GENOA AND U.S.A.

Press, Volume LVIII, Issue 17392, 1 March 1922, Page 7

GENOA AND U.S.A.

(SrKCTAI, TO "THE PRESS."j

(Bt Fraxk H. Simontjs.)

WASHINGTON, February 1. Will the United States go to Genoa? This is the question which is being generally debated at the present moment, and affirmative and negative theses are both being actively sustain, ed. On the whole, it seems to me likely that we shall meet the problem with a convenient compromise, and neither participate fully nor abstain absolutely.

Tile failure of the Cannes Conference and the fall of Briand came as great surprises to the American public, and Government, and served unquestknibly to strengthen the hands or those who prefer to see the United States remain loyal to the policy of isolation. But domestic rather than international facts really dominate the situation. Thus one of the members of the President's Cabinet, who might himself represent the United States in the forthcoming Italian meeting, remarked to me, when the Genoa Conference wa«; first cal'ed: "I am told that Genoa has one of the most famous cemeteries in the world, and I should not like to go there, because I think that cemetery would prove the resting place of the career of any American representa*iv« who attended the Conference." Ihis view was based upon two circumstances. The fact that the situation in Europe is so little understood in the United States, that any project of modifying in anv essential detail the claims the United States has upon Europe in the shape of Allied debts, would be rejected by Congress, and, secondly, the feeling in administration circles that pending the balancing of Continental budgets by reductions of military expenses, no useful end can be served by the Genoa Conference, or at least by American participation in that international, gathering. We may come to Genoa, we probably shall, but we shall ask in advance, I feel Bure. that the question of Allied debts shall be excluded from the ag«nda, and if it is, how useful will our presence be? Moreover, if we do come our influence, so far as it is felt, will be almost exclusively exerted on the side of the British thesis for European reorganisation. On such questions our habifs of thought run along with the British, and there has been an enormous amount of quiet missionary work by British representatives to the Wnshineton Conference. On the other hand we shaH not join in puv new association of nations such as Mr _ Lloyd George advocated just after his departure from Cannes. By the time the Genoa Conference assembles, if it meets on March Bth as scheduled, we shall be in the midst of n battle over the treaties which will represent the fruits of tho labours of the Washington Conference. It is idle to undertake to forecast the outcome of that battle, but it is necessary to warn European observers that the battle will he long and bitterly contested. My own judgment, for what it is worth, is that in the end the Treaties of Washington will meet the fate of that of Versailles, but the prevailing opinion here at the moment ia that they will be ratified after much debate and considerable modification.

In any event, however, Genoa negotiations will be largely obscured in American circles by the struggle over the Washington Treaties, and the Harding Administration will be very reluctant to undertake new foreign negotiations a't the moment when the fate of its recent agreements is in the balance, and the defeat of those Treaties might follow any extension of foreign engagements. And the bottom fact in the whole situation is that the United States, as a whole," is "firmly convinced that Europe can and must pay the Allied debts, and begin paying at once. It feels that it has ft right to demand that European countries shall so order their domestic policies, notably in the matter of armies, that it can commence payment promptly, and it will resent any suggestion or postponement, let alone cancellation at Genoa or elsewhere. The truth is that we are on tho threshold of an election which will decide the control of Congress for the next two years, and have a profound influence upon, the presidential election two years hence. As it now stands, the Administration and the Republican Party would seem to be condemned to make their chief appeal for support upon their handling of foreign affairs. But given tho mounting opposition to the decisions of the Washington Conference, they are likely to hesitate long before running new risks. Therefore it seems to me that there will be little of real value for Europe in our presence at Genoa. We are not going to do anything for a variety of reasons, the first of which is that popular ignorance of facts in the world situation bv controlling Congressional votes forbids all useful action in the matter of Allied debts. And, as we sea it here in Washington, Allied debts remain one of the chief problems. No one knows yet whether the Washington Conference has been a success or a failure, viewed from the angle of domestic politics. It is at least being attacked more sharply now than were the agreements of Paris at the corresponding period in their formulation. But it is clear that the success here has not been so immediate and convincing as was hoped and even expected. We are going to have, at I have said, a long debate before the vote and an election soon after the vote in the Senate, and it will not be until alter the election in November that the popular decision will be known. . . Pending that decision, the Administration is likely to go slow in Europe and vote "present" rather than participate largely in any European conference, either at Genoa or elsewhere. Mr Hoover has been accustomed to refer to the Washington Conference as "a red carpet leading to a party," and tins party, of course, has been a European conference, but the carpet is getting muddy, and not only have the important guests not yet appeared, but their coming .remains a matter of doubt. These important guests aro, of course, the American people, who are of two minds as to whether they will go or stay at home. At all events it is the duty of an ; American to warn foreign observers that it is easy to exaggerate the effects up to date of the Washington Conference, all that has happened up to the present moment is no more than the i argument made to the jury, which is the American electorate, and the jury ! is already asking questions which make | counsel on both sides frankly nervous. [ (Copyright, 1922, by Tho McClure Newspaper Syndicate.)