The Press. WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1908 THE FRONTIER WAR.

Press, Volume LXIV, Issue 13108, 6 May 1908, Page 8

The Press. WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1908 THE FRONTIER WAR.

The statement of the London "Times" as to the Ameer's connection with the pi eseritj trouble on the Indian frontier is decidedly disquieting, the mare co, as it chimes in with a suspicion that has been "Jα the air" for a week past. Peehawar reports ten days ago Btated that arms and ammunition manufactured in Afghanistan were being sold openly at Jellalabad, near tho Indian frontier, that quantities had been purchased by. the tribesmen who vrere joining the Mohmande, and that tho food supply of the latter was largely procured fiom Afghan territory. At that time the attitude of the Ameer seemed friendly enough. He was reported to have forbidden the Sufi Mullah to preach a "holy war" against tho British, and his brother, tho Afghan Com-mander-in-Chief, was said t*> havo ordered tho recall of those Afghan soldiers who had joined the belligerent tribesmen. "The Times," which has exceptional eotrrcee of information, on Indian as on all foreign matters, now declares in effect that tho Ameer has been playing a double game over since tho present trouble began, that tho Afghans assisting tho Mohmands are the first reserve of the Afghan army, and that Afghan officials are actively helping tho fanatic Mullahs, on whom resta the blamo of every tribal ris- :„-->£ - - -■- ■ -~

ing, in an organised invasion of Britiah territory.

It is difficult to understand, if this is trne, "why the Ameer should thus almost openly ski© with the Mohmands. He has never been on. quite euch good terms with the British Government a£ ' was h* 3 father, and there has been more than a suspicion that he has gained too Jnigh an opinion of bis power and importance, bat he has arways spoken fair -words, and his own. interests, which are, after alB, the dctenmkiing factor iai every Afghan ruler's conduct, would seem to depend on hde acting in loyalty and good faith towards Engla-nd. One is forced to believe that there is something in the assertion that he is fomenting the frontier trouble because of pique at being ignored in the •n-egotriatiione between England and" Russia last year. By tiho convention wiuich was then arrived at by the two Powers, Grea* Britain dec]aired that she had no intention of disturbing the "status quo" in Afghanistan, and promised to exercise her influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, wihilo Russia bound herself to recognise Afghanistan* aa outside her sphere of influence, to conduct all her political relations with the Ameer tihrouigh the British Govermmenit, and to send no agenta into Afghanistan. Both Powers further declared their adherence to tiae .principle of equality of commercial opportunity in the country. Why the Ameer should tafce offence art. not boing consulted with regard to a convention which simply assured his independence hae yet to be learned.

It is, however, with the effect of hia anger (Pa*her than with its cairoe that tho British Government bas at present to deal. If he is supporting tho unruly tribesmen the Mohmand rising must be recognised as more important that it would otherwise be. Had he remained even neutral, that tribe ■would have been ,redoced to submission probably as quickly as were the Zakfka Khels, in fact there were evident signs that 'before the Afghans themselves came irtto the fray, the " wolves of the Abassaa" were seeking peace. The faot tbdil €ney rose at all will inevitably lead to a revival of the much discussed question of our frontier policy. Some ten years ago, on Lord Chrrzon's initiative, Great Britain abandoned: what was knowoi aa -the "forward policy"—that is, she has refused to occupy territory beyond the administrative frontier agreed upon witih the Ameer. • Beyond tlrat frontier is another marking the limits of her political influence, and it is,with the .wild- tribes occupying the country iying •between these- two boundaries that all the trouble has occurred. A ■largo party, including probably tmcet military men, hold that "this territory should bo effectively occupied', and! the frontier tribes absorbed. Under the Iprosent arrangement tihe latter are gractioaSly , independent, so long as they patrol and keep open the passes and main roads, for which they are paid subsidies. These are withheld when the tribes break out, and a punitive expedition is -then sent to. punish them. The "forward! policy" party term this a "raid , «amd scuttle" policy, and a military officer of considerable experience on the frontier tibue describes in the "ATgue" ite working: " The British Army goes out and gives "one tribe a hammering for having ''committed offences. Tho tribe says "that it will be good in future, and " the British force Tetania to India. "Then the next tribe, which had been " waiting and watching developments, " sees that the British have gone back, " and thinks it will have a chip in. "The British force then has to come "back again and) hammer the second " tribe. After that a third 1 tribe takes " a turn, and ©o the thing goes on." It is contended that the present trouble would never have arisen if the force that quashed tho ZaTska Khel rising had not been withdrawn so hurriedly. Aβ it was, tho Mohmands, who have all ifche Paithaii love of war, came to the assistance of the Zakka Khel juet too late, but tho evacuation! of the coun/try by the British troops encouraged them to start raiding on their own account. There are obvious disadvantages to the present policy, for *he process of keeping tho tribes in order seems never-ending. But the "forward policy" could only be carried out at the risk of exciting tho active hostility of the Ameer, and possibly of precipitating a war in which he would have tno keen support of the Moslem tribes, and perhaps of the millions of Moslems in British India. A war with Afghanistan alone would be a tedious and costly affair, but of its final result there can be no doubt; a war with the forces of Islam om both sides of the frontier would be a very different matter, with possibilities so vast that they may well induce British statesmen to persevere with a policy which, if not wholly satisfactory, is at least tolerably safe.