be disregarded. The clear possibility arises that German and Italian assistance to General Franco’s forces will be facilitated and that the facilities will not be neglected. International co-operation will be heavily handicapped and may very easily break down entirely, while Germany and Italy remain outside the circle of the controlling committee; and if the patrols of the English, French, and Russian fleets are extended to cover the wide gap in the system, the risk of international “ episodes ” must become correspondingly greater. In the circumstances that prevail, the shaky international agreement on the policy to be observed is so far weakened, if it is not already destroyed, and the machinery of consultation is so far broken down, that it would be almost a miracle if time and goodwill and reason enough could be found to interpose checks between some petty incident and ruinous consequences. Imagination need not be unrestrained to picture such incidents and possible sequels; and it is to be feared that all the forceful and persistent statements of the Dominion Prime Ministers may not avail to keep England (and the Dominions) from being “embroiled.” They will certainly not avail to establish and maintain the distinction they draw between “ Empire affairs ” and those—such as war in Spain and over Spain—which are “not Em- “ pire affairs.” What happens in Spain, what Germany and Italy in desperation* or folly determine to bring about in Spain, is a very grave “Empire affair”; and it will not become less grave even if the Empire can, and does, turn its back and shut its eyes.