The Press. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1908. THE TRUTH ABOUT GORDON.

Press, Volume LXIV, Issue 13102, 29 April 1908, Page 6

The Press. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1908. THE TRUTH ABOUT GORDON.

TW most; striking figure in- the history of modern Egypt *& that strange compound of eairut,- eoldier, and visionary,' General Gordon. In> Lord Cromer's recently-publieihed volumes on "Modern Egypt," vre get for the first time the truth about \ Gordon, as nearly, perhaps, as tre shall ever get it. It is a sad sbory, mainly- of incompetence on the port of Mr Giladstono'e Government. It shows that Gordon was tihe .last man who should have been chosen for such, a mission to Khartoum. It reveals many weaknesses dmt one who ■was a demi-god va the popular esteem, and yet it leaves him at ttio end o choice and noble spirit, one whom the world wiH ever account one of Uβ greatest heroes! Lord Cromer does not urge that after the destruction, of Hicks'e army ia tihe Soudan in 1883 the English Government were wrong in advising tihe Egyptian Government to abandon tJhe Soudan, It was'evident that it was simply impossible for them to keep it- The agitation of tihe "Pall Mall Gazette" was mainly responsible for the decision to send , Gordon- to Khartoum to bring aßout its evacuation by the Egyptian garrison. . Lord Gromer,. when consulted, twice rejected the propose} to send Gordon Hβ did so mainly because Ihe thought Gordon was personally unfit to carry out eueh a task, but in ibis official correspondence he dwelt mainly on the objections entertained by the Egyptian Government, which were reasonable, and, he thought, calculated to produce an impression in London, without bringing am the awkward question of personal fitness. ' Popular clamour continued, and Lord Cromer being appealed to a third time, gave a qualified approval. In a private telegram to lord Gra-nvfflo ho said: "Gordon "wouid be tihe best man if he will " pledge himself to carry out the policy "of withdrawing from tie Soudan, as " quickly as possible consistently with " saving life. He must also fully understand that he must take his in"structdons from the British repre- " sentativo in Egypt and report to " him." When it was announced that Gordon was to go, ihis appointment was applauded enthusiastically by the Press ail over the country. Lord Cromer was reproaolrcd for having ?too tardily discovered that Gordon "was the best man," and'the Government were sharply criticised for not having utilised his services at a-n earlier date. Lord Oromer now bitterly regrets that he did not reject tbo proposal a third tinw when it was submitted to him. Two" points are now, to his mind, clear. The first js that no Englishman should have sent to Ebartoum. The second isVthat if anyone had to bo sent, General Gordon was not tlio right man to send.

"Why Gordon, preat and noble ns ;fcras his character in many reepects, Skm xtosaibod for such a difficult and

<lan.ge.rous mission, is abundantly clear from Lord Cromctf'e splendidly liioid ami imparttaJ narrative. To say that Gordon "svas impulsive and erratic is to pub it Tory mildly. Ho wns flighty, almost to tho verge of mental instability. Lord Cromer used to α-ecearo fomo twenty or thirty telegrams in the cour«> of tiio day tvlkmi Gordon was at Kluirtouin. t-hoso in the won 111,2 ofuui giving opinions Which it was impossible to reconcile witli others L!e.s>pa.tched dmring the day. Although he ivas sent to earn - out the policy which. he himself had suggested, namely, tlia-t of evacuation, ac soon as he gob to t>he Soudan, 'ho proposed several widely different policies, eomo of them naturally contradictory. At one time ho ivo-nt to treat with tho Mahdi, and .made him Emir of Kordofan; in the next breath. Hie Hisi&t<*l that tho Mehdi must be 'smashed up." Ixjrd Cromer, -with univea-ried patience ond calm, sober judgment usodj in his ccnimnniicationa to the Home Government, to insist thx'it there was generally a lino of oommon-senso running througltout Gordon's suggestions, and it> ■woUld be a nii&taike to a.tetaoh too iriich importance to their wording. But if Gordon's comTnaiiuicaiions wore erratic, it is infinitely moro painful to read of the pitiable (helplessness and vacillation of the Govonunemt at Home, blown a ,r l>cait by ©very passing gust of public opinion. Wiheii-

over an emergency arose which necGiEsLta.ted prompt action, ifaey sent. out for reports ■which it would take weeks to prepare—on one occasion, at least, when tho information was already in their own bluo books. Their crowning infamy —wo can ueo no other word—was tho delay which took place in sending tho relief expedition when it became evident that an attempt must be made to rescue Gordon and his gallant companion, Colonel Stewart, and that thero was no other way of achieving this result-. Lord cromer says that there can a doubt that if the decision to send tho expedition had been taken in April or May, instead of in August, its objects would havo beem attained. But, at a time when Gordon and Stewart were beleagured in a remote African iywn. by hordes of warlike savages who were half-mad with fanaticism and elated at their recent successes, -Mr Glad--stono wanted furthor proofs that tho British officers wore really in danger. As Lord Cromer says, tho facts 6poko for themselves, and General Gordon, in a passage of hie "Journal," which would be humorous if it were not pathetic, himself described Mr Gladstone's attitude in the following cuttang terms:—"lt is," he wrote on September 23rd, "as if a man on the " bank, having seen bis friend m the "river already bdbbed down two or " three times, hails, 'I say, old fellow, ■'_" let ue know when we are to throw " the life-buoy; I know you have " *bobbed down two or three times, but " 'it is a pity to throw you the life'"bnoy until you are really in ex- " 'tremie, , and I want to know exactly, "for I am a man brought up in> a " school of exactitude."

Tlie key to Gordon's contradictory policies when he got to the Soudan is to be found in the fact that be was above all things a fighter, and, therefore, could not Wing himself to work heartily in the interests of peace. Be longed to "smash the Mahdi," or at any rate "to frivo the Arabs one good "defeat," as he admitted, "to wipe "out Hicks's disasters and defeats." And he died a soldier's death. Wβ know of nothing ' more moving in all; history than the story of ,tho last days of Khartoum and the manner in which this soldicrmaTtyr met his end. "Hordes of savage " fanatics," says Lord Cromer, "surged " around him. Shot and shell poured "into the town which he was defend- " ing against fearful odds. Starvation " stared him in the face. The soldiers " 'had to eat dogs, donkeys, skins of " 'animals, gum and palm fibre, and " 'famine prevailed. The soldiers stood "'ontho fortifications like pieces or " Svood. The civilians,were even worse " 'off. Many died of hunger, and " 'corpses filled the streets—no one had "'even the energy to bury them!' "Treachery and internal dissension " threatened him from within, whilst a "waste of burning African desert sepa- " rated him from the outward help "which his countrymen, albeit tardily, " were straining every nerve to afford. " 'All the anxiety he had undergone " 'had gradually turned his hair to sii- " Very white.' . 'Yet, , said an eyo- " witness, 'in spite of all the danger " *by which* he was surrounded, Gor- " 'don Pasha had no fear.'" His end showed that this was no idlo boast. "When the Dervishes stormed the town and broke into the palace, Gordon stood in front of the entrance to his office. He had on a white uniform. His sword was girt around him, but he did not draw it. Ho carried a revolver in his right hand, but he disdained to use it. One of the Dervishes dashed forward with a curse— "0 cursed one, your time is come!"— and plunged his spear into his body. Gordon, it is said, made a motion ot scorn with his right hand and turned bis back, when he received another spear wound which caused him to fall forward, and was most likely his mortal wound. Then his foes' cut and slashed at his body with their swords, and as Lord Cromer r.says: '\Foul creatures "wore not wanting to kiclc the dead "lion." Bordeini lipy testifies:—"lsaw " Gordon's head exposed in Omdur- " man. It was fixed between the " branches of a tree, and all who passed " by threw stonea at it." Gordon was no politician, no diplomatist. But, as a man of strong and simple faith, who laid tlown his life in the pursuit otftha.t ho believed to be his duty, his

r-amo will ever shine, emblazoned in letters of gold, go long as the British nation is in existenco and has not lost tho love of valour.