THE PHILIPPINES AND CUBA.

Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10267, 9 February 1899, Page 4

THE PHILIPPINES AND CUBA.

There have not been wanting abundant evidences that America would be obliged,; to show the iron hand before the of the Philippines would return to peaceful industry, and leave their political destiny in the hands of others. They have burst into open rebellion, and by this time, no doubt, have begun to realise what a different foe from the Spaniard they now have. Sharp and decisive deferft at the outset, is what every friend of peace would wish for tho rebels. The mass of the islanders are too ignorant to be aware of the hopelessness of a struggle with the United States, or of the impossibility of absolute independence, or of the advantages likely to arise from American protection. It is but natural for both Cubans and Filipinos to exhibit the usual weaknesses of insular tribes. They cannot realise the paralysing effect that naval disaster has \ipon land forces. They possibly believe that they themselves defeated the Spaniards, and that the Americans just stepped in in time to take the credit. { They have little doubt that? Americans I are equally selfish, stupid, and tyrannical ! with the Spanish, and that it is therefore necessary, and, to such braves, perfectly easy, to nip American ambition in the bud. Of course, there is a difference between the proposed relations of Cuba and those of the Philippines to America. Cuba is not aunexedf She is to become an indopendent Republic. But the extent of the independence may be gathered from two ! facts; first, that America proposed, and very rightly too, to pacify the island, to destroy, if need be, the military autocracy of the patriot leaders, and to direct— President MeKinley's own words—the people to form a Government; the other fact is, that the Cuban patriots, while resenting American restraint, have coolly demanded American dollars by way of pay, thus admitting that it was America's business. The great Republic has risen to the occasion, and paid three million dollars. Tliese things point clearly towards a veiled protectorate. The United States have spent their blood and treasure to save Cuba from anarchy and her commerce from annihilation, and they may therefore well insist upon a thorough completion of their task. America will not endure a second Hay'ti, nor can she tolerate long and frequent struggles for the Presidency between armed guerilla leaders. She does not wish to add Cuba to the number of the States in the Union, for that would introduce a new lowgrade influence into her own domestic affairs. But her position thei-e, like Britain's in Egypt, must continually nearer and nearer to <3£>vereignty. Every serious disturbance in the island will tighten the grip of the strong neighbour, and every advance in education made by the islanders will be but a further qualification for citizenship in the United States. The Philippines are further away' and less civilised, and there is, therefore, loss reason in their case for middle courses. They can be annexed without creating any very obvious necessity for tendering their citizensliip. They are not to be subject to tho tariff of tho United States, nor will the duties favour any nation. This amoimts to annexation without Statehood. A- protecteu independence would be very difficult and dangerous, because of the intrigues which the various Powers would be sure to carry on with ambitious patriots contending for power. As to independence, pure andl simple, it would bo impossible. Should America withdraw-to-morrow, other nations would step and scramble for the islands, endangering* the peace of the world. This the Filipinos are too ignorant or too conceited to realise, and they are demanding an independence which it is impossible to give them. General Otis and his troops may have some hard marching and much suffering from the climate before them, but when it is found that the Americans both govern better and fight better than the Spaniards, the trouble should subside.