ENGLAND'S WEAKNESS.

Press, Volume LI, Issue 8727, 24 February 1894, Page 7

ENGLAND'S WEAKNESS.

THE NAVAL DEFENCE QUESTION. [VROM OUR 9PEOIAL CORRESPONDENT.] LONDON, Januarys. Althougli the Government refused, and perhaps not unreasonably, to have their "hand forced" with regard to naval strengthening, they have evidently taken alarm at the warmth, depth, and width of the feeling expressed that increased. naval power was imperative, and substantial additions to England's fighting fotce by sea have already been quietly put in hand. The news, has, however, leaked out, and general satis/action is expressed that Ministers have recognised the necessity of augmenting the naval strength which their Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer had declared to be equal to s.ll possible require* inents. The personal recantation of the latter, and the practical recantation by the Government as a whole, have greatly com forted those who beheld in imagination a Franco-Russian fleet dominating the high seas where Britain's flag once ruled supreme. Bat it cannot be questioned that the peril which menaces English supremacy— maritime and commercial —is very real and tangible. A hostile combination against England is admittedly " one of the probabilities of the near future." Aα one writer puts it:—" it is now felt that - the European explosion, when ib eventually comes, is quite aa likely to find ita line of least resistance on the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the Indian frontiers, as on the Rhine and the Vistula. In other words, the Dual Alliance, instead of renning its head against German bayonets, may prefer to try conclusions with r -England ; and nobody would raise * finger to help ue." Soreness bas long exisced on the part of the Triple Alliance that Eoglaod will not oast in her lob definitely—offensively and defensively—with the three Powers, and so, by bringing the needed naval strength, render the combination virtually irresistible and impregnable, and thus practically making war an improbability if not an impossibility. Hence neither Germany, Anstrl* nor Italy would be at all eorry to see England get a slap in the face from the Dual Alliance. . ■' ■■ Even non-alarmistr recognise that the situation is of some anxiety. EocUnd is confessedly isolated. If Franco and Russia should take it into their heads to be suddenly nasty —to assail England's ascendancy in Egypt and Afghanistan simultaneously, &nd at the same time have a try at the British posseesions io the Mediterranean and at Britain* colonies in various parts of the world, to say nothing of & possible attempt at invading England itself, what could we do ? That is what thoughtful people are.asking themselves. How could we possibly defend so long a line without allies or even " benevolently neutral" friends? And suppose, at the same time, the United States took a fancy to Canada? What would come of it all? Suoh reflections make one pensive. The answer ie not an ea«y due. Nor can the possibilities indicated be deemed far-fetched. It is notorious that France wants Egypt and Russia India. At all event* France and Russia want to get England oat of Egypt, and may at any time «uw the British occupation of that country as a pretext for hostile action. ' The conditions would be more favourable to them than would be the case should a. general election teplace the Conservatives in power, aa ia commonly expected. Mr Gladstone's tenderness . toward* Russia and his dislike of the Triple Alliance, both are well known. Lord Roaebery*B strong hand at the Foreign Office is reckoned as a factor on the other side, but Lord Salisbury is the British Statesman .of whom the Continental Power* stand mott in awe. A proposal is now being discussed on paper that an ad valorem tax of 2 per cent, should be levied on all British sea-borne commerce, and the proceeds applied solely an ! exeluBively to the Navy, thus reli«vi «it the general taxation by fully £15,000,000 per annum, and giving shippers and merchants the almost absolute certainty that no three foreign Powers in', combination oould keep the seas against Great Britain if war were declared, while to commerce the additional impost would be virtually in nc*ciab4e.