The Press. MONDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1895. THE EVIDENCE FURTHER AMENDMENT ACT, 1895.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 9300, 30 December 1895, Page 4

The Press. MONDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1895. THE EVIDENCE FURTHER AMENDMENT ACT, 1895.

One of the useful measures of last session—and we are afraid there are not so very many of them—is the Evidence Further Amendment Act. The third and fourth clauses provide for a simple procedure for bringing up as a witness in any proceedings a person who is suffering a term of imprisonment, and whose evidence is required before the Court. Hitherto it has been necessary in such a case to proceed by writ of habeas corpus. Provision is made for requiring the party who wants the evidence to pay the expense of bringing the prisoner to the Court. The second part of the Act refers only to evidence in cases for the breach of any enactment relating to Customs duties, the sale of intoxicating liquor, distillation, or beer duty. In such cases any person may be required to be examined, and no person can be excused from answering questions on the ground that his evidence may incriminate him. If he refuses to answer he is deemed to be a witness appearing under subpoena and refusing without lawful cause to be sworn or give evidence. On the other hand, if such a person is examined and by his answer makes a true and faithful discovery of all matters as to which he is so examined he may receive a certificate to that effect from the Judge and is then freed from all prosecutions and penalties. By another clause confessions to ministers shall not be divulged without the consent of the person alleged to have made the confession. Ministers, of course, means ministers of religion, not Cabinet Ministers, who, we presume, are not often the recipients of interesting confessions. So also communications to doctors are not to be divulged without the consent of the patients making them unless the sanity of the patient be the matter in dispute. But these provisions are not intended to protect communications made for a criminal purpose, nor are they intended to limit the right of a doctor to give evidence of any statement made to him in or about the effecting by any person of an insurance on his life. The next part of the Act will, we believe, be of great value in diminishing the powers needlessly to annoy witnesses on cross-examination which have hitherto been possessed by barristers, and which are sometimes abused, but only we are glad to think by the cowardly bullies of the profession ; of whom, as far as we are aware, there are not many specimens in Christchurch, if, indeed, there are any. The rights of counsel in crossexamination have been too wide and have often been used so as to inflict great torture upon people who have" bad some sorrow or trouble or failing

which they are unwilling to speak of in opan Court, and the discussion of which is really in no way relevant to the issues to be tried. Doubtless highminded lawyers refrain from inflicting pain and misery even upon people who have much in their past careers which deserves censure. But unfortunatoly all lawyers are not high-minded, and many are not gentlemen in the best sense of that word. It is therefore desirable that their powers of insulting and annoying witnesses on cross-examination should be much curtailed, as they are by this measure. This new Act, accordingly prescribes that if any question put to a witness on cross-examination rolates to a matter not relevant to the proceeding except in so far as it affeots the credit of the witness by injuring his character, the Court shall decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and may warn the witness that he is not obliged to answer it. In exercising this discretion the Act prescribes that the Court shall have regard to the following considerations—lst. Such questions are proper if they are of such a nature that the truth of the imputation conveyed by them would seriously affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testified. 2nd. They are improper if the imputation which they convey relates to matters so remote in time or of such a character that the truth of the imputation would not affect or would affect in a alight degree only the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testified. 3rd. They are.improper if there is a great disproportion between the importance of the witness's character and the importance of his evidence. Another clause enables the Court to forbid any questions which it regards as indecent or scandalous, although they may have some bearing on the questions before the Court, unless they relate to facts in issue or to matters necessary to be known in order to determine whether or not the facts in issue existed. Another section empowers the Court to forbid any question which appears to it to be intended to insult or annoy, or which, though proper in itself, appears to the Court needlessly offensive in form. Further, it is made contempt of Court to publish any of .these prohibited questions. There are two other important provisions relating to criminal classes. One of these is to the effect that, when there is a question of whether some person administered poison or procured it to be administered, evidence tending to prove that the accused had been guilty of the same crime whether to the same, or another person, at the same time, or at some other time, shall be relevant to the general issue of guilty or not guilty, and admissible both for proving the administration of the poison and fbr the purpose of proving the intept. It will be romembared that it was because evidence was admitted in a celebrated poisoning case in this colony of a character similar to the evidence now made admissible by this section that the conviction was quashed in the Court of Appeal." Such evidence of previous poisoning?. or attempts to poison was then inadmissible. The other provision is to the effect that no confession tendered in. evidence is to be rejected on the ground that a promise or threat has been held out to the person confessing unless the Judge or other presiding officer is of opinion that the inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made.