The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1937. Armaments and War

Press, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22005, 1 February 1937, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1937. Armaments and War

The cable news this morning contains important and characteristic statements by Mr Stanley Baldwin and Mr Neville Chamberlain on British foreign policy in its relation to the growing burden of armaments. Mr Baldwin, in a letter to the National Conservative candidate in the North St. Pancras by-election, holds out the hope of " still further improvement in our " social and industrial conditions provided we " can be assured of the security of peace." In order to guarantee our security (Mr Baldwin adds) it is essential that we should have stronger defence forces, although we all hope the time is not far distant when we shall be able to persuade other nations to agree to a joint reduction of armaments. This can only be secured by patient and prudent statesmanship and the avoidance of headstrong courses of action. Mr Neville Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham, is obviously perturbed over the economic and financial effects of the British rearmament programme. Owing to the rush of armament orders, he points out, many firms are finding it very difficult to fill orders for export, and the danger is that, when the pressure of armament orders eases, these firms will find that their export markets have been lost or seriously diminished. But this aspect of the problem is less serious than the effect of rising taxation and the expenditure of hundreds of millions of pounds on which there can be no economic return. The terrible burden of armaments is bound to pull down the standard of living if nothing is done to reduce it. I cannot help being impressed with the incredible folly of a civilisation which is piling these terrible burdens on the shoulders of the nations. It should be noted that both Mr Baldwin and Mr Chamberlain refuse to regard the situation as hopeless, though it cannot be said that an examination of the rational basis of their hopes is at all encouraging. Mr Baldwin, accepting his inclinations as a guide, puts his faith in "patient and prudent statesmanship and the " avoidance of headstrong courses of action." To the extent that it means coolness in emergencies and a refusal to be stampeded, the formula is a good one. But in Mr Baldwin "patient and prudent statesmanship" is too often opportunism and lack of principle; his " avoidance of headstrong courses of action" has too often amounted to loss of nerve in difficult situations. In any case, caution and prudence are not enough. The world situation is deteriorating with such terrifying rapidity that any government which pursues a passive policy is acquiescing in the inevitability of disaster. Mr Neville Chamberlain is a little more convincing than Mr Baldwin, despite his inclusion of the Mediterranean pact between Great Britain and Italy in the " hopeful features " of the European situation. Mr Chamberlain thinks that the cost of rearmament must lead to a movement for the reduction of armaments. " In " the face of the ever rising burden of taxation," he says, " I cannot but believe that the requisite " goodwill and determination will be forthcom- " ing to bring us some relief." For a Chancellor of the Exchequer that is a natural enough view; but the truth is that the economic burden of armaments, while it may hasten the approach of war, is not at all likely to generate the " requisite goodwill and determination" for a reduction in armaments. No limit can be set to the amount a nation will spend on armaments when it believes its security to be endangered. In Japan 50 per cent, of all government revenue, and more than the whole tax revenue, is being spent on armaments. Mr Hirota's Government was committed to a heavy increase in this expenditure; and now Mr Hirota is out of office because the army leaders do not find him complaisant enough. Most European countries have a long way to go before they reach the Japanese level of armaments expenditure. The prerequisite of national disarmament is national security, and there can be no security for any nation except through a system of collective guarantees. No policy which is not based on acceptance of that truth can do anything to reduce the risk of another world war.