RUSSIA'S ROLE.

Press, Volume L, Issue 15034, 31 July 1914, Page 8

RUSSIA'S ROLE.

COULD GERMANY DEFEAT

FRANCE QUICKLY?

PROBLEMS IN HIGH STRATEGY

The following are extracts from an article in the ''National Review" on 'Russia's Role iv a European War," by Earl Percy, who has made a study of the European situation and its ■■""litary strategy : — ■' ■. "Germany, beinp situated in f frA -*y. trai position between two relies on her ability to crush France'first: and then to concentrate her total>iMSsflable strength against Russia. Jt is allMr.portant for Germany to cteieat France in ihe shortest possible timo. She has, therefore, made every arrangement for carrying out a great outflanking and enveloping movement by utilising Belgian and possibly Swiss territory, which. i» successful, will deal a l>!mv so ovorwhfclmiug' ill.'it further resistance will be impracticable. It is doubtful v.heliior Russia would, in that ccse. continue tho struggle against tho united forces of Germany and Austria, and if Great Britain refused to a,jike peace the occupation of Holland nnd Belgium by Germany, and the utilisation of every harbour in the North Sea. Chan.iel, and Bay of Biscay, as a base to attack British commerce and food-supplies, would, it is honed, soon induce her to come to terms.

BRITISH HELP. "It will thus be seen that this first gieat'battle "' lll !) e of supreme iinport-at-ce. For France, tho great question 'a how much assistance can sho look for from Russia and Great Britain for this first battle, which will take place about the seventeenth day after the order for mobilisation has been issued? The British Navy cannot affect the situation. The British Expeditionary Force consists of six divisions. It could, no doubt, ht: mobilised and placed in the held within tho required time, but its numbers and its actual value in the lino of battle, will be seriously affected dv a disproportionate number of reservists, unused t» marching, and lacking training in musketry, by a general shortage of horses, and by a very defective transport syst-OM. Their rifles will bo inferior to the German, and their artillery training inferior to tho French, and they will possess no great general who- has ever commanded 30,000 men, even in peace manoeuvres. The material .support they will bring is, therefore. greatly discounted in France; the most hopeful estimate of their numbers, that of General Langlois, is 100,000 men; other estimates are far less, but in spite of this tho moral effect they will exercise will undoubtedly bo very great, and there is no doubt that French officers place great reliance on British support on thoir north-western frontier.

RUSSIAN DISPOSITIONS. "So much for Great Britain. Let us now turn to' Russia and see first what help sho can givo to Franco in resisting ibis first and. all-important attack, and next,. what effect she can havo if. tho Fronch are successful in resistsing and prolonging the struggle "If sho cannot bolp, Franco within seventeen days it is plain that sho is of littlo value to her ally, for a few British divisions will certainly not give tho numbers required to equalise the opposing forces. The only possible ir.ca.iis, therefore,, of "assisting her ally, ah the beginning of a war, is to keep as' many German troops as possible on -tho Polish frontier and prevent them from affecting the issue in tho west. Before the Russo-Japanese "VNar, by far the greater "part of the Russian army was concentrated along the German and Austrian frontiers and in tho fortresses of Novo-Gcorgewski, Warsaw, and Ivangorod on tho -Vistula, supported by tho entrenched camp ot. Brest-Litowski on the Rug- .-'lheseform tho famous Polish "Triangle, Tho concentration of these enormous masses of troops in so advanced and isolated a position .was considered necessary because- tbe reinforcement ot the frontier garrisons, owing to the enormous distances and the defective railway system, must bo exceedingly slow, and therefore necessitated the maintenance of a force which would be self-contained and capable of making a protracted resistance against a sudden offensive, and' even of taking the offensive itself if occasion required it. indeed the distribution of the Russian troops was undoubtedly made primarily with.a view to offensive -action.. "Since the war in Manchuria the Russians have realised that neither their mobility nor their offensive power is sufficient to justify the hopo of assuming with any clianco of success an immediate offensive against the combined forces of Germany and Austria. Instead, a feeling pf anxiety has arisen as-to whether their garrisons in Poland will not fall victims to the quicker mobilisation and greater readiness of the two Western Powers, which may crush them by a concentric and simultaneous advance from north and south before reinforcements can arrive. "In addition to those considerations, the massing of troops in Poland proved most inconvenient during the war in tho Far East., and would i do so again if the Government should require to employ them elsewhere, while the destruction of Russian sea-power has rendered tho authorities extremely apprehensive as to a. landing of German troops on the coast of the Gulf of 1 inland, not to mention the passubUity ot a German fleet threatening St. .Petersburg Itself if, it had onco gained command of the Baltic. Tho danger of shcli a lauding, which would outflank the Polish defences, and also the far greater danger of an Austrian annv outflanking them from the south and striking at Kioff, thereby dealing a blow at the heart of the Empire, has i been keenly felt, and has occasioned <an entire change their policy with I regard to national defence.

THE NEW POLICY. "This new policy accords with Russian traditions and with tho geographical conditions of the country. A nation which subdued the two greatest conquerors of modem times —Charles XII. and Napoleon—by luriug their enfeebled armies into the heart of barren wastes, and then either overwhelming them or consigning them to the tender mercies of tho Russian winter, a nation wh<~>--» <-rr battles, such as Zorndorf, Borodino, havo be- '•' T ith awful slanghter, •id, it must bo adv lack of tactical 'not perhaps look J Aho light which th \traditions ot regtj i t> either organisaand the pro|fe m un . "i General s latf lt ►co *t tiie hi a ' o{ inmost portion o/i a block l surround? 'two 1 —ma» .id on 1 ..a terri- 1 -, of Aus- j of Rus- I ts lack of poor qual-j N -t marshes ration of ■»—the

Empire—would mean the abandonment at tho outset of all the natural defences of the country. It was, thereto) c. '..-cH'-vi that preliminary concentration of the Russian masses should tako place on the line of two rivers, the Dwina and Dnieper, represented by the three main points —Dunaburg, Witebsfc, and Kieff."

Earl Percy says that this drawing in or the Russian lines has caused uneasiness in France, but he thinks the move a wise one. Germany has nothing to fear from an immediate invasion in foice by Russia on the outbreak ot war. But Russia maintains a very strong ccvalrv force in Poland, and handled with boldness, these troops might raid Germany's cistern provinces and produce such .-in effect that the German Government would be compelled to weaken tho forces on the French frontier. In "he meantime, behind tho Russian cavalry, the main weight of the Russian armies would be pushing on, and by. the thirty-fourth or thirty-fifth day Germany might see her territory invaded by no less than thirteen army corps. Summing up, Earl Percy calculates tint up to the twentieth day ot the war Franco would have to rely mainly on the moral effect of the Russian *\iva'rv and rln+ hv the thirtieth day the situation vi Germany would bo very serious if Germany had not by iWI. time .'iifiictcd a en shing defeat on Fit-nee.