"NO SECRECY."

Press, Volume LXIV, Issue 19463, 9 November 1928, Page 11

"NO SECRECY."

NAVAL COMPROMISE. STATEMENT TO LORDS. FOREIGN SECRETARY'S ERROft. (beitish official wireless.) (Received November Bth, 5.5 p.m.) RUGBY, November 7. Lord Cushendun,. who is ActingForeign Secretary in the absence abroad of Sir Austen Chamberlain, made a statement in the House of Lords on the Anglo-French compromise. Lord Cushendun said he welcomed the opportunity of saying something regarding the immense amount of misunderstanding, and a good deal of- misrepresentation, respecting this matter. He denied that there had been any secrecy whatever before any agreement was reached. At the earliest possible moment ;t was publicly announced that conversations were going on with a view to arriving at an agreement with the French. A compromise was reached on July 28th, and two days later, on July 30th, the terms of it were telegraphed to the Japanese, Italian, and United States Governments. On the same day the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, announced in the House of Commons what had been done. Sir Austen Chamberlain's statements must have conveyed to any ordinarily intelligent person the whole nature or the transactions, but be would make this admission, that Sir Austen did not give the actual terms of the compromise. "I am quite free to admit that if it had been possible for him or anyone else at that time to foresee, the extraordinarily wild, and in many cftßCfi malicious, rumours and innuendos that sprang up, not immediately but after a short time, I have very little doubt that he would have published the terms of the compromise, and would have explained to the foreign Governments that this departure from the ordinary courtesies of international intercourse was for a good reasoii, which it would have been possible to make them understand. Unfortunately, very shortly afterwards, Sir Austen's health broke down, and he was not responsible for anything that subsequently occurred."

"Mischievous Suggestions." Lord Cushendun, continuing, related how the mischief began with unauthenticated statements in certain French newspapers in August. They reierred to a secret alliance and alleged that arrangements had been reacned tor pooling the two navies. It was not unnatural that statements of that sort caused misgiving in Germany, Italy, and the United States. He had become Acting-Foreign Secretary in place of Sir Aiisten Chamberlain, and the mnuendos grew. When he was at Geneva he decided to do something to stop the false reports, and on August 30th he made a statement, giving all the circumstances of the negotiations. What, asked Lord Cushendun, was the precise charge against the Government ? Tho Government was constantly being exhorted to proceed with disarmament, and no one was more anxious thati the Government to encourage- and push on with a policy of disarmament in every way that might be practicable. By what conceivable method could we compose our differeiices frith the French except by the method that .had been .adopted by talking together, by consultation,"by seeing whether by give and take it Was possible, to arrive at an arrangement P Bv what special Method could we darry out what we all agreed we Wanted to get—international agreement P Critics of the Government shorted it to base its international relations upon agreetaent, arid in the same breath denounced it when it adopted the only method for arriving at ah agreement. One of the most pernicious and mifisuggestions which had been tnade was that because we arrived at an agreement with One nation it must nettesSarily imply hostility to some other nation. It was said in some quarters that this agreement involved an Anglo-French combination against Gerto&fiy, at aiiother time an AngloFrench combißatiOn against America, and he waiis liot sure if they were opt saving the same in regard td Italy, ur course, therd was not the _ .smallest shadow of foundation or evidence to stipport such innuendos.

No Commitments.

Lord Cushendun proceeded to ask whether tie actual terms of the comptomise Were bad in themselves. The criticism that we had allowed the Frenoh to have unlimited small submarines and unlimited smiill cruisers, and that by so doing we were, apparently conferring dome immunity upon the French Which they had not at present rested upon a complete fallacy. The French had complete freedom at present to build- aS iniiiiy small submarines and cruisers as they chose, and the ohly thing we had to consider was: Could we mftke gome arrangement that would be some limitation upon this unlimited building? , In order to get some limitation we were willing to give up something that we certainly desired t0 have. The whole question was: Would it or would it not be better thaft nothing t He entirely denied that the effect or these negotiations had been actually to set back the cause of disarmament. They had done nothing of the sort. What they had done, and ho did not wish to minimise the regret which he felt, was to put ua back in exactly the same position as though we had -hot made these proposals for a compromise at all. It meant that We had to fiftd some other Wfty. fie had been aSked what were our commitments. He could not state too emphatically that there were no commitments. There neve* had been any, but nothing had been done to disturb the warm and friendly feeling which we had towards the French, even although this particular attempt to agree upon the principles Of disarmament had unfortunately not been successful.

Military Reservists. On the question of military reservists, added Lord Cushendun, it would be necfess&ry before very long for the Government to give instructions to its representatives at Geneva. Those instructions had not yet been even considered, but we were under no obligations. We could, if we liked, insist Upon ouf own view regarding military but he did not suggest that we were likely to do so, because he believed that it would be absolutely futile. Although our view was that without including reserves disarmament must be ineffective, the Continental nations believed that they could carry out a large measure of disarmament by totally different methods. It was no use going to Geneva at all unless one were willing, in a sufficiently good cause, to surrender one's oWn point of view, and consent to give as well as take. He repeated that although this particular failure had not given any definite setback to the cause of disarmament, Be agreed that it was very disappointing that it had not given ,f & yefj large fillip as it would have dope if it had succeeded. We must not be discouraged, but must try to find some other mode of approach to a general agreement .