The Press Saturday, January 16, 1926. Meaning and Materials of History.

Press, Volume LXII, Issue 18591, 16 January 1926, Page 12

The Press Saturday, January 16, 1926. Meaning and Materials of History.

The great German scholar and theologian, Adolf von Harnaek, lias been, at intervals during the past twenty years, re-issuing in the form of volumes, the vast scattered mass of his "Addresses " and Essays." He has recent]}* put out the fourth volume, to which he gives the German title, " Erforschtes " und Erlebtes." It is not easy to convey the meaning of these two words in two corresponding English' words; but, paraphrased, the sense is—" the com- " bined fruits of my researches and my " life-experience." The contents of the volume are miscellaneous, and exhibit Harnaek in all his versatility and mastery. The opening address is on " The Certainty and the Limits of His- " torical Research"; and to this we should like briefly to direct attention, j though the matter is already so condensed that it is impossible to present 1 any clear conception of it within the limits of an article. We will take a few concrete points. Dealing with the factors which constitute the history of a race or people, Harnaek classifies them into three groups. The first he terms the elementary or materialistic group: that is, the actual physical (and, in a sense, spiritual) conditions, under which the race has developed. Such are climate, soil, food-supply, and suchlike. Within the limits imposed by these conditions a race or individuals may develop into higher or lower forms; but the important (almost tragic) fact is that neither race nor individual can transcend them; the limitations which they impose arc for ever insurmountable. And Harnaek adds that so powerful is the influence of this group of conditions in determining the course of history, that attempts are made from time to time to limit historical investigation wholly to their

operation. The second factor or group of conditions carries us a stage higher. To it belong all organisations that tend to the promotion of culture in its widest sense. Such are the State, Churches, Societies, Schools, all that works for the promotion of morality, religion, art, science—all these, in their co-operation with, or opposition to, the great historical events and occurrences, constitute this second class. They supply copious material for gaining an insight into the evolution of a people; so much so that, here again, as before, there are historians wlio build on them as the sole infallible foundations for tracing

the course of such evolution. With the third class we come to one of Harnack's favourite themes, over which he waxes enthusiastic: the power and influence of commanding personalities or dominant individualities in shaping or turning the course of history. He denounces the blindness or shortsightedly stupid obstinacy of those who refuse to recognise the potency of individuality. To escape from such recognition, they have recourse to a mysterious collectivism, of which the individual is merely the accidental exponent or symbol. But, he rejoins', no amount of adding together of a multitude of feeble units will produce a substitute for one overmastering unit. The great personality is one who can bring' a historical movement to its consummation or create a new one. In fact, . everywhere " even our great, fertilis- " ing ideas and institutions are merely "the long shadows of significant men; "and our whole spiritual and tech- " nical inheritance is merely the capital " which they have accumulated, and represents the progressive energy of " their lives. No wonder that we have " actually had a historian who represents the whole course of history as "merely the achievement of its great "individuals." In another connexion Harnack gives a number of examples of big, determinative historical movements, which, however disguised as collective or national, really due in each case to one dominant personality. Harnack will not hear of " Laws of " History," or a " Science of History." Such claims are mere empty phrasemaking. Laws imply Science; Science implies Laws; and both imply the power of prediction. History presents no such power—not even the qualified power of prediction possessed by an imperfect science like Meteorology. Where do we stand, then? Is history merely a concocted fable? This is a "counsel of despair," which is frequently on the lips of diplomatists and politicians, and has been emphatically expressed by one greater than any of them. "What have you to gain from "History?" said Goethe to a young historian. "It rests solely on tradition; and tradition is being con- " stantly falsified and distorted, whether "from party spirit, or enthusiasm, "or blind admiration, or blind anti- " pathy, or personal advantage, or even " from deliberate lying or unscrupulous " deception and calumny. • . . Try "the experiment of citing witnesses "in relation to an event which only " happened the day before yesterday, "and caused general excitement; and " see in what a tangled and inextricable "mass of contradictions you will fiud " yourself involved." This is all true, says Harnack; but the task of History is not hopeless; we can still build a solid structure on a sure and solid foundation. There are always three questions to be asked %bout every epoch, the answers to which will yield sure and irrefutable replies: What were the forces that were operative in the given epoch? In what direction did they operate? What was the actual tangible result of their operation? And for answering these questions we have three classes of material. The first is the great epoch-making events. He give's a few examples: The transformation of the Roman Republic into an Empire; the Rise of Christianity; the Teutonic Migration; the Thirty Years' War; the French Revolution, etc. The next is the material monuments or memorials surviving from an epoch. These may ; ra.nge from colossal such :

as the Egyptian Pyramids, down to a tiny work of art or a half-faded inscription. There they are, and their tangible evidence cannot be ignored or gainsaid. And Harnaek dwells especially on the extent to which the study of ancient history has been revolutionised by excavation and the successive discovery and classification of inscriptions. Lastly, there are the institutions of an epoch: its form of government, its laws, its administrative regulations, its public bodies, churches, schools, councils; in fact, the whole regulative machinery of its corporate life.