SINGAPORE.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 18346, 1 April 1925, Page 9

SINGAPORE.

♦" a SUGGESTIVE ESSAY. tfiirt\rnti** interestinsf and suggestive u «rdcd the Hoyden Prize at the was Senate of tho Lmvcreity. K. V>". Connor, of the University 0 f Otago ] 4t tho recent Washington Arms Conference it was tacitly recognised lhat the wealth and power ot Lurope had pas** l into tho keeping of the United States of America, Great Britain and Japan. These three nations, however, far from being in diplomatic concord have, by their divergent policies, given rise to the almost insoluble * "problem of the Pacific/' ijhjs is tho title given to two more or j es s separate questions: — (I) The question of Asiatic Colonisa- ■, fhe question of the Balance ot Power in the China Sea. The question of Asiatic: colonisation . erown simultaneously with the rise f Japan to the. status of a modern Power and to-day this nation is scekf_ everywhere for an outlet for her liamulv excessive population. It is to deny this fact. The Japanese Islands already maintain 370 persons to the square mile—a density which makes her (next to Great Britain and the Netherlands') the most thickly populated country in the world When wo remember that only JU.Uu'J square miles of her total area ot 146.000 square miles is cultivable the urgency of overseas settlement 'incomes ■ obvious. The attempts to colonise Kerea failed owing to the iower standari'of living of the Korean. Later attempts to colonise Yezo and Saghalien failed owing to the fact that these countries are outside the "ltice Belt." Future .Japanese settlement milst, therefore, recognise two rules:— (I.) .Settlement must keep within the "Rice Belt." (II.) Migration must be to those countries with an equal or higher standard of living, or to those countries undeveloped by their inheritors. Two «mtinents fulfil these requirements— Sbnth America and Australia. Japanese expansion already shows a tendency to follow two routes across the' Pacifier: (a) Southward through the .Philippines, tho Dutch Indies, to Australia. In tho Philippines there arc already vigorous Japanese colonies: Japanese folders are entrenched in the Indies, • and Japanese pearl-fishers are frequently encountered on the Australian coflpts. . ' .(b) Eastwards through Hawaii to North and South America. Already Hawaii is Japanese in all but name and',, in British Columbia. California, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Argentine, and Brazil tho Japanese settler and trader ia frequent. This in spite of intense hostility on the part of tho white races, who regard these colonies as cancerous growths. In the eyes of Australian:! and Now Zealanders tho importance of Singapore lies here. Situated 011 the natnral'migration route from Asia to Australia, Singapore may be likened to a flood-gate which, when watertight, will inevitably divert the southerly pressure of Asia, eastward into tli« ilWefended and sparsely peopled continent of South America. . As the path to Australia is from island to island. Singapore's strength must lie in her paval.. forces.. This entails not only fortifications,, coal and oil supplies anc'i magazines, but docK- /, yard? >,sufficient to accommodate at least one-half of the British Fleet simultaneously. Along -with these groat dockyards must bo included shiprepairing yards, armour plata mills «nd a local'supply of first-class, trustworthy labour. Such a base would wHte White 'Australia" in reinforced ! =' concrete. •' /The resulting migration of Asiatics into tho degenerating Central Ainert- ■ can Republics would deprive Europe of nothing, for these States pre tho homes of Indians, negroes, and half-breeds who are steadily sinking into the »jnorass of savagery and miscegenation. Tjot us now examine the second <->- ' ' pect of the Pacific Problem—the qv.es- . ,tion of the Balance of Power in the China Sea. The Great War and the half-forgot-ten Busao-Japancsc War proved con- - Illusively that the fighting range of « fleet is within 500 miles of its base. Thus-'no nation can hope to dominate the vast spaces of the Pacific. Certain . nations can, however, aspire to the control of tho heart of this ocean —the China Soa. This, then, is the North Sea of post-wftr naval strategy. . The China Sea is fringed by the outposts of six nations —China, Japan, the United States, Holland, Groat Britain, and France —whose strongholds -ire - Canton, tho Pescadores (islands in the Straits of Formosa), Cavito (near Manila), Batavia, Singapore rind HongKong. fthd Saigon. Four of these, like Port ( Arthur, nre situated on the mainIttiida of sparsely populated foreign territories, and arc, therefore, vulnerable to an expeditionary force possessing Siege artillery. Moreover, by diplottitic agreement, tho right to fortify . Hong-Kong audi Oavito has been surrendered. Thus Singapoie is the soft) white stronghold in the Far East. ' Bore, then, is a peculiar position — the White Powers, owning the rich fist .Indies, Australia, Indo-China, and alaya, hold tenure only on sufferance. «5 Well do Americans know that the Phil- '■ ippinca must pass into Japanese ■ fiends; it would be futile to send an , ' American fleet 6000 miles to fight a battle against tho powerful, homogeneous Japanese Navy with its heavilyfortified bases in rear. Disaster Would inevitably follow; even au initial victory would not affect the result, for, whereas Japan's crippled ships Would be quickly docked and repair?d, America's "lame ducks" must limp i <3OOO miles, harassed by enemy cruisers. When we realiso that the American : squadrons, even to-day, are accompan'w by .fuel and oil transports in order to visit the Philippine Islands, and in addition would be escorting a fleet of wooplhips containing »3einforcemen;s •or the Island garrison, the difficulties will bo better realised. This fact un-j i uoubtedly influences America's sym,Wthy in regard to the present agitation in these Islands for independence. If the United States withdraws from wie Philippines these islands will be inevitably assimilated into the Japin- , Bttipir»s A strong Singapore would prevent this. The knowledge that a. first-class naVal base is at her disposal if Japan ' to break the text of the FourPact would enable tho United i "States to change her present policy . - Mrvous friendliness towards Japfn .;t? °Oe more in keeping with her tnidif®'rplay to unhappy China. a reversion, backed by the presf! V]!® of Britain, would enable the forces - > 01 law and order to reassert themselves '■'St . a Peaceful, industrious China, i fci •e$ ovcr Anglo-American eyes • f rom Singapore, would go a long way towards solving tho problem of tho uaianco of Power. A repetition ot s recent diplomatic blunder—tne Twenty-one Demands—wouki thus •n '® n " er ®d imposdble; the "Open ■k&i wo, i'd bo kept open and the Far m w be enabled to solve its without recourse to force. Failure to strengthen Singapore ' +t x therefore, menace the peace of Orient. Although fortification ' not > » n itself, solve the Problem ' tu tP® Pacific, it would "bolster 11 up , Jr e Policies White Australia and tho " ® ,lr "Pow l &r Pact on which dfpendsthe ' existence of the white and ™ 110 "' races in the Pacific continents.