ECONOMY IN MEN

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15773, 14 December 1916, Page 9

ECONOMY IN MEN

THE ANGLO-FRENCH SCIENCE OF

ATTACK

(The War Officc has received the I °1 _ | lowing article from a. I'cliable source, t \ One of the best points nbout our j ]atc6t gains on the So in rue front is that | they have cost us so few of our men. j Of course no British soldier's life is i ever cheap in si British commandcr s | eyes. Every casualty is a regret. .But j all losses have to Tx> weighed relatively, j It may be relatively to the strength ol tho positions attacked, cr it may be relatively to the losses ot the ononis, or relatively to our own previous losses in similar operations; or, again, relatively to the extent of the material and the moral victory obtained —the value of the ground that is physically gained and the degree in which the spirit of tho enemy is broken and the confidence of our own men is raised. Judged by any of these standards our losses in the two battles that have finally given us the command of the high ground from Combles to above the Ancre arc extraordinarily small. Thiepva[ was a fortress of singular strength, even in this battlefield of subterranean fortresses. Tho Germans valued it like a Gibraltar. But it cost us fewer men to carry it ou September 28th than it had cost ns in July to take Montauban. For every three casualties of all kinds incurred by -us in the engagement, we took two German prisoners; that is to say, the enemy's permanent loss, in prisoners alone, was considerably greater than our permanent loss from all causes together A. visitor to Martinpuich just after its capture on-Sep-tember 15th, before tho dead of either armv -were buried, was surprised to find "tile German uniforms for outnumbering the British, on the crown of the ridge? It belied everything that one had icarnt to believo about the relative expensiveness of attack and defence. MORE EXPERIENCED SOLDIERS. Every British soldier feels that if -his life is to be spent it will be made* to go as far towards buying victory as one life can, and that victory is surely to be had at the present price in lives. That is all a soldier wants. He docs not measure casualties absolutely, but always relatively to the achievement of which they are incidents. And thus measured,"he is satisfied that our recent casualties are light. Ono of tho causes of their rccent declino is that he himself has become a more expert soldier. As the South African "War taught him to use cover, the present war has taught him how to advance safely under the fire of his own artillery, neither rushing so fast as to bump into our barrage nor losing momentum in attack through excessive caution against over-running. 'I ho value of experience is shown by the exceptionally low casualties in recent engagements of a particular Division which has been exceptionally long in action —altogether, since July Ist. POOLING IDEXs. But tho main cause of the general reduction in our losses is the general advance in the Allied armies of the science of attack. It has been a common and an equal advancc, brought about by the most constant and generous interchange of idc-as, discoveries, and inventions between neads of departments in the French and British armies. One new expedient may originate in one army and o nc in the other. But all are pooled, and it Lg a point of .honour with each army to place, its own finds at the common service without making any claim for separate credit for finding them. The minute and precisc co-operation of artillery and infantry, the exact instruction of gunners by airmen before and during an attack, the scientific use of aerial photography —all these are developments in which very tew persons indeed are qualified to say which of the Allied armies has taken the lead at ono moment or another; and those tew would be the lasfc to say it. ' Of course, in all adaptation of new improvements in tactics ~or strategy, regard must bo had to national temperament- Of two methods, both good in themselves, one ifray be more congenial to the French. ' character and the other to the English* A wise commander, in either army, will | act accordingly, aiming rather at bali ance or correspondence than at identity |of practice. But every improvement of j method, every form of dexterity newly I acquired in either army, is eommuniI cated to the other. To that extent the two armies are oin 1 . For people at home this fact is somci times a little obscured by our national | habit of self-depreciation. Wo always ; find it a little difficult to believe that we can be acting sensibly. It wouid be a mistake to let this modest disposition go so far as to underrate the equal, generous, and seit-nostponing comradeship of the French armv and our own in what may be called thei research work of war and in the skilful application of its results. The simultaneous recent reduction in both armies of the rate of casualties sustained, in proportion to military advantage secured, is the best proof that, the brains of each army are doing their share.