The Press FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1936. Two Views of Rearmament

Press, Volume LXXII, Issue 21939, 13 November 1936, Page 8

The Press FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1936. Two Views of Rearmament

It was unfortunate for Sir Thomas Inskip that, on the day of his statement on defence policy to the House of Commons, Mr Stanley Baldwin should elect to discuss the same subject at the Mansion House banquet. Sir Thomas Inskip was frankly elated at the progress of British rearmament and apparently had no misgivings over its ultimate consequences. Given “ proper “ precautions ” oh Great Britain’s part, he said, another war was not inevitable. If, however, another war did occur, and Great Britain became involved, she “could never give up till “ she was safe again.” And finally,, emulating M. Litvinoff, Herr Hitler, and Signor Mussolini, he permitted himself a gesture of defiance and warning.

We are still an island, and, when ah has been said and done, we have a long start over anyone ill-advised enough to meddle with our treedom. If we cared to use our great resourcea, I cannot see any reason why that freedom should ever be in jeopardy.

Even the development of air power and recent events in the Mediterranean have not shaken Sir Thomas Inskip’s confidence. The navy is still the first line of defence; and since sailors have been able to cope with mines and toipedoes there is no reason to suppose that they will not be able to cope with the air menace. Mr Baldwin, on the other hand, contemplates the future with a kind of tranquil despair. Although he recognises that rearmament is for Great Britain inevitable and necessary, he is “ conscious all the time of the folly of it to all “of us.” Not for him the luxury of selfdelusion. Increased expenditure on armaments may bring a temporary and spurious prosperity; it may for the moment mean security; but. over the long period the piling-up of arms will bring war nearer and the financial burden will create discontent and despair. Sir Thomas Inskip may dream of Great Britain fighting her way through the next war to a new security; Mr Baldwin sees that another war means “ the “degradation of the life of the people and in “ the end anarchy and world revolution.” It could be wished that all members of the, British Government had Mr Baldwin’s capacity for looking steadfastly at the truth, or that Mr Baldwin’s control over national policy was in proportion to his grip of realities. British rearmament can be a stimulus to world rearmament; it can also exercise a steadying influence on the world situation and mark the beginning of a return to sanity. The consequences will depend on the policy of the British Government; and at present the Government seems to be divided between two views of the purpose of rearmament. Sir Thomas Inskip thinks in terms of a Great Britain so strong that no country will dare to attack her. This attitude is based on a romantic illusion. It ignores the fact that the British Empire is the most vulnerable military unit in the world and it ignores entirely the manner in which wars arise. If Great Britain becomes involved in another major war, it will not be because some other power has attacked her without provocation. It will be because a situation has arisen which compels her to go to war in defence of her vital interests. In other words, Great Britain will not escape war merely because she is strong enough to frighten off would-be aggressors. The other view of British rearmament, arid the original justification for it, is that it is intended to enable Great Britain to make a more effective contribution to the attempt to create a system of collective security. If that attempt is persisted with, and if the problem of collective security is seen in its relationship to the allied problems of disarmament, treaty revision, raw materials, and international trade, there is still some slender hope of averting the disaster foreseen by Mr Baldwin. As Dr. J. B. Condliffe points out, the time Is not entirely unpropitious. Economic distress, which in the last few years has done so much to drive certain governments into reckless policies, is now much less prevalent; and the currency agreement which has followed the devaluation of the franc provides a basis for the long-de-layed revival in world trade. Great Britain can still, if she wishes, reassume her leadership in Europe. The danger is that the British Government will miss the opportunity by seeking the impregnable isolation Sir Thomas Inskip dreams of or by concentrating shortsightedly on the preservation of a favourable balance of power.