GERMAN GUILT UNMASKED.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16220, 24 May 1918, Page 8

GERMAN GUILT UNMASKED.

In March last, there was made public, as mentioned in the cables at the time, a transcendeatly interesting and important pamphlet written in August, 1016, V Prince Lichnowsky, who was the German Ambassador to Britain from November, 1912, until the outbreak of war. The text of tho pamphlet has been forwarded to us through Renter's Agency, which received it, by cablefrom the Ministry of Information, London. Prince Lichnowsky, who began hi' oipiomatic carcer in 1880, retired to hi Silesian estates in 1904, and was recalo.'l from his retirement in 1912 to succeed Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. After rccounting the circumstances of his appointment, Princo Lichnowsky refers to Germany's "enigmatic" Morocco policy, and il.e effect of that policy in inducing the ajlianccs and rapprochements amongst Germany's present enemies. Ho then proceeds to take up the .story from the date of his appointment to London: — SIR E. GREY'S PROGRAMME. When I camo to London in November, 1912, the excitcmcnt over Morocco had subsided, as an agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true that Haldane's mission had failed, as no had required tho assurance of neutrality instead of being content with a treaty securing us against British (?)'attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward Grey had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an understanding with ns, and in the first place tried to do this in colonial and economic questions. Conversations wore in progress through the medium of tho capable and businesslike envoy, von Ivuhlmann, concerning tho renewal of the Portuguese colonial agreement and the Mesopotamia-Bagdad railway, the unavowed object of which was to divide both the colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence. The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to tho best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and AngloRiisrian { differences, so he also wished to do lus best to eliminate- the AngloGerman, and by a network of treaties which .'jronld in tho end, bo doubt, have included an- agreement about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure tho peacq of the world after our. previous policy had led to an association—rtho Entente—which represented a mutual insurance against the risk of war. This wa,i Sir E. Greg's plan. In liis own words: "Without interfering, with aur existing friendship with Franceand Russia, which has no aggressivo iums and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement, and under- j *tnndiii£ with Germany "to bring the two groups nearer." - As with us, there were two; parties in Eugland at that time, tho optimists, who believed in an understanding, and ■ thn pessimists, who thought that Boouer or later war was inevitable. The' former embraced Mr H. H. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldanc, and most, of- the Ministers in the Radical; Cabinet, also the leading Liberal papers, such as the "Westminster Gazette," tho "Manchester Guardian,'' and the "Daily Chronicle.'? The pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like Mr A. J. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me, also leading army men like' Lord Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal military service—"the writing on the wall;" further, the Northcliffe * Press and the eminent English journalist, Mr J. L. Garvin, of tho "Observer." Ihtring my period of office, however, they abstained from all attacks and maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But oar naval policy, and, our attitude in 1005,' 1908, and 1911 had aroused in them th 0 that after all it would some day come to war. ' Just ns it is with us. the former are now being accused in England of shortsightedness and simplicity, whereas tho latter 1 are looked on as the true prophets. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION. Tho first Balkan war had led to the collapse of Turkey, and thus -to a dc- : feat for' our polity which had been identified with Tq/key for a number of, years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer h© saved, there, were twp. ways in which we could deal with , the inheritance; either we could declare v our, complete disinterestedness with regard to th© frontier i delimitations in the Balkans y and leave the , Balkan Powers to settle them, or we ; \ could support our "allies" ' and carry ' : on a/Triple Alliance policy in the Near East, thus giving lip the role of medi- j ator., " FromCth© very "beginning I udvocat- - ed .the former course, but the Foreign Office emphatically favoured the latter. ' The vital -point was the Albanian , question. Our' Allies desired the es- > tablishinent of an independent Al- . banian State, as the Austrians did not \ want the Serbs to obtain access to the ] Adriatic, and the Italians did not want , the Greeks to get to Yalona, or even to tho north of Corfu. As opposed to this, j Russia, as is known, was backing Ser- i bin's wishes and France those of j Greece. 1 My advice was to treat this question < •as / oritsido : the scope of the alliance, j and to .support neither the Austrian < nor th©-,ltalian claims. Without our ' aid it would have been impossible to 1 set: up an independent Albania, which, 1 as anyone could foresee, had no pros- i pect of surviving; Serbia would have i extended to the sea, and the present 1 world war would have been avoided, t

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S REVELATIONS. THE REAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.

Franco and Italy would liav© quarrelled over Greece, and if the Italians had not wanted to light France unaided they would have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north of Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is Hellenic. Tho towns in the south are entirely so; and during the conference of Ambassadors delegations from the principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece, liven in tho present-day Greece there ire Albanian elements and the so•alled Greek national dress is of Al>.mian origin. The inclusion of the Ibaninns, who are principally Orthoox and in the body of the Greek State was therefore the best and most natural solution if you left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons the Emperor was also in favour of this solution. When I supported this view in a letter to the monarch I received

agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence. THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. Wo ought at last to have broken with tho fatal tradition of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East .ilso, and havo recognised our mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the' south with tho Turks and in the north with the Austro-Magyars. 1" or tho continuance of this policy, upon which we had entered at tho Berlin Congress, and which wo lmd actively pursued ever since, was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and to the world war, more especially if the requisite cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming to terms with Russia on a basis of the indej>endence of the Sultan, -whom oven Petrograd did not wish to oject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to oiir economic interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia Minor into spheres of influence, while renouncing any intention, of military or political interference, it was our political ambition to dominate on the Bosphorus. I n Russia they began to think that the road to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay via Borlin. Instead of supporting tho active development of the Balkan States —which, once liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with whjch our experiences had been very satisfactory—we took sides with the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The fatal_ mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy—-which had | forced Russia, our natural best friend and neighbour, into the arms of Franco and England, and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion—was the more apparent as a Franco-Russian attack, which was tho "sole" hypothesis that justified a Tripl© Allianco policy, could bo left out of our calculations. The value of the Italian alliance needs 110 further reference. ' Italy will want our money and our tourists even after the war, with or without an alliance. That this latter would fail us in the case, of war was patent beforehand. Henco tho Alliance had "no value." Austria needs our protection iji war as in peace, and has no other support. Her dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic considerations, and is the greater the more intimate our relations with Russia arc. The Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted such a self-confident attitude toward us as Count Aehrenthal during the later years of his life. If German policy is conducted on right lines, cultivating relations -with Russia, Austria r Hungary is our vassal, and dependent on us,. even without an alliance or recompense. If it is wrongly conducted, then we are dependent on Austria. Hence there was "no reason" for the Alliance. I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Morits Esterhazy was inconceivable

there. Littlo as the Slavs there love lis, just as little do they wish to return into a German Empire, even with a Habsburg-Lorraine Emperor at its head. They are striving for a federation in Austria on national lines, a stato of things 'which would have even less chance of being realised within the Gorman Empire than under the double eagle. The Germans of Austria,' however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German might and culture, and are well aware that Austria can never again be the • loading Power. They wish for as intimate a connexion with the German Empire as possible, ■ not for an anti-German policy. Since the seventies the position has fundamentally changed in Austria, much as in Bavaria. As in the latter, a return to the great German separatism and old Bavarian policy is cot to be feared, so with the former a resuscitation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not to be expected. By a federation with Austria, however, which, resembles a wij Belgium, since its population even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only nbout half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest, thus espousing Austria's quarrels. Hence ww were not obliged to take my notice of the desires of our Ally. They were not only unnecessary, but ilso dangerous, as they would lead to » conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Austrian spectacles. i The development of the alliance I From a union formed on a single Hypothesis for a single specific purpose into a general and unlimited association, a pooling of int«rests in all spheres, -was the best way of producing what such a binding contract was designed to prevent—war. Such an alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies of the strong young rising communities in the Balkans, who were prepared ;o turn to us and to ( open their mar£ets to us. The difference between i 'he power of a ruling house and a

national state, between dynastic and democratic ideas of government, Lad to be decided and, as usual, we were on the wrong side. King Carol of Roumania told one of our representatives that he had entered into the alliance with us on tho assumption that we retained the leadership, but if this passed to Austria that would alter the foundations of the relationship, and under such circumstances lie would not be able to go on with it. Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic interests, we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation. Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown eo'ild have been foreseen, Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid. Wilhelm of "Wied, ending—the most fatal of all mistakes—with tf'e great plunge on t,i?e Berchtold stable. THE CONFERENCE OP AMBASSADORS. Shortly after my arrival in London, at tho end of 1912, Sir E. Grey proposed an informal conversation, to prevent the Balkan war developing into a European one. after we had, unfortunately, refused, on the outbreak of the war. to agree to the French proposal of a declaration of disinterestedness. The British statesman, from the very beginning,, took up the position that England had no interest in /• 1bania, and had no intention of going to war over this question. He greailv

wished to mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" and smoothe over difficulties. Ho therefore .by no means took sides with the Entente, and during the eight months or so of the negotiations Ik goodwill and his authoritative influence contributed in no small degree to the attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting an attitude similar to tho English one, invariably took up the positjon which, was prescribed for us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff was the leader of tho Triple Alliance in London, and I was his "second.'' It was my duty to support liis proposals. That clever and experienced man, Count Szogyenyi, was conducting affairs in Berlin. His refrain was, "Then the 'casus fccderis' will arise." and when I oncc ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion X was severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It was also said that J had an "hereditary weakness"—the allusion being to my father. . Oil all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy—about Albania, ft Serbian port on tho Adriatic, Scutari, and also about the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania—while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the French or Russian claims. On tho contrary, ho mostly supported our group in order not to give a pretext like that a dead Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus, with his assistance, it was possible to coax King .Nikitam out of Scutari again. Otherwise this question would already have lod to a world war, as we should certainly not have ventured to induce "our ally" ( to give way. _ Sir K. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact. When a. question threatened to become involved he sketched a formula for agreement -which was to the point, and was always accepted. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants. As a matter of fact, wo bad again successfully emerged from one of those trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia liad been obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was ne,ver in a position to procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania- was established as a vassal State of Austria, and Serbia was pressed back from the seas. Hence this conference resulted in .a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 and in 1908, we had opposed tho Russian plans, although no "German" interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate tho mistake of the Congress bv the secret treaty, and by his attitude in the Battonberg Question: but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous path upon which we had once more entered in thef Bosnian question, nor did wc leave it in time- when it led to the precipice. The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown durin" ' the conference by attacks in the Rus" Man Press against my Russian colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his German descont and Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend of Germany and the accident that lie was related both to Count Mensdorff and to me. without possessing a very distinguished personality. Count Benckendorff was endowed with a number of nullifications that distinguish a good diplomat—tact, polished manners experience. courtesy, and a natural eve for men and matters. He was always at prims to avoid a brusque attitude, and was supported in this by England and Franco. Lator I once remarked to him "I presume that Russian feel in t f 8 very anti-German?" He "There are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, but in genoral the peode are anti-Austrian." It is _ hardly necessarv to add that our friendship for Austria through thick and thin was hardly calculated to loosen the Entente and to direct Russia toward her Asiatic interests I

THE BALKAN CONFRENCE.

At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London, and I had opportunities of coming into conj tact with the leaders of the Balkan i States. M. Venezelos was certainly I tho most distinguished personality. At j that time he was anything but anti- • German, and yisited me several times. He was specially fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle —lie even wore it at the French Em- , bassy. His prepossessing charm and 1 ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. Next-to him JL. Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier, and confidant of Count Berchtold, played a great part. He gave the impression of an astute and energetic man, and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna and Budapest friends, of whoso homage no sometimes made fun, that he was induced to commit the folly of entering upon the second Balkan war, and of . refusing Russian arbitration. M. Take Jonescu was also frequently ' in London, and then visited me regularly. I knew him from the time when I was secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's , friends. In London he was endeavouring to obtain concessions to Roumania from M. Daneff by means of negotiations in which he was assisted by the yery able Roumanian Ambassador. Misu. It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the failure of these negotiations. Count Berchtold and we. of course, with him, were entirely on Bulgaria's side, otherwise, by putting pressure on M. Daneff, we might have secured the desired satisfaction for Roumania and placed her under an obligation to us. She was finally estranged from the Central 1 Powers bv Austria's attitude during aiid after" the second Balkan war. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR. The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan war and the victory of Serbia with the Roumanian invasion naturally constituted a humiliation for Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon . after. The Italian revelations prove I this, and it may bo assumed that the | Marquis San Giuliano, who described I the plan —most aptly—as a perieolosissima aventura, saved us from being involved in a world war as early as tic summer of 1913. Owing to the intimacy of RussoItalian relations, tho Vienna plan was ' doubtless known in Petrograd. In any , case, M. Sazonoff openly declared at Constanza, as 31. Take Jonescu_ told me, that an Austrian attack on Serbia would be a casus belli for Russia. Whsn one of my staff returned from

] leave in Vienna in the spring of 1914 ' lie said that Herr von Tschirschky had | declared that tliero would soon be war. !As I, however, was always left in ! ignorar.ee about important events, I considered this pessimism to be unfoundod. As a matter of fact it would appear that ever since the peaceof Bucharest. Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the treaty by her own effort, and was apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext. Vienna statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. They were aware of that, /is they had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria." LDIAX VON SANDERS. When I returned to London in December, 1013, from a lengthy leave, tho Linian von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations with Iliissia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the excitement there was in Petrograd over it. "I have never seen them so excited." I received instructions from Berlin

to request the Minister to exert straining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and hi 3 intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of in a similar manner when we wished to attain anything there, .as our representative proved himself quite useless for such a purpose. During the fateful days of July, 1014, Sir Edward said to me, "When you want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to nie, but if I appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you refuse ,to support me." THE COLONIAL TREATY. The good and confidential relations' which I Had succeeded, in establishing, not only vvith society and the most influential people like Sir E. Grey and Mr Asquith, but also with the great publio at public dinners, produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this "rapprochement," and his intentions were most apparent on two questions —the Colonial and the Bagdad railway treaties. In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr Balu.r signed a secret agreement dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic spheres of influence between us aud England. As the Government of Portugal had neither the power nor the means to open up her extended, possessions or to administer them pro-! perly she had already thought of soiling them before, and thus relieving ner financial burdens. An agreement had been come to between us and England which defined the interests of both parties, and which was -of the greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent oh England, as u generally known. I On tho face of it,.this agreement' was to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Portuguese State.' and merely declared the intention cfi j DGtng of financial and economic as-1 sistance to the Portuguese. Literally, I therefore, zfc did not contraveue tho 1 "nrient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of tho fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles 11., ami gAve a reciprocal territorial guarantee. In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of tho Marquis Soveral. who was presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a new. treaty—the so-called Treaty of Windsor—was concluded between England and Portugal in 1899. confirming tho old agreements, which had always remained in force. Tho object of the negotiations be- ~ - .1 m i_ _ T i ♦ t t i

tween ns and England, which had commenced before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of 1898as it had* proved unsatisfactory on several _ points as regards geographical delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the British Government I ( succeeded in making the n&y agreement fully accord with our wishes ana' interests Tho whole of Angola up tf the twentieth degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo State from the south. We also acquired the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, which are north of the equator, and therefor© really in the French sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to enter strong but unavailing protests. Further, we obtained tho northern part of Mozambique. The Licango formed the boundary, I The British Government showed the j greatest consideration for our interests

and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill toward us, hut he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole, as England hoped to divert the German development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany »ier colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me. The British Government originally suggested the inclusion of the Congo State in the agreement, which would hare given us the right of pre-emp-tion and enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer, alleging consideration for Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps wo wished to be economical of successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of its real, though unexpressed, intention— the later actual partition of tho Portuguese colonies —tho treaty in its new form showed marked improvements and advantages as compared with the old ones. Cases had been specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned to us. # These were drafted in such wide terms that it was really left to us to decide when "vital""interests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent on England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good relations "with England in order to carry out our joint intentions at a later date with English assent. Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire to respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished to invest capital, and asked for the support of the British Government in the districts assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this was completed and signed, and by informing them that their enterprise belonged to our sphere of influence. The agreement was practically completed at the. time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time j a conference took place in "Berlin, un- 1 der the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor. In this conference I also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were defined. On my return

to London I succeeded, with the as sisiance of of the Lega tion, von Kuhlmaun, wiio was work nig at- the agreement with Mr Parker in having our last proposals incornor ated, so that the whole agreemenl . could be initialled by Sir E. Grey «nc ; by me m August, 1913, before I wenl on leave. But now fresh difficulties were tc arise which prevented its being signed and I did not obtain the authorisatior to conclude it till a year later—that is, shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, never signed. Sir E. Grey was only willing to sigc "if the agreement were publishecj together with these of ISDS and 1899. ' 1 England had. as he said, no other secrct treaties besides these, and it was contrary to established principles to keep binding agreements secret, Therefore lie could not take any agreement without publishing it. He was, however, willing to accede to out wishes with regard to the time and manner of publication, provided that such publication took pface. at latest within one year from the date of signature. _ = At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage who acted the part oi Hcrr von Holstein wanted the London post for himself, I was informed that i lie publication would endanger our interests in the colonies, as the Portuguese would then not give us any more concessions. The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of Anglo-Portuguese relations, were most probably just as well aware of the old agreement as of our new arrange- ! ments, and that the influence which \ England possesses at Lisbon renders ■ their Government completely impotent .in face of an Anglo-German agree- | ment. j Another pretext had therefore to be I foiind for wrecking the treatv. It «ras : suggested that the publication of the , Treaty of Windsor, which had been j concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe—though it was only a renewal of the treaty of Charles 11., which had always remained in for"e might endanger the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg as a proof of hypocrisy and perfidy! I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same thing as the Treaty of Windsor, and as other similar treaties, namely, that we would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the inviolability of its possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated discussions with Sir E. Grey, at . which he made many fresh suggestions ! for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, and finally , arranged with Sir E. Goschen that matters should be left as they were! . The treaty, which offered us extra- ; ordinary advantages, the result cf more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a> public success for me. ~ When _ I mentioned the subject to Mr Lewis Harcourt at a dinner at the Embassy m the spring of 1914, the Minister for the Colonies told me that KPlaced m a difficult position, and did not know how to act The present position was intolerable—he wished to safeguard our interests, but was in doubt whether h e should proceed, on the terms of the old or the I new treaty. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time. I _ re .ply to a despatch in this sense l received instructions couched in terms which showed more alarm than civility, telling mo to abstain from any further interference in the matter. ; I now regret that r did not immei diatelv travel to Berlin and place my i • post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I did not abandon the hope of arriving at an understanding with those in authority—a sinister mistake which was to bring its Nemesis in a few months later in such a tragical way. ; However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official of the Empire, as he feared that I was

aspiring to his post, yet I must in justice to him say that during oar last interview before the outbreak of war at the end of June, 1914, to which I will rofcr later, he gave me his assent for the signature and publication of the treaty. In spite of this it required repeated applications on my part, which were supported by HJerr Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was at last obtained in July. 1914. As the Serbian-crisis at that time already imperilled the peace of Europe the completion of the treaty had "to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices of this war. THE BAGDAD TREATY. At the same time, I was negotiating in London, with tho able support or Herr von Kulilmann, about the socalled Bagdad Treaty. The real object of this was to divide up Asia into spheres of influence, although this term was anxiously avoided, in view of the rights of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey also repeatedly stated that there were in . existence no agreements with | France and Russia about tho partition of Asia Minor. In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions concerning German undertakings were settled, in the main, according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important

I concession Sir Edward Grey made to me personally was the continuation of the railway as tar as Basra. We had dropped this point, in favour of the connexion to Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the ternxinaJ point of the railway. An international commission was to regulate navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the harbour works at Basra, and received rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia, as far as Basra, was included within our _ snhere of influence (without prejudice to already existing: British navigation rights on the Tigris and" the rights of the Wilcox irrigation work), as well ts the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway. The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna Aidin railway were recognised as the British economy sphere, Syria as the French, and Armenia as the Russian. If both treaties were executed and published, an agreement with England would be reached which would preclude all do'ibts about the possibility of an ''Anglo-German co-operation." THE QUESTION OP THE NAVY. The naval question was, and is, the most delicate of all. It is not always quite correctly judged. The creation j of a povyerful fleet on tlie other side of the North Sea —the development of the greatest military power of the Continent' into the greatest naval power

as ■well—was bound to be felt in England as at least "inconvenient." There can be no doubt about this in any reasonable view. In order to maintain the necessary superiority, and not to become dependent, in order to secure the rule over the tea which is essential for her if she is not to starve, she was compelled to take armaments and expenditure, which weiehed heavily on the taxpayers. England's international position would bo threatened, however, if our policy created the belief that warlike developments might ensue—a state of affairs which had almost been reached daring the time of the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian problem. Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet "within its then appointed limits," but it was certainly not we - corno, and was one of the causes — though not the only cause, and perhaps not the most important—of her adhesion to France and Russia; but, on account of this "alone," Enpland would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which lias been alleged to ha.ve produced jealousy, and finally, war. From the very beginning \ maintain-

' Ed that, notwithstanding the fleet, it I would be possible to arrive at a friendly : understanding and "rapprochement" if tve did not a introduce a new -S'avy Bill j «tnd our policy were indubitably pacific, j I also avoided mention of the fleet, and j tlio word never passed between Sir E. j Grey and me. On one occasion Sir E. Grey aid at a meeting of the Cabinet, '•Tlie present Gorman Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me." During my tcnuro of office Mr Winston Churchill, then i< irst Lord of tho Admiralty, proposed, as is known, tho i so-called "naval holiday,'' and sug- , gested, for financial reasons and probably also to meet the pacific wishes of his party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially, Sir E, Grey did not support the proposal; he never mentioned it to me, but Mr Churchill repeatedly spoke to me about it. I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication is altogether foreign to tho English nature. It would have been a great success for Mr • Churchill if he could have come before the country with reductions of expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of armaments that weighed on the people. I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to agree to his plan. "What was to become of the workmen who were engaged for this purnose. and what of the technical staff? Our naval programme had been decided on, and ft would "bo difficult [to alter it in any way. On the other hand, we had no intention of exceeding it. But he reverted to it again, and pointed out that the sums used for enormous armaments might better be employed for other and useful purposes. I replied that this expenditure, too, benefited our home industries. TTiiyjugh interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal private secretary, I mnnapecf to have the question removed from the agenda •without causing any ill-feeling, although it was again referred to in Parliament, and to prevent any. official proposal being made. COMMERCIAL JEALOUSY. The "commercial jealousy" about which we hear so much is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial Power after the war of IS7O and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles,- which, with their industries and export houses, had held a virtual monopoly of trade. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading; country in Europe as regards British exports—a fact to which I invariably referred ' in my public sueeches —had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations ■with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other con-

siderations into tho background. However, it was a pot idea of Mr Churchill and the Government, and I think that hy entering upon this plan and tho formula 16 to 10 for battleships we might have given tangible riroof of our goodwill and strengthened and oncouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the Government) to enter into closer relations with us. But. as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding "in spite of the fleet" and without a "naval holiday." I had always regarded my mission from this point of view, and I had also saoceeded in realising my plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I had achieved. The Briton is matter-of-fact—he takes things as they are, and does not tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial circles . I encountered the most friendly spirit' and the endeavour to further our common economic interests. As a matter of fact, nobody in them took any interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even in the French' representative, in spite of his striking personality and his political successes. Only the German and American _ Ambassadors attracted public attention. In order to get into touch with im- j portant commercial circles I accented! invitations from the United Chambers of Co r nme»-ce and from the London and Brndford Chamber, and was the ruest of the cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I was well received everyManchester, Glasgow, and Kdinburirh had invited me, and I intended to eo there later. Pwole who did not understand British conditions, and did not realise the importance of "public dinners," also neople to whom my successes were unwelcome, reproT-hed me with having done harm with my speeches. I behevo, on the contrary, that by ap-

| pearintj in • public and emphasising | common commercial interests I contributed'in no small measure to tVe .improvement of the relations. , quite apart from the fact that it wouVI havo Iwen clumsy and churlish to refuse all invitations. In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and hearty co-operation—at Court, in society, and from, the Government. THE COURT AND SOCIETY. The King, although not a genius, is a simple and wcli-weaning man, with sound common sense; he demonstrated his goodwill toward me, and was frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although the British Constitution leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the monarch, in virtue of his position, can cxcrciso a. considerable influence on opinion, both in society and in the Government. Wo were received in London with open arms, and both parties rivalled one another in courtesy toward us. In view of the close relationship between 1 politics and society in England it would be wrong to undervalue social relations, even when the majority of; the Upper Ten Thousand am in opposition to the Government. Hcnce the social adaptability of a j representative nowhere plays a gj-eater; role than in England. A hospitable house, with pleasant hosts, is worth more than the most profound scientific knowledge; a savant with provincial manners and small means

j would gain no influence, in spito of al > his learning. i The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; ho likes a good follow. Sill EDWARD GIIEY. Sir Edward Grey's influence in al matters of foreign policy was almosl unlimited. On important occasions ho used, indeed, to say, "I must iirsl bring it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed to his views. His authority was undisputed. Ho was returned to Parliament as a young man, and soon began to interest himself in foreign affairs. Undor Lord Rose liery he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and became Secretary of State in 1906 under Mr H. Camp-bell-Bannerman; ho has now held the post for some ten years. The scion of an old North Country family which had already furnished Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the Left Wing of his party and sympathised with socialists and pacifists. You may call him a socialist in the ideal sense, as ho. carries the theory into his private life and lives i very simply and unpretentiously, although he has extensive means. The simplicity and honesty of his ■ways secures him the esteem* even of his opponents, who wore to bo found rather in the sphere of homo affairs than of foreign policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him. The calm quiet of liis British nature is not lacking in a. sense of humour. Once when ho was lunching wi,th us and the children and heard them talking German, he said, "I can't help thinking how clever these children are to talk German so well," and wns pleased with his joke. This is a true picture of th© man who is decried as "Liar Grey," and instigator of the world war. MR ASQUITH. Mr Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp.. A jovial bon vivant, fond of the ladies, .. especially, the young and pretty ones. lie is partial to cheerful society and good cooking. Formerly a well-known barrister rntli a large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, then a Minister under Mr Gladstone, a pacifist, like his friend Grey, and favouring an understanding with Germany, lie treated all questions with the cheery calm and assurance of an experienced man or business. His daughters were at school in Germany, and spoke German

fluetxtly. • . • . i Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign p.olitics when imDortant questions arose; then, of couife", his decision was final. During the critical days of July Mrs Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the tragic turn of events. Mr Asquilh, also, when I called on him on August 2nd to make a last effort in the direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks. ' t ATTITUDE OP THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE. Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London successes, and the position which I had managed to make for myself in n short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render my office inori difficult. I was left in complete ig noranco of the most important mat ters, and was confined to the hand ling of dull and unimportant reports Secret agents' reports and matters about which I could not learn withou' and the necessary funds were never available to me, and :t was not till the last days of Julv, 1914, that I learnt quite by chance from the Naval Attache of the secret, Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets in case of war. Tho knowledge of other important events which had been known to the office for a long time, like the correspondence between Grey and Cambon, was kept from me.

IN CASE OP WAR. Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under no circumstances had. we to fear a British attack or British support for any foreign attack, but that under any circumstances England would protect the French. I expressed this view in repeated despatches, with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain anv credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications. In addition there were the secret agreements which I have referred to, and which were known to the office. I always pointed out that in the event of" a war between European Powers England, as a commercial State, would suffer enormously and would therefore do her best to prevent , a conflict, but on the other hand she would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France, because of the necessity of maintaining the European balance" of power, and of preventing a

German superiority of forc& Lord Haldane had told me? this shortly after my arrival, nnd all the lending peoplo | hitd expressed themselves in the saiw | sense. [ {To be Concluded To-morrow.)