A BOOTMAKER'S CASE.

Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10536, 23 December 1899, Page 3

A BOOTMAKER'S CASE.

IMPORTANT RULING. The Arbitration Court satin tbe Provincial Council Chamber* yesterday mon_uig. t Hi* Honour gave judgment in the case for breach of an. industrial agreement against A. F- Tcomer, brought by the Bootmakers' Union, in which the Court heard legal argument on Tuesday last. His Honour said that three objection* urbre taken by counsel for the defendant. First, that the agreement relied upon had not been executed by the No. '2 Federated B.ot Trade Industrial Atsochticii of W-.rlri.h. which was madi »» -iy t» :-. ■ ' as it was contended, was not binding upon the other paity, uiu _.__..u..u., «.... _...„....„ it Second, that: tj« provisioiu ot stex-i.ii. o of the Act of 1838, under which Act the proceeding was taken, had not beeh'complied witn, 'Ihird, that the proceedings could only be taken by the Industrial Association of Workmen, which waa the party to.,,the agreement, where it appeared that tfie pro-\ eetdiDga had been initiated by the local onion, Which was tt branch of the Association. .He did not think it necessary to expn_! any concluded opinion upon the first objection, but the inclination ox his opinion was that it was not tenable. The second objection was one of the greatest importance, ss it applied not only to the present case, bat also to a. number of others token by soother union, and now before the Court, and the question was also one of very general application. It was admitted by counsel for the Workmen's Association that the provisions of section 5 oi the Act of 189 d had not bee;, complied witb, but it waa contended that these proceedings did not apply to a prat-ceding to enforce the provisions of an itodnstrlal u#reement. His Honour quoted sections 5 and 8, pointing out that the former required a resolution of a specially summoned meeting of an association or trade union, before any industrial dispute could be referred for settlement to a board, or any application made to the Court for enforcement of an award. Section 8 laid down that for the purpose of enforcing any award or order of the Court, whether made before or after the coming into operation of the Act, certain provisions should apply, anything in the principal Act to the contrary notwithstanding. Tlie rest of these provisions said thai i& so far as the award itself directed the payment of money, it should be deemed to be an order 'of ,the Court, and payment should be enforced under the subsequent provisions of the section relative to orders of tbe Court. Provision 2 waa as follows: —"If any party or person on whom the award is binding commits any breach thereof by act or default, then, subject to the provisions of tlie lost preceding sub-section hereof, any party to the award may, by application in the prescribed form, apply to tli9 Court for the enforcement of the award." It was clear that sub-section 2 of section 8, although it made no reference to section 6, and purported, without any qualification, to enable any party to tlie award to apply to the Court for the enforcement of tho award, must be read as subject to this - ci:alification, that no such party, being an industrial association, industrial union, or trad© union, might so apply, except in pursuance of a resolution passed at a meeting as prescribed by section 5. The provision of section 5 must, therefore, be reid into section 8, as proviso to sub-section 2of that section. These provisions would v more appropriately have found their place aa a proviso to sub-section 2 of section 8 than in a separate section, but the effect appeared to him to be the same. Section 9 gave the Court jurisdiction to deal with industrial agreements. It. appeared to him that in providing that the provisions of section 8 should apply to proceedings to enforce ap industrial agreement, as if such an agreement were an award oi the Court, the whole of the provisions of section 8, including not only what was expressed therein, bnt also what mutt necessarily be read into it, were made applicable to proceedings to enforce an industrial agreement. This, lie thought, was clearly the intention of the Legislature. The object of section 5 was to prevent the governing bodies of the workers' unions ; .pressing,upon-the employers in respect to matters which the common . sense of the majority of their members might tfiink it expedient to overlook. This object waa wholesome and rational, and the reasons for its adoption applied with equal force to applications to enforce" industrial agreements as to applications to enforce awards. It was to be regretted that more care had not been taken to express the intention of the Legislature, but he thought it" appeared sufficiently from the provisions to which he hud referred. There waa little excuse for tbe disregard on the part of the union of the provisions of section 5 of the Act of 18S& Very shortly after the Act came into force Ins Honour had directed the various Clerks of Awards not to file, such applications until the union applying" had filed a statutory declaration setting out in the words of section 5 that the application had been made pursuant of a resolution passed as thereby required. His Honour had been under the impression that the necessity for making this declaration would have called the attention of the officers of the Unions to the necessity of complying with th© provisions of section 5, but this expectation Kid been disappointed. • The officers of the Unions bad made the declaration required with a. somewhat remarkable disregard of facts, 'but the requirements of the section were rarely fulfilled. The third objection , was also, in his opinion, fatal. The application was made in the name of the New Zealand Federated Bootmakers' Union, which he understood to be the name of the local Union, and it was made by the officers of the local Union. After the proceedings had been begun by the local Union, it appeared that a resolution was passed by a ."-,. meeting of the Council of the New Zealand Federated Boot Trade Association, purporting to empower the local Union to institute "y proceedings, but the resolution could not ~ render the proceedings already taken in the V>,'\ tMm m & on hehalf of the local Union, the "';'.,' proceedings of the Association. Such a .?'/, resolution could not affect the validity of lie the proceedings in the form and manner in g;, which they had been taken. An application ;ff to enforce an award or agreement could, nnder * ' sub-section 2 of section 8 of the Act, orfy be A, made by a party to it; the local Union Vv: ?_-* not a P art y to the agreement sought to be enforced, and the proceedings must fail, t therefore, on this ground also. The test was •v.,'. """hether, on the present application, an order ■ . , co -ld bo made under sub-section 3 of ccc- -,. tion 8 against the Federated Association for * payment of the corta incurred in the pro- ;, ceding*. It was properly admitted by conniel that such an order could not be made, ? and this disposed of the question. ; Mr Harper applied for costs. ; ' His Honour said the merits of the case had . *_ot bean considered. The Court was declining jurisdiction, and he did not think it had power to give costs. He pointed out that there was undoubtedly a breach erf the award which would certainly have to be visited with -•-_-.„._ a punishment of some sort or another. Mr 1.. Tooroer had been guilty of a wrong not only fX; _> his employees, but his fellow-employers, 4"t hy employing men at leas than the minimum £ih '?*•"*• - He "would certainly not rive costs gff v the proceedings were dropped as augJested by Mr Kippenberger. I j? • Mr Kippenberger undertook as far as poafc. sible to prevent further proceedings in rej< t • faction to the case before the Court. * Bis Honour therefore refused costs.