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The Press Friday, August 12, 1932. The New Naval Policy.

Great Britain's two-year programme of naval construction, which, according to the message from London yesterday, provides at least 43 new ships at a total estimated cost of £20,000,000, is at once the logical outcome of the 1930 London Treaty and the changes in naval thought that have taken place since the War. Before 1914, £17,000,000 was spent on the construction of nine battle-cruisers. In 1932 a smaller sum is spent on five times as many small ships of several kinds, but mostly destroyers and light cruisers. Of course the dispositions of the Treaty, with its bewildering schedule of categories, partly control the types and tonnages of the programme; but behind that and with that there is working, no doubt, new thought on tha naval needs of the Empire. Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, in some interesting remarks on this subject in the Nineteenth Century last year, recalled that the unwritten theory underlying English policy a century ago was that in war the political object is security in the widest sense, and security to be attained by battle. But after a hundred years " the policy of build- " ing battleships of ever-increasing size " was further developed with the view "to overawe any possible enemy and " thus to avoid the need of battle." An extreme large cruiser policy was pursued, few if any small ships were built, no thought was given to the value of a convoy system in time of war, and, " seemingly, the security of the sea- " borne trade was to depend upon suc- " cess in the search for enemy ships on "the high seas." The trouble about building gigantic battleships is that other nations can follow suit. Barfleur commented in 1904: "The new depar- " ture . . . swept away a large proportion of the force available for the " convoy service and protection of "trade, which will certainly be neces- " sary in time of war." Other nations did follow suit; and when the War broke out serious losses among merchantmen sent heavy cruisers to sweep the seas in search of raiders, while the number of suitable ships available as escorts was small. Admiral Custance considers that the convoy system is " the only really effective method whioh " the Navy can apply to give security " to sea-borne trade against any really "serious attack." The futility'of attempting to patrol "80,000 miles of "trade routes, to say nothing of the "wide areas, with only one cruiser to "2500 miles," was hardly recognised at the 1921 Washington Conference, where 10,000-ton cruisers were advocated; but it was forced on the attention of the delegates at London by tho practical terms in which parity and proportion had to*be worked out. The detailed building programme now announced will settle the minds of many who have been anxious about the turn of British naval policy at the crossroads; and it will comfort others by its promise of a force essentially defensive.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19320812.2.50

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20623, 12 August 1932, Page 10

Word Count
488

The Press Friday, August 12, 1932. The New Naval Policy. Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20623, 12 August 1932, Page 10

The Press Friday, August 12, 1932. The New Naval Policy. Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20623, 12 August 1932, Page 10