America and the League.

Press, Volume LXVI, Issue 20084, 13 November 1930, Page 10

America and the League.

The Washington cable message yesterday, reporting an Armistice Day address by the President, touched on a point of difference between the United States and the members of the League of Nations, in effect the European members, and perhaps with the implication that in this difference lies the reason why the United States will not join the League. Mr Hoover i>aid that Europe believes in methods " which in " the laat resort use force to compel "nations to abide by their agreements " to settle controversies by pacific "means"; America, on the other hand, believes that she can be moat useful, "in " those emergencies in which the* "nations fail to keep their undertakings on the paeifle settlement of djs- " putes," if she ia "free from any ad- " vance commitment or entanglement " concerning the character of our " action." This of course expresses the very strong American distrust of the sanctions clauses of the League Covenant, which, though they have never been operated, provide for military action against an aggressor; and it applies equally to the familiar "security" theory favoured chiefly by French statesmen, who want to guard against specific dangers by specific military alliances. Clearly, a policy under which the nations would be sorted into prospective allies and antagonists in the field would be fatal to the growth of confidence, and therefore to any hope of more rapid disarmament, Although, it is two years since the League declared that the state of international security justified a great advanee in disarmament', yet there has been none except the limited naval agreement in London early this year; and in the light of all the facts, among whieh two stand out, the obligation to disarm assumed in Article 8 of the Covenant and the pacific pledge of the Kellogg Pact, the Foreign Secretary's appeal to the Assembly in September was neither premature nor too vigorous. One of its most interesting features was a 'statement that the British Government hoped to see the Covenant harmonised with the Pact, but would not move for revision until a treaty to reduce and limit armaments j had been signed. The question of re- j vising the Covenant has some bearing on America's attitude to the League, though less or more according to the extent and nature of the revision. One point is simple. The Kellogg Pact renounces war " as an instrument "of national policy," but not war waged in self-defence; and it ignores the possibility of war as an instrument oi international policy, such as is provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, The Covenant (Article 1?), while it binds members to submit to arbitration or to the Council's investigation any dispute likely to lead to rupture, leaves them free to go to war about it, though "in no case until "three months after the award by the " arbitrators the report by the

"Council." This is the "gap in the " Covenant," which it would be easy to close, as the British Government suggested, by making Article 12 an agreement " in no case [to] resort to war and closing it would align the Covenant with the Pact. But there would remain the sanctions clauses and the possibility of a war waged with the authority of the League against a treatybreaker. The problem is whether it is worth while to attempt to conciliate American opinion by revising these clauses, when the attempt would certainly provoke bitter controversy and perhaps even disastrous disagreement. Perhaps, if it were really important to bring America into the League, and if there were only this one obstacle to her entry, the risks might have to be faced. But to think that America stands out of the League because, and only because, she dislikes the sanctions clauses, is to simplify the case much too drastically. Further, if America works with the League—and American co-operation has steadily increased in extent and value—it does not matter much whether she is inside or outside. To associate the United States with the League, through contact and cooperation of every kind, economic, judicial, and social, is easy. The attempt to incorporate her, dangerous and almost certainly hopeless, offers in the remote chance of success no considerably greater advantage.