The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1937. Mr Eden's Speech

Press, Volume LXXIII, Issue 21991, 15 January 1937, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1937. Mr Eden's Speech

Mr Anthony Eden's speeches on British foreign policy—another of them was reported in the cable news yesterday—used to make a good impression because they revealed good intentions and because the British public believed it had in Mr Eden a young man who might do things. No one believes that now. It has become painfully apparent that the National Government, because of deep cleavages of opinion and because Mr Baldwin's many virtues do not include a capacity for vigorous leadership, has no long-term foreign policy. It prefers to deal with situations as they arise and to extract itself from difficulties by the method likely to cause least trouble at the moment. Mr Winston Churchill, in one of his brilliantly rhetorical utterances, summed up the position admirably during a recent debate in the House of Commons. Anyone can see what the position is. The Government simply cannot make up their mind, or they cannot get the Prime Minister to make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to.be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing more months > and years—precious, perhaps vital, to the greatness of Britain—for the locusts to eat. In such a Government Mr Eden is a useful Foreign Secretary; he is willing to talk and he is good at glossing over failures. But it is now so apparent that he counts for little in his Government that his good intentions have ceased to command respect. His speeches have become interesting, not for what is said, but for what is left unsaid. In the speech reported in the cable news, he deals with rearmament, the Spanish situation, and the Mediterranean pact. The British Government has, he admits, embarked on a rearmament programme which must before very long impose a strain on the financial and economic structure of the country. For that reason it is deeply anxious for an agreement which will make it possible to limit and reduce national armaments. But what is the British Government doing to bring such an agreement into the sphere of political possibilities? Obviously it is no use waiting passively for the nations to become more peaceable in outlook. The problems of disarmament and security, as Mr Baldwin has insisted, are closely related. But when, at the last meeting of the League of Nations Assembly, Mr Eden was asked to explain Great Britain's attitude to the problem of security, he was verbosely reticent. In effect, the British Government's policy is unilateral rearmament, a policy which at different times most of its members have vigorously condemned. Dealing with the Spanish situation, Mr Eden repeats his homily on the dangers of a "war of doctrines" and says it is essential for the peace of the world that nations should be allowed to choose the form of government most suited to them. What is the British Government doing to enforce these principles? It is, says Mr Eden, " discouraging " intervention in Spain—a feeble word and a feeble policy. Speaking of the Mediterranean pact, Mr Eden is at pains to explain that it is not directed against any third power; That is pathetically obvious. What everyone wants to know is whether the pact is anything more than an effort temporarily to appease a dangerous rival in the Mediterranean. The recent actions of the Italian Government have shown how little the pact hinders its designs in Spain. Mr Baldwin recently complained that, in foreign affairs, democracies are always two years behind their leaders. At present, the British public is far ahead of its leaders in foreign policy and is keenly alive to the dangers the present Government is storing up for the Empire by its unwillingness to think ahead. The Spanish situation illustrates the point. If General Franco wins and owes his victqry to help from Germany and Italy, Great Britain's position in the Mediterranean will suffer damage which no amount of expenditure on Malta and Cyprus and no bargain with Italy can possibly repair.