THE RETREAT OF BOURBAKI TO SWITZERLAND.

Press, Volume XVIII, Issue 2490, 24 April 1871, Page 3

THE RETREAT OF BOURBAKI TO SWITZERLAND.

[From the European Mail.~\ A note has been communicated by the Government at Bordeaux, which points out tho disastrous efleets of tho armistice on the fortunes of the Army jof the Fast, and explains how BourI baki was compelled to enter Swiss territory. It says:—"At the very moment when the Convention of January 28 was notified to the Delegate Government, a double stragetical movement was taking place. On ono side the Army of tho East was operating, while on the other Geueral Garibaldi, who had received reinforcements numbering 50,000 men, commenced a diversion in force in the roar of the enemy, advancing towards Dole and the forest of Chana. Had this movement ended as successfully as it began, tho Prussian troops might have been placed in a very critical position between two fires. On February 2, tho army of tho East suspended its operations, and tho army of General Garibaldi halted within three kilometres of Dole, which had been almost completely evacuated by the enemy. During tho two following days, while the French generals wero negotiating with the enemy to clear up what seemed to be a mitU'ideretanding, the enemy continued to advance, sending considerable reinforcements against Garibaldi, occupied important positions, and rendered it impossible, for tbe French army to pursue tlio original plan. When the full text of the armistice became known, General Garibaldi was obliged to evacuate Dijon and to fall hack on Macon, aud the army of the East was compelled to enter Swiss territory, wi h the exception of the 24-th Corps, forming the left wing, which succeeded in escaping the pursuit of the euemy." The Bund published a letter from the Franco-Swiss frontier, dated January 28, which gives some particulars of the retreat of Bourbaki's army. " Tho retreat," says the writer. " was carried on along a sin-Trie road, which was covered with sheet ice, so that the horses could not keep their footing. One may easily imagine tho confusion which resulted Men and horses suffered terribly from tho cold. A third of the troops had frostbitten feet. Owing to incomprehensible negligence the Prussians were allowed to restore the bridges at L'lsle, Clerval, and Beaume-les-Daines. Tho consequence was that the army was intercepted in the rear and flunk, and shut up between theDoubsand tbeSwiss frontier. Some of the divisions, cut off from the line of retreat on Besangon, were driven into tho mountains. General Convagnie's division drew back on Morteau, and thence towards Pontarlier. On January 27, while I was at Morteau, General Castella arrived with his adjutant and escort, followed by remnants of the army, which he had saved after an unsuccessful encounter at Pont-aux-Moulins. It waa stated that he was directed, with scarcely 3000 men, to take a position held by 25,000 Prussians. The French officer told mc that General Castella formed the extreme covering detachment of Bourbaki's army, and that he guarded the retreat from Arcy to Clerval with rare energy. Castella has advanced further towards Pontarlior. All the troops which are marching through have a melancholy appearance. They give the impression of wanting a few dayß* absolute rest if they are again to take the field. Poop France is in a very pad plight." Berne received 20,000 men, Zurich 11,000, Argovie 8800, Captain de Vaud 8000, Saint Gall 7000, and other places in proportion, the whole force interned numbering 84,900. Switzerland will not suffer financially through the internment of the French army, as the amount of French war material iv the hands of the Confederation, consists of over 100 guns and mitrailleuses and 80,000 rifles. A correspondent, writing on February 4, says —" The retreat of Bourbaki's army southward was made under disastrous circumstances. The enemy —an indefatigable enemy—harassed them on all sides, allowing them not a day, not an hour, to rest from their fatigues or to reform their disordered ranks. Heads of hostile columns debouched on every side—in the rear, on the flank, and in front, to cut off their line of retreat and to intercept their communications. All issues were closed up at once j they marched and slept, or rather watched, surrounded by dangers. Every moment an alarm was given; they, had to fight, to dispute foot by foot a village or a house: then in place of halting to take breath, to march and march again, leaving behind them a long line of killed, wounded, and sick. And all this without food, almost without ammunition, above all without that hope of victory which sustains such great privations. They arrived thus in less than twelve days from Clerval, Blamout, Pont de Eoide, and Hippolyte, as far as Morteau and Pontralier, but a few leagues from the Swiss frontier. If they had entertained any hope of returning to France by passing along the Swiss frontier, to take the road from Bourg by Lons le Saulnier, or that that from Gex la Faneille, they were obliged to abandon it, for every road to the north, south, or west, was occupied by the indefatigable cavalry of the enemy, behind which were strong columns of infantry, supported by formidable field artillery. On January 28 the 2nd Corps d'Armee (Poraerarians), recently arrived from Paris, under the command of General Franseky, captured a train of waggons near Nozeroy, 30 kilometres southwest of Pontarlier." On that day the French army was completely surrounded by the army of General Manteuffel and the Swiss frontier,'