THE PACIFIC.

Press, Volume LV, Issue 16520, 12 May 1919, Page 9

THE PACIFIC.

PROBLEMS FOR THE DIMEDIATE

FCTURE

(mow orr. ows ro R r.» ro M> ■-* T ■)_ LONDON. March Taking as his subject ,^ mS -^j r Reconstruction in the Paci hn Guy H. Scholcfield.ls.Se.. toldhu audience, at a meeting of t " e 1 " . Colonial Institute, that when ' e o war broke out the British s>steni the Pacific was a strange c£Uig er '^ s + j units-Fiji was a Crown colon* ot orthodox type with a P al r\ ptorl te live Council; Tonga was loosely controlled bv the , sioner; the Cook Islands uere pendency of New Zealand; c n i 0 . and EMicj in the north and the mons far to the vest were r by Resident Commissioners re?p°»-J"- ; to a High Commissioner whom . rarely, if ever, saw; m the Hebrides tho fiction of a native so eignty was not yet dead and the , tish and French residents lived. seoarate codes and separate . trationsj the British CJonnmssione being responsible to the High C° mm sioner at Fiji, whom he also rarely sa . "It is unfortunate," remarked Scholefield, "that for more than thirty vcars. with a few bright intervals, the views of the Colonial Office and or these Dominions have been so olten diametrically opposed." , Dealing with the annexation or tne v/hole of non-Dutch New Guinea bv Queensland in 1883, after a decade of imitation, tho lecturer referred to the stubbornness of Lord Derby ana Lord Granville, the latter readily giving an undertaking to tho German Ambassador in London that England would not raise any obstaclo to tho German settlement. Many months elapsed before these conversations were disclosed, and meanwhile Lord Derby repeatedly _ assured tho colonies that their wishes would havo consideration. "Finally, information reached Australia from Germany that Great Britain had surrendered to Bismarck more than half of New Guinea., and it transpired that in almost the first conversation on the subject Lord Granville had given an undertaking directly antagonistic to the wishes of Australia, the basis of whose annoyance was that the -whole of the negotiations were carried through behind her back.'' Over and over again, the chiefs or Samoa—the closest kin of the Maori— petitioned to be annexed to New Zealand, but the offer was always declined, with the result that in 1880 a tripartite arrangement was inaugurated which, "with the best will in the world, brought nothing but misery and intrigue to the unhappy_ Samoans." In 1899 when all the colonies, in an outburst of patriotism, were sending contingents to South Africa, Lord Salisbury signed the Samoa 'Convention surrendering all British rights in Upolu and Savaii to Germany. "The bargain in itself was not a bad one. From a purely material point of view it was a distinctly good one. But the moral surrender was damaging to- British prestige in tho Pacific, and more damaging to Imperial relations, which had improved a good deal under the vigorous and synJnathetic administration of the Colonial Office by Air Chamberlain. The grievanco was that the colony most directly interested was not consulted or informed in any way of what was being done.'' A DUAL GRIEVANCE.

Again, in 1905, much the same tiling happened. Australia and New Zealanu liacl shown constant and unabated interest in the future of the New | Hebrides since 1878, and they submitted their views to the Imperial Government as to what should bo doiie, j and they woro told that a few French and British officials were to meet to discuss the single matter of land claims. It was not until April, 1906, that Lord iilgin communicated with them, submitting for approval the whole elaborate sclicme of a condominium. "The unimportant discussion on land claims had beon widened to cover the whole political system of the group, and the thing had been carried through without either of the two interested colonies being informed. Both Dominions had previously expressed themselves strongly against dual control." Referring to the incident at the ensuing Imperial Conference, Mr Deakin protested "that there should bo no pretence that any rcspect-was paid, or sought to be paid, to the opinion of Australia, or any recognition given to us m a very seriotis .matter on which wo certainly were entitled to be consulted, or at least informed, at every step." "It is on incidents like these," said Mr Scholefield, "that Australia and New Zealand at large have formed their opinion of Colonial Office, government. Wo all hope there is no longer grounds for holding such opinions." But a great deal still has to be done before the Pacific domain of the British Empire can be considered satisfactory. Tho development'of the islands, their communications, their organisations for defence —"if that unfortunately should be necessary"—cannot possibly be loft again to chance os in the haphazard past. \ •

"WHITE ME* AND NATIVES IN HARMOMT. It was the view of tlie lecturer that the economic policy of our Pacific administration also required a new bent. We had a sat back far too long on the old missionary conviction that tho interests of the natives and those of the whites are ticcessarily. separate and antagonistic. "Could the Maori ever have made the progress he has made if white settlers and farmers and pastoral ists had been prevented from taking up land in his midst and affording him the assistance of employment and example? In_ consequence of tho unselfishness of British rule in Fiji, after more than forty years of our government, only about one-seventh of the land had been alienated from tho native owners." The interests of the. Paciiic natives to-day urgently require that they should become a factor in the economic development of their own lands, that their education should cease to be merely literal and become practical, and that they should gradually be absorbed into industrial callings, either for white masters or for themselves. "Our measures for protection of the natiro havo tended to withdraw him altogether from the labour market, which is open to the local planter, and conversely have discouraged the planter for lack of labour. In Fiji we have vigorous industries entirely dependent on the labour of 50,000 Hindus who have been imported and have become indigenous, while more than that number of natives livo the old life and are gradually being pushed back by the aliens absorbing their available lands. NEET> OF A NEW POLICY. The lecturer came to tho conclusion that some new and definito policy will have to be promoted to induce the natives to enter industrial life. "There is a. geniii of real value in the method davised by &ir Arthur Gordon—and so angrilv condemned by Di!ke—for inducing the I 1 ijians to work l»v making them pay taxes in kind. But anv such scheme on a large scale must fail unless it is preceded or accompanied bv a land policy which while providing ail the necessary safeguards against pauperisingtne natives or creating monopoly. will encourage the white enterpriser to undertake the develooment of the islands.

Horn* was expressed that the Colonial Office would depart from its traditional polirv and give active encouragement to the teaching 0 f the English language—a policy that had been imposed l)y French and Germans—and a colonising race might well claim the privilege of irnposin s its lano-uage on the natives. I'-ven in nji of Lughsii is not general. The Melanesia n missioners and the great bulk of

tho natives liavo to learn tho Mota language as a medium of intercommunication. Tho argument for teaching English straight out instead of 3lota j ( seems all the stronger. As originally designed, the High Commission of tho Western Pacific had long l>een obsolete, and there were obvious duties that might be entrusted to it in the reorganisation of British interests in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand ivculd need to confcr with representatives of the other Pacific administrations, with a view to devising; reciprocal treatment of many problems. It was possible that a reformed High Commission, with entirely new functions — c l ll separated from the government °f I'iji. and preferably based far to the westward of the present headquarters—might he a useful supervising authority to assist in co-ordinating the variegated British domain. It was a very grave commentary on the importance and usefulness of the office tliat the late Commissioner (Sir Bickham Sweet Escott) was not able in the whole of his term of six years to visit the inost important regions of the High Commission—tho Solomons and New Hebrides. Another very active Commissioner, Sir Everard im Thurn, was not able to visit the New Hebrides until he had been two years in the Pacific. British interests, particularly in the Xew Hebrides, liavo undoubtedly suffered from the want of a more direst oversight by the responsible authority.

FAILURE OF THE CONDOMINIUM

_ A matter urgently crying out for decision was the control of the New Hebrides. Set up in defiance of the opinion of tho -Dominions most interested, the condomimium now existing was admitted by Lord Elgin to l>o an unprecedented institution striving to produce peace and prosperity amongst a singly community of "French and! English. residents through tlio medium of two codes of law administered by two executives. Of course it failed. The earlier experience of Samoa convinced most people in the Pacific that anything with the germ of dual control in it must fail. Ever since the understanding of 1878 Australia and New Zealand have cherished the hope that France would withdraw from tho group for compensation elsewhere. There is 110 evidence at all that she is willing to do so. On the contrary, unless she is prepared to abandon New Caledonia, with its valuable nickel deposits, it is only natural that she should wish to retain and improve her position in the adjacent group.

WHO IS TO HAVE CONTROL? f "However much we dislike it—and has come about against the con-' stant protests of the colonies—the fact remains that France has been accorded parallel rights with Great Britain in the New Hebrides, just as Germany and the United States had in Samoa. We can only mako the best of it, and come to the best possible understanding for a peaceful and prosperous future. All agree that it is only by a unitary system of law and administration tliat satisfaction can be given. r s not the New 'Hebrides an ideal case for tho application of the mandatorysystem? Once more wo are up against the problem: Who is to have control? We believe that Britain's record gives her the best claim to the trust. But would France .accept that? If not, wo are back again face to face with the solution which New Zealand pressed so strongly fifteen years ago—a definite partition. That would,not, be easy, but it would be possiblo with the goodwill that now exfsts . between the two nations. The problem must be solved in the immediate future." /

In .the discussion which followed Sir Everard-im-Thurn, Sir G. R. Le Hunt, Sir Gilbert Parker, and Major Horsfali. A.T.F., took part. Sir William Macgregor, tvho was ill tlic chair, discussing the different methods of British and German administrators, said that whereas in German colonies they punished the natives by cutting down their cocoanut trees, in Papua he inflicted punishment by ordering the delinquents to plant cocoanut trees. He had right from the beginninc regarded New Guinea as coming within the orbit of Australia, and thought it was quite right that Australia should control New Guinea and New Zealand Samoa. There was no doubt at all that New Zealand had won the respect and love of the natives of the islands by the manner in which she had administered her colonies. The best evidence of that was the way in which they had come. forward for the war. He admired very much the sentiment which was behind the administration of both New Zealand and Australia, namely, the desire to give the natives a chance.