WAR HISTORY.

Press, Volume LIX, Issue 17700, 28 February 1923, Page 12

WAR HISTORY.

TOLD BY GENERAL BLISS

HOW FOCH WAS MADE

SUPREME.

The "inside story" of the manner in which Marshal Foeh was made supreme commander of the Allied forces in Fntnce during the German drive of March-, 1918, and in spite of the unwillingness of Field-Marshal llaig. commander of the British Army, is told in an article by Generaf Tasker H.-Bliss, American representative in the SußTCme War Council, in a recent issue of "Foreign Affairs." Only the menace of "irretrievable disaster" finally overcame what General Blis.« calls "the reluctance of human nature" and brought about proper cooperation at the hour when the German offensive had almost achieved its purpose.

Hitherto unpublished documents, including special reports he made from time to time from France to the Washington Government, are quoted by Gen eral Bliss, states the "Springfield Republican." On February l*nd, 191s, the Supreme War Council decided on the creation of a general reserve, and the various commanders-in-chief vrero notified of the contributions they wero expected to make towards its establishment. By February 19th a definite agreement was made with General Petaia. for eight French divisions, and with General Diaz for six Italian. The reply from British headquarters was dated March 2nd, and read in part as follows: —

"An enemy offensive appears to be imminent on both the English and French fronts. To meet this attack J have already disposed of all the troops at present under my command, and if 1 were to earmark six or seven divisions from .these troops the whole of my plans and dispositions would have to be remodelled. This is clearly impossible, and I, therefore, regret that I am unable to comply with the suggestion conveyed in, the joint note. ' Haig added that he had an individual arrangement' with Petain for mutual relief to "meet" any emergency." What Foch Proposed. "Brief comment Only is necessary," says General Bliss. "It was admitted that to meet the danger an assured means of inter-Allied assistance must be provided. For that sole reason the question of an inter-Allied general reserve was decreed without protest from anyone. "But it was also declared in the let ter from. British Headquarters, 'thii force could not be located in any particular areas prior to tbe delivery ol the German offensive.' Each army hnc its own general reserve. What was ii for? And where was it to be stationed? In the absence of an Allied com-mander-in-chief to take the responsibility, each national commander assumed that the sustained attack in force would come against him. "•■General Foch'a proposition was thai each army should place its general reaervfe so as to cover that part of its own front most likely to be attacked ii the enemy struck that front at all j in a position where it could be rapidly moved to any other part of its front if necessary; to have certain of its divisions 'earmarked' as belonging to the Allied general reserve and not to be fed into the battle until he gave the word: and even those later divisions not to be moved to any other front until the crisis of the battle became so evident that no one could hesitate as to where they ought to go. lso one can now deny, nor could anyone have denied after midnight of March. 21st, 1918, that General Foci's plan was the only one 'that could have assured prompt assistance the moment the crisis developed." Lloyd George Wavered. The matter was left for the regular meeting of the Supreme War Council, scheduled for March 14th in London. At this meeting Mr Lloyd George wavered. "I have come to the conclusion," he said, "in, view of the exceptional concentration against us, that it would be very difficult for Field-Mar-shal Haig to spare the necessary reserves." Even M. Glemenceau, though saying that there "can be no question of abandoning the principle of the general reserve," thought the threatened attack made it impossible to withdraw divisions "for the moment." General Bliss comments: "Having decided as it did, there was but one thing the Supreme Council could do. Assuming the Italians (who themselves insisted a serious attack was coming against them) would cheerfully do what the British and French had declined to do. It directed:— " The British and French divisions now on the Italian front, together with the British division which has just left that front, and a! quota of Italian divisions to be determined by the Executive War Board, shall form the nucleus of the general reserve.' " On the night of March 20th a committee of four generals, sent to learn the Italian views, returned reporting failure to agree. General Bliss continues: "The_ great battle continued on the following morning. And now, because there was no commander of an Allied reserve, there was to be a Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. And, after all, the supreme necessity for an Allied Commander-in-Chief was to enable him to create and handle reserves at his will.

Irretrievable Ruin. "Even, then he did not come until the black spectre of irretrievable ruin was brooding over the battlefield. By March 22nd the situation had become gravely critical. The Germans had expected, about this date, to inflict the final blow. They were opening a breach between the two armies, the very thing General Foch's plan for the Allied reserve—had he been permitted to organiso it and prepare it in time for orderly movement—was intended to prevent. It began to appear British troops might have to be withdrawn on a line that would have compelled the separation of the armies. The way was almost opened for an advance on Paris by the Valley of the Oise or to the Channel by that of the Somme." The British and French civil and military authorities met at Doullens on March 26th, when, after the commanders had' reported what they could do, Lord Milner suggested to M. Clemenceau that Foch be placed by both Governments in a position of general control. A resolution was signed that gave Foch the task of "co-ordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western front.'' To Prevent Defeat. General Bliss points out .this did not give Foch the supreme command; he could' only consult and advise, and was forced to waste precious time going j from one headquarters to another per- • suading commanders to do what he : should have been empowered to order. ', General Bliss concludes: "After just one week's experience, all this was made clear at the conference of Beauvais. This conference was called to remedy the situation resulting from the one at Doullens. It resulted in the nearest approximation to giving General . Foch supreme command that was ever 1 attained. ) "The statement of the case carries ! its own criticism. Yet no harsh criticism can justly lie against the inevitable result of the limitations of human ■ nature. Americans may say what they

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pleaao as to what ° U^VJ I done and what they |W*fl« ! have done had thev hadJW „\m ! But if the situatioa *« ,*« : enacted on Ameri&n^| ' wearisome, bloody JK*£j»i*B ! ably be followed. J B J,»*B supreme command » „*■ knew had his own f*B the war, nor would tM p&W same reason, accept •* ,»« mand until it had bert"" M .Me or death for "Unified command £^,l4 F» the first moment tljat » ,# ™ ! come. Opposition ga»* ' fa M it was manifest course had been tried jffiW Unified command was jjjjsSj* not for the purposStfi^B torr, but to prevent »